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Summary 
This doctoral dissertation is composed of three essays and it is submitted to the Department 
of Finance at the Norwegian School of Economics, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for 
the Doctor of Philosophy degree. The essays empirically investigate the following three issues: 
first, the reaction of the bond markets to the introduction of the bail-in scheme in the European 
banking system; second, the impact of the product market competition on profitability and on 
leverage; third, the effect of the U.S. Capital Purchase Program on banks’ capital, lending and 
payout ratios. I provide a short summary of these three essays in the following. 
  
 
Impact of Bail-in on Banks’ Bond Yields and Market Discipline 
The bail-in scheme is a mechanism that limits the involvement of taxpayers during banks’ 
restructurings by limiting the possibility of equity and unsecured debt to access the rescue plans 
set up by governments in favor of distressed banks. In order to solve the crisis of several Spanish 
banks, in 2012, the top European authorities have reached the agreement about the 
institutionalization of the bail-in, while the final European level approval of the related Bank 
Recovery and Resolution Directive occurring in 2014.  
My research investigates the main events concerning the introduction of the bail-in regulation 
by analyzing both the legislative process and the impositions of bail-in on specific distressed banks. 
I test if these heterogeneous and staggered events - which indicate a modified commitment of 
authorities towards the bail-in principle - induced the market participants to reprice existing bank 
bonds in a way that reflects an increased expectation of bail-in.  
The empirical methodology elected for this test is a difference-in-differences framework that 
compares the yields of unsecured bonds with the ones of secured bonds, as the distinctive 
characteristic of a credible bail-in regulation is that it “make(s) the bail-in debt de facto junior to 
debt not subject to bail”, which rises the cost of unsecured bonds (i.e., bailinable), compared to 
secured ones (i.e., non-bailinable) bonds.1 I illustrate that positive (negative) indications of 
                                                            
1 See Chan-Lau and Oura (2016). 
4 
 
commitment increased (reduced) the difference in yield spread between unsecured and secured 
bonds. 
Further analyses suggest that these results are not driven by the possible generalized distress 
that may be generated by the bail-in impositions. In fact, placebo tests show that the bail-in 
impositions do not affect the cost difference between bonds with different exposures to defaults 
but belonging to the same category of bailinable bonds. 
This research also introduces in the literature a study of the impact of bail-in on the market 
discipline. A set of triple-differencing tests document an increase of the correlation between a 
bank’s risk and the yields of its securities. This result suggests that bail-in events increased 
investors’ incentives to incorporate a bank’s risk while pricing its securities, corroborating an 
improvement of the market discipline.  
 
Competition, Profitability and Leverage. How Did Norwegian 
Firms React to China’s Exports Shocks? 
The established evidence of a negative profitability-leverage relation, according to Fama and 
French (2002), represents a critical discrepancy between the static Trade-Off Theory (TOT) and 
its empirical assessment. This discrepancy has been addressed both through a theoretical revision 
of the static TOT and through an empirical revision of its tests.  
The trade-off dynamic inaction theory has revised the static TOT, for example, by 
acknowledging the presence of adjustment costs towards the equilibrium leverage. With this 
framework, the dynamic trade-off theory clarifies that the evidence of a negative profitability-
leverage relation does not contradict the trade-off theory. 
On the other hand, concerning the empirical revision of the static TOT’s test, Xu (2012) 
emphasizes that an enhancement of the identification strategy is sufficient to solve the discrepancy. 
Xu (2012)’s intuition is that, since the predictions of TOT involve the expected profitability (rather 
than the lagged realized profitability normally used in the TOT’s tests), better proxies of expected 
profitability are supposed to improve the TOT’s tests. As new proxy for the expected profitability 
of domestic U.S. firms, Xu (2012) adopts the import competition, namely the product market 
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competition exerted by foreign producers against domestic U.S. firms. The use of this proxy builds 
on the evidence that import competition deteriorates profitability. By finding a positive relation 
between leverage and expected profitability, which corroborates the static TOT, Xu (2012) 
contrasts the conclusions of Fama and French (2002).  
My paper contributes to the investigations about the profitability-leverage relation by nesting 
and extending these two revisions. It tests the static and dynamic trade-off theories by employing 
a measure of profitability that emphasizes the expectations of profitability, and it also tackles the 
endogeneity concerns of the previous empirical analyses. 
Using the “double instrumental variable” approach (Becker and Woessman (2009)), the first 
stage predicts the exogenous competition from China where the instrument is the Chinese exports 
towards rich countries (Acemoglu et al. (2015)); the second stage predicts the decrease of 
Norwegian firms’ profitability that is explained by the increases of exogenous competition from 
China; the third stage investigates how leverage reacts to the predicted profitability.  
Concerning the tests of the static TOT, I find that profitability reduces leverage by decreasing 
assets while maintaining debt stable. Moreover, tests of the dynamic TOT illustrate a negative 
profitability-leverage relation at non-refinancing points, which corroborates the dynamic TOT. 
Nevertheless, I also find insignificant profitability-leverage relation at refinancing points, which 
does not corroborate the dynamic TOT. 
 
Impact of the Capital Purchase Program on the Capital Ratio 
of U.S. Banks 
Introduced in October 2008, the U.S. Capital Purchase Program (CPP) allowed the Treasury 
to acquire at a subsidized price preferred equity issued by U.S. banks, with a maximum possible 
expenditure of $250 billion. The original primary objective of this capital injection was to promote 
the capitalization of financial institutions. 
This paper illustrates that the CPP has succeeded in increasing the capitalization by 
stimulating the equity issuances of the banks that had access to the program. I analyze this effect 
by means of a difference-in-differences approach, after illustrating that the parallel trend 
assumption is satisfied.  
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In addition, the paper shows that modifications of the payout or investment policies do not 
attenuate or reinforce the increase in capitalization. These results are robust to the implementation 
of an instrumental variable approach. In addition, I show that not only the preferred equity, but 
also the common equity has increased in response to the preferred equity infusions. 
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Impact of Bail-in on Banks’ Bond Yields and 
Market Discipline 
Raffaele Giuliana* 
July 7, 2017 
 
Abstract 
The bail-in mechanism limits government’s assistance to banks by restricting the access 
of equity and unsecured debt to rescue plans in favor of banks. I analyze the salient events 
regarding both the legislative process and the impositions of bail-in on specific distressed banks; 
I test if these indications of authorities’ commitment towards the bail-in principle were credible 
enough to induce a repricing of existing bonds that reflects increased expectations of bail-in. 
Heterogeneous and staggered difference-in-differences tests illustrate that positive (negative) 
indications of commitment increased (reduced) the difference in yield between unsecured (i.e., 
bailinable) and secured (i.e., non-bailinable) bonds. Placebo tests suggest that the possible 
banking distresses induced by bail-in impositions do not drive these results. In fact, the bail-in 
does not affect the cost difference between bonds with the same bailinable status and different 
exposure to distress. A triple-differencing framework suggests that bail-in events increased 
investors’ incentives to incorporate a bank’s risk while pricing its securities, in line with an 
improvement of market discipline.  
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1. Introduction 
During the European sovereign debt crisis, in the attempt to reduce the involvement of 
taxpayers into exceptionally expensive assistance programs for banks and in order to incentivize 
investors to consider the risk-taking of a specific bank while pricing its securities, European 
policymakers have deeply amended the regulatory framework for the resolution of distressed 
financial institutions. 
Acknowledging its vast scope, authors like Philippon and Salord (2017),  Hadjiemmanuil 
(2015) or Cappiello (2015) have even recognized this legal reform as a “regime shift” for the 
European banking system, in particular for the fact that it institutionalizes the principle of the 
bail-in. Contained in the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD), the bail-in mechanism 
allows authorities to identify banks that are “failing or likely to fail” and, before the default and 
before any injection of public funds, to allocate a bank’s losses to its unsecured (bailinable) debt 
and equity, while maintaining its secured (non-bailinable) debt intact. 2,3 Thus, the fundamental 
principle of the bail-in coexists with the possibility to support a distressed bank with public capital; 
however, the mechanism institutes strong legal constraints on public capital injections by 
subordinating them to the imposition of losses on a bank’s investors. 
In the context of this fundamental legal reform of banks’ debt, this empirical research assesses 
for the first time (to the best of my knowledge) how tradable debt securities have reacted to the 
introduction of the bail-in mechanism. In particular, employing an event study in line with 
Acharya et al. (2016), I examine the effects of a set of “bail-in events” that includes the relevant 
steps regarding not only the legislative process (e.g., the approval of BRRD) but also the decisions 
of authorities to impose a bail-in on specific distressed banks (e.g., Bankia or Bank of Cyprus). 
                                                            
2 Concerning the notion of “failing or likely to fail”, Hadjiemmanuil (2017) describes fours triggers: first, 
balance-sheet insolvency; second, inability to repay debts and other liabilities when they fall due; third, a 
breach of regulatory requirements that is enough to motivate the withdrawal of the bank’s authorization; 
fourth, the bank’s need for “extraordinary public financial support” (BRRD, Art. 32(4)). 
3 Hadjiemmanuil (2015) describes the decision process for the imposition of the bail-in on specific distressed 
banks. The authorities participating to this process are the national and European banking supervisory 
authorities (European and national central banks) and political authorities (European Commission and 
national Finance Ministers). 
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This paper addresses two main questions. The first enquiry contributes to the discussion about 
the credibility of the new regime by testing whether and in which cases the bail-in events have 
induced market participants to adjust bond yields in a way that reflects an increased expectation 
of bail-in (Philippon and Salord (2017) Hadjiemmanuil (2015) Walter and White (2014), Cœuré 
(2015)). I illustrate that my results are driven by the legal specificity of the bail-in rather than by 
the possible deterioration of the financial stability that could coincide with (or result from) 
impositions of bail-ins. The second question is whether the bail-in events have increased the 
incentives of investors to consider a bank’s risk while pricing its securities. This result would 
corroborate an increase of the market discipline, which is the main objective of the bail-in 
(Goodhart and Avgouleas (2014), Cœuré (2015), Philippon and Salord (2017), Hadjiemmanuil 
(2015)). 
Concerning the first question, it is frequently argued that the bail-in regulation has a severe 
problem of credibility. The theory of Walter and White (2014) shows that the bail-in regulation 
is not credible because, given that authorities have large discretion in imposing bail-ins, they will 
avoid to mandate them in order to prevent bank runs. Hadjiemmanuil (2015) identifies the vast 
political discretion about the decision to mandate bail-ins as the critical determinant of the lack 
of credibility. Philippon and Salord (2017) list the credibility as the first “key challenge” for the 
bail-in regime because the BRRD gives authorities the right to impose the bail-in mechanism with 
very wide flexibility. They argue that the authorities need to further promote the credibility among 
market participants, for instance, by “seizing the opportunity” and deciding to impose this scheme 
on distressed financial institutions. Though destabilizing, these decisions represent the essential 
indications of authorities’ commitment towards the bail-in that are supposed to progressively 
update markets’ beliefs about the possibility of bail-ins for distressed banks.4 
This paper examines whether the “bail-in events”, which describe authorities’ commitment 
to the bail-in, can modify the credibility of the bail-in. Specifically, my analyses investigate whether 
the events have altered bondholders beliefs in a way that has produced a repricing that follows 
                                                            
4 Political institutions, in particular, have to bear large short-term costs in response to the imposition of 
bail-ins. For instance, the Financial Times explains that the Italian bail-in case in 2015 has “illustrated the 
severe loss of political capital imposed by retail losses”. 
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the theoretical predictions about the bail-in’s introduction, which are illustrated by Chan-Lau and 
Oura (2016). Thus, I measure if the bail-in events have increased the yield spread between 
unsecured bonds and secured bonds, as the distinctive characteristic of a credible bail-in regulation 
is that it “make(s) the bail-in debt de facto junior to debt not subject to bail”, which rises the 
cost of unsecured bonds, compared to secured ones.5 To visualize this increase in the cost difference 
between unsecured and secured bonds, Figure 1 provides an example. The graph illustrates the 
reaction of existing bonds to the bail-in event represented by the restructuring, in 2012, of a group 
of Spanish banks (Bankia, the third largest Spanish institutions, was the most prominent one 
among them).6 In particular, Panel A in Figure 1 depicts the national daily averages of the yields 
of unsecured and secured bonds issued by Italian banks.7 The plot indicates that, in the seven days 
before the event, the yield difference appears stable while, in response to the event, the difference 
exhibits a rapid positive reaction, after which, the spread remains steady in the subsequent seven 
days. 
With a difference-in-differences approach (also referred to as Diff-in-Diff or D-D), I compare 
the reaction to the bail-in events of existing bailinable - unsecured - bonds with the reaction of 
existing non-bailinable - secured - bonds. I document that the yield spread between bailinable and 
non-bailinable instruments grows significantly - both statistically and economically - on the dates 
representing an increase of authorities’ commitment to the bail-in regime. Interestingly, evidence 
illustrates that this yield spread decreases in the cases in which authorities display large flexibility 
in the application of the bail-in principle, as in the EU Commission’s permission for a state aid 
(without bail-in provisions) in favor of the Italian bank Monte dei Paschi di Siena (MPS) or in 
the unconstitutionality verdict regarding the bail-in of the Austrian institution Hypo Alpe. 
                                                            
5 See Chan-Lau and Oura (2016). 
6 This bail-in case is considered by Hadjiemmanuil (2015) as the crucial determinant for the inauguration of 
the project of the European “banking union”. As such, this case is the first realization of the principles 
ratified in the EU Commission’s proposal 280/2012, the official document that initiated the path of the 
banking union and that represents the strong political agreement behind the union (the document was 
approved by the ECB, Finance Ministers of the Eurozone (Eurogroup), the European Council and the 
European Commission). 
7 Figure 2 shows the reaction of the yield spreads of Italian, Spanish, French, British, Austrian and German 
institutions. 
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This paper recognizes that this change in the yield spread might have an alternative 
interpretation. For instance, the difference-in-differences estimates might be attributable to a 
generalized banking instability rather than to the legal specificity of the bail-in reform, which 
introduces a divergence between two specific categories of bonds, namely between unsecured and 
secured. In fact, it is conceivable that the yield spread between unsecured and secured bonds is 
not determined by the fact that unsecured bonds are bailinable while secured bonds are non-
bailinable but, rather, by the fact that they are junior to the secured bonds. This lower seniority 
may be the determinant of the stronger reaction of the unsecured bonds to bail-ins and, specifically, 
to the possible generalized increase in default probability resulting from bail-ins. 
My empirical methodology addresses this alternative interpretation in two ways. First, 
placebo tests suggest that the fact that unsecured bonds are junior to secured ones is not the driver 
of the main difference-in-difference’s results. Specifically, I compare the yields of two subcategories 
of bonds that are both bailinable but one of the subcategories is junior to the other one and, 
consequently more exposed to possible distresses induced by bail-ins. The tests illustrate that, in 
response to bail-in events, the reaction of the cost difference between these two subcategories of 
bonds is insignificant, suggesting that the level of exposure to distress - proxied by seniority - is 
not per se a crucial driver. The example illustrated in Panel B of Figure 1 provides the graphical 
intuition behind this test. The figure depicts the national daily averages of the yields of junior 
unsecured and senior unsecured bonds issued by Italian banks, which are both bailinable. We 
notice that these two subcategories of bailinable debt do not react differently to the event even 
though one is junior to the other.  
Second, I show that the spread between bailinable and non-bailinable bonds reacts also to 
events that do not produce a significant increase in banks’ risk like, for instance, the events linked 
to the legislative process of the BRRD (Schafer et al. (2016)). This evidence corroborates the idea 
that the shock on the yield spread is not necessarily the consequence of a wide financial instability. 
Concerning the second main hypothesis, about the market discipline, the primary objective 
of the bail-in is to reinforce creditors’ incentives to take into account the risk of a specific bank 
while pricing its securities, thereby making more expensive the debt of banks with more risk-
taking. Goodhart and Avgouleas (2014) and Gleeson (2012) predict that this attenuation of the 
“creditor inertia” is possible because the banking reform warns bondholders about the possibility 
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of orderly resolutions for the distressed banks; by virtue of the bail-in, these resolutions might be 
credibly realizable since it purportedly safeguards banks’ going concern by minimizing the risk of 
systemic adverse disruptions that may, instead, result from complete liquidations. 
Numerous authors (e.g., Acharya et al. (2016), Sironi (2003), Flannery and Sorescu (1996)) 
measure the increase of the market discipline with the increase of the risk premium component of 
banks’ bond yields, which - in turn - has been proxied by the correlation of a bank’s yield spread 
and its bank-specific default probability. In line with this literature, I investigate the impact of 
the bail-in events on market discipline by testing whether the correlation between a bank’s yield 
spread and its bank-specific default probability is higher after the occurrence of the event, 
compared to before, with a measure of default probability calculated by Bloomberg.8 In line with 
the triple-differencing model employed by Acharya et al. (2016) to study market discipline, this 
time-series growth of the correlation between yield spread and bank risk is measured by regressing 
the yields on the triple interaction comprehending the bank’s default probability, the dummy 
variable for the occurrence of the events and the dummy variable for the bailinable status of the 
bond. The results of this triple-differencing approach illustrate that the bail-in legislation and its 
impositions increase the yield-risk correlation of bond yield spread, which corroborates an increase 
of the market discipline. 
The sets of countries, banks and bail-in events feature a large heterogeneity and, by analyzing 
how the yield spread reactions are associated with the heterogeneity within these sets, the paper 
can establish some empirical regularities that contribute to the discussion about bail-in’s 
consequences (Philippon and Salord (2017), Hadjiemmanuil (2015)). 
For instance, I show that the events reflecting decisions and commitment of domestic 
authorities generally produce a bond repricing only for domestic banks. On the other hand, events 
resulting from negotiations between national and supranational authorities, by reflecting the 
commitment of authorities that is informative also for bail-ins in other countries, generate a bond 
repricing not only for banks in the country that has been the most directly affected by the bail-in 
                                                            
8 The daily measure of bank-specific default probability is the Bloomberg’s 1-year default probability. It is 
a comprehensive measure of default probability that uses the following nine bank-specific and time-varying 
inputs: CDS spread, the volatility of the stock price, the net income, non-performing loans, market-to-book 
ratio, total assets, short-term leverage, long-term leverage and loan losses reserves. 
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event, but also for banks in other countries. In addition, I illustrate that the impact of the bail-in 
has been stronger in countries with smaller fiscal capacity and for medium-large banks, while the 
effect has been smaller for the very large institutions. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 1 discusses the related literature; Section 
2 presents the dataset, the timeline of the events and the descriptive statistics; Section 3 illustrates 
the models and the results relative to the difference-in-differences and the placebo difference-in-
differences approaches; Section 4 presents the model and the results relative to the triple-
differencing approach for the study of the market discipline; Section 5 provides some robustness 
checks; Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Related Literature 
In very recent years, authors have started to contribute to a comprehensive empirical 
assessment of the bail-in regulation. The study of Conlon and Cotter (2014) describes which classes 
of security holders would have been impaired the most if the bail-in framework had been 
retrospectively applied during the European banking distress cases from 2008 to 2012. Their results 
show that holders of equity and subordinated bonds would have been the main losers from the 500 
billion euro losses of the failed European banks. Beck et al. (2017) illustrates, with a quasi-natural 
experiment, that the bail-in of Banco Espirito Santo (BES) significantly deteriorated the credit 
supply for the non-financial firms receiving funding from banks that were exposed to the bail-in 
of BES; however, these firms were able to compensate this credit contraction with the funding 
from other institutions. Schafer et al. (2016) show that the impositions of bail-in on specific banks 
produced higher CDS spreads and lower stock prices, particularly for the countries with low fiscal 
capacity. They also show that the events relative to the legislative process of the bail-in do not 
generally have a significant impact on banks’ CDS spreads. Their research is related to Neuberg 
et al. (2016) who use the CDS premium to extract the market-implied probability of government 
support, though not in an event study methodology. 
My paper contributes to this literature in some respects. First, it introduces an event study 
investigating the reaction of different types of bonds featuring different levels of exposure towards 
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the risk of bail-in. This characteristic allows the analysis of the yield spread between bailinable 
and non-bailinable bonds, which - combined with the implementation of an event study framework 
- is apt to measure the effects of authorities’ decisions on market expectations about the bail-in. 
Second, since the change in yield spread might be potentially motivated by the mere fact that 
secured bonds are senior to unsecured ones, I illustrate by means of placebo tests that the seniority 
per se is not a driver of the yield spread’s increase in response to the approvals or the impositions 
of the bail-in. Third, while previous research has studied the CDS premium, I examine the reaction 
of the bond yields. The analysis of the bond yields allows to study a noticeably larger and more 
heterogeneous set of banks by including also banks that are not reference entities of any CDS 
contract. Moreover, the analysis of the bonds provides a more direct description of the effect of 
the bail-in on the banks’ balance sheets (Arce et al. (2011)), which is the typical dimension of 
interest for regulators in the discussions concerning the consequences of the bail-in (Visco (2015), 
Cœuré (2015))9. Fourth, to enhance the identification of the commitment to the bail-in as the 
driver of bonds’ repricing, I use a difference-in-difference approach with heterogeneous and 
staggered events, which allows a better control for confounding factors linked to bank-specific 
time-varying characteristics or to macroeconomic dynamics. Fifth, by investigating bail-in’s effect 
on investors’ incentives to incorporate a bank’s risk while pricing its bonds, I test whether the 
reform has succeeded in increasing the market discipline, which is its primary objective. 
A vast literature investigates banks’ market discipline, though without examining the bail-in 
framework. Authors have measured the market discipline by means of the correlation between 
subordinated bonds prices or yields and banks’ risk measures. Among them, Covitz et al. (2004), 
Jagtiani et al. (2002), DeYoung et al. (2001), Calomiris (1999) and Flannery (1998)) show that 
funding costs depend on banks’ risk, but this relation might be insignificant for too-big-to-fail 
institutions and in periods of particular regulatory forbearance. 
Other contributions focus on the question of whether the events related to the alteration of 
the government support can modify the yields-risk relationship, which is typically used as a proxy 
                                                            
9 Numerous authors (Trapp (2009), Nashikkar et al. (2008), Bai and Collin-Dufresne (2013), Klingler and 
Lando (2015)) describe the existence of a stable difference between CDS spreads and bond spreads. Klingler 
and Lando (2015) even show that the relation between CDS spreads and bond spreads might be negative 
for the reference entities that have highly safe and liquid bonds. 
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for market discipline. Flannery and Sorescu (1996) show that, in the period after the bail-out of 
Continental Illinois (1984) and before the approval of the FDIC Improvement Act (1991), yield 
spreads were not reflecting the issuing bank’s risk. Sironi (2003) shows that governments can alter 
the yield-risk relation by illustrating that the relation strengthens after the restrictions on public 
expenditures and on national monetary policies. Also Acharya et al. (2016), Santos (2014), Araten 
and Turner (2013), Baker and McArthur (2009) indicate that the higher government support in 
favor of the too-big-to-fail banks generates a lower yield and a lower market discipline. 
This paper is related also to the literature examining the costs of specific resolution 
frameworks for financial institutions (Mishkin (1999), Freixas (1999), Eckbo (2010)) and to non-
financial firms (Ang and Mauck (2011), Eckbo and Thorburn (2008), Cowenberg and Lubben 
(2011)). In addition, this work contributes to the literature analyzing the impact of banking 
regulatory events on the market expectations (e.g., Wagster (1996), Mamun et al. (2004), Yildirim 
et al. (2006), Armstrong et al. (2010), Bhat et al. (2011), Kolasinski (2011) Georgescu (2014), 
Bruno et al. (2015)). 
 
3. Data 
From Bloomberg, I select the bonds issued by Italian, Spanish, French, British, Austrian and 
German firms with a final maturity later than January 1, 2012, and earlier than January 1, 2016. 
I select only the bonds relative to the banking industry, and then I drop the observations without 
data about yield to maturity or 1-year default probability. With this sample selection procedure, 
I compose a dataset with 4,868 bonds for Italy, 541 for Spain, 3,050 for U.K., 10,433 for Germany, 
2,001 for Austria and 2,863 for France. Each bank’s name is manually assigned to the respective 
Bloomberg ticker. 
Employing the same procedure used by the bond market event studies of Ederington et al. 
(2015) and Bessembinder et al. (2009), per each date and each bank this paper creates 
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representative bonds.10 Specifically, I create a representative non-bailinable bond whose daily yield 
(and time-to-maturity) is the value-weighted average of the yields (and time-to-maturity) of all 
the active secured bonds. The weight of each secured bond depends on its value at issuance (where 
the sum of the weights of all active secured bonds for each bank is equal to one). This 
representative non-bailinable bond summarizes the information about “secured”, “senior secured” 
and “asset backed” bonds.11 
Analogously, I create a representative bailinable bond whose daily yield (and time-to-
maturity) is the value-weighted average of the yields (and time-to-maturity) of all the active 
unsecured bonds. 
This representative bailinable bond summarizes the information about “senior unsecured”, 
“unsecured”, “senior subordinated”, “subordinated” and “junior subordinated” bonds. With this 
procedure, each financial institution has its pair of representative yields, although a subset of 
banks does not have contemporaneously both types of representative bonds.12 
The final sample is composed of 30 Italian, 13 Spanish, 104 British, 65 German, 25 Austrian 
and 45 French financial institutions and a total of 37,262 bond-day observations analyzed in the 
days relative to the 19 bail-in events. 
 
3.1 Information About Events 
In line with previous studies about markets’ reactions to the introduction of new banking 
reforms (e.g., Yildirim et al. (2006), Schafer et al. (2016), Acharya et al. (2016)), I compose the 
events’ list by scanning official documents produced by competent authorities as well as the press 
reports; in particular, this paper has scanned the national parliaments’ gazettes, the European 
                                                            
10 The difference with the methodology of Ederington et al. (2015) and Bessembinder et al. (2009) is the fact 
that my research creates, per each bank and each date, two representative bonds, rather than one: a 
representative non-bailinable bond and a representative bailinable bond. 
11 The information about the seniority is provided by Bloomberg’s “payment rank”.  
12 However, as shown by the evidence relative to model (3), the results of the sample composed of banks 
with both categories of bonds are very similar to the results regarding the full sample. 
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Commission’s press releases and all the Bloomberg’s headlines from June 2012 to December 2015.13 
I have manually collected information regarding a set of 19 events containing all the bail-in cases 
of Bloomberg’s headlines, the BRRD national transpositions of the countries in the sample and 
the cases of exceptions to the bail-in mechanism.14 When I identify in the Bloomberg’s headlines 
an article regarding cases of bail-in, I scrutinize as well the related articles provided by the “News” 
section of the Bloomberg terminal (which contains the articles from several journals (e.g., 
Bloomberg News, Financial Times, Wall Street Journal)); this scrutiny is intended to ascertain 
the specific timing of the event. The timeline of Appendix I chronologically lists the 19 bail-in 
events analyzed in this study, while Appendix II provides the description of each event. 
 
3.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 illustrates the descriptive statistics concerning the total assets, time to maturity and 
the bailinable status variable. We can notice that the bailinable bonds represent the 71% of the 
sample.  
                                                            
13 This paper investigates the cases of bail-in from June 2012 because the path for the introduction of the 
bail-in and the wider project of the European “banking union” have been inaugurated in June 2012 (EU 
Commission Memorandum 280/2012 proposes the bail-in, and EU Commission Memorandum-12-413 
proposes the “banking union”). Indeed, Hadjiemmanuil (2015) recognizes that the profound distress of 
important Spanish banks (May 2012) has convinced the EU leaders that a stable and persistent agreement 
was necessary to address resolutions like Bankia’s one. Although before 2014 the bail-in and the “banking 
union” were not yet codified into detailed laws, the solid accord behind the EU Commission Memorandum 
280/2012 (involving Finance Ministers of the Eurozone, European Council, ECB and European Commission) 
created a vast and very persuasive political agreement that has managed to create the preconditions for the 
application of the bail-in principles in several banking resolutions. 
14 The bail-in cases described by the Bloomberg headlines are identified by employing Bloomberg’s search 
engine “Avanced news editor”. Searching through “All media sources”, I filter the news by using the string 
“bail-in”&“europe” in the “Banking” section of the database. The bail-in cases are not altered if I use the 
strings “bail-in”&“europe”&“bank” or “bail-in” and “bank”. The paper includes the transpositions regarding 
the six EU countries analyzed in this paper excluding the British and German national approvals because 
they were redundant given that their national banking systems introduced the bail-in scheme before the 
European BRRD (2014) and before the EU Commission document 280/2012. 
The prerequisite of the presence in Bloomberg’s headlines represents a convenient threshold for defining the 
relevant bail-in cases. 
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Figure 3 depicts the time series of the monthly average yields of the bailinable and non-
bailinable bonds. The time window starts from June 2012 and ends in January 2016. Both groups 
of yields show a general downward trend, but it seems clear that, in the middle of the year 2012, 
the difference between the yields increased sharply. This period may be related to the bail-in of 
Bankia (and other Spanish institutions). Another increase in yield spread takes place in 2014 and 
it might be presumably related to the approval of the BRRD. However, we should stress the idea 
that Figure 1 offers only a visual description of two unconditional monthly means and therefore 
we need to further investigate the yields with an appropriate statistical test, with a set of control 
variables and by differentiating across countries. 
 
4. First Hypothesis: Bail-in’s Expectations  
The first hypothesis of this paper is that authorities’ indications of commitment to the bail-
in scheme have induced market participants to adjust bond yields in a way that reflects an 
increased expectation of bail-in. I test this hypothesis by measuring if the positive (negative) 
indications of commitment amplified (reduced) the difference in yield between existing unsecured 
and secured bonds. I gauge the impact of the bail-in events on the yield spread between unsecured 
and secured bonds because the characteristic feature of the bail-in is that it makes the former 
junior to the latter, thereby increasing their difference in costs (Chan-Lau and Oura (2016)).  
The method elected for this analysis is a difference-in-differences estimation where the 
bailinable instruments represent the treated group, and the non-bailinable instruments are 
assumed to be the control group. The fact that the yield of the secured bonds might decline in 
response to the bail-in events is not a concern for my identification strategy because I am 
investigating the causal impact of the indications of commitment on the yield spread between 
unsecured and secured bonds.15 The regression model is: 
𝑦𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛼𝑗 + 𝛽1 ൈ 𝑏𝑙𝑛𝑖𝑗 ൈ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿1 ൈ 𝑏𝑙𝑛𝑖𝑗 + 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑡 + 𝛿2 ൈ 𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡                        (1) 
                                                            
15 Unreported tables show that the bail-in events decreased the cost of non-bailinable debt.  
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The subscripts ݅, ݆ and ݐ refer to the bailinable status, the bank and the day, respectively. 
Thus, the units of observation relative to all the regressions performed using model (1) are the 
yields relative to a specific representative bond, a specific bank and a specific day. The bond-
specific bailinable status is 𝑏𝑙𝑛. It is valued zero if the bond is non-bailinable (“secured”, “senior 
secured”, “asset backed”) and one if the bond is bailinable (“senior unsecured”, “unsecured”, 
“senior subordinated”, “subordinated” and “junior subordinated”). 
The date-specific time dummy is 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡. It takes the value of zero in the seven days before the 
event and one in the day of the event.16 The day fixed effect is 𝑑𝑎𝑦. It captures all the time-varying 
macroeconomic factors.17 The time to maturity of the bond is 𝑡𝑡𝑚. The bank fixed effects ߙ௝ controls 
for bank-specific and time-invariant (within the event window) components in the bailinable and 
non-bailinable bond yield.18  
The estimator of interest, ߚଵ, describes the difference between two differences. The first one 
is the difference between a bailinable bond’s yield on the day of the bail-in event and the respective 
average yield in the seven days before the bail-in event. The second one is the difference between 
a non-bailinable bond’s yield on the day of the bail-in event and the respective average yield in 
the seven days before the bail-in event. This event study methodology is based on a constant yield 
model similar to the one used by Acharya at al. (2016).  
                                                            
16 The fact that the time dummy is valued 1 in the day of the event is consistent with Schafer et al. (2016). 
In Appendix III, I also use windows of (-7; +2) and the results corroborate the first hypothesis - concerning 
the average yield spread reaction - by showing that the yield spread increases (decreases) in response to 
positive (negative) indications of commitment towards the bail-in. In addition, untabulated regression 
models use windows of (-6; 0), (-8; 0), (-7; +1), and their results are robust. 
17 Results do not change if I substitute the day fixed effect with a set of macro-variables, which are the 
spread of the national 10 years treasury bonds (relative to the German 10 years treasury bonds), the yield 
of national 10 years treasury bonds, the term spread (i.e., the spread between the yield of the national 10 
years treasury bonds and the 6 months treasury bonds) and the price of the national stock market portfolio. 
18 The inclusion of the bank fixed effect is motivated, for instance, by the fact that small banks more likely 
have only bailinable bonds and, given that their small size is correlated with higher bond yields, the estimate 
of the interaction variable - which contains also the variable regarding the bailinable status of the bond - 
might be inconsistent. As a robustness check, I show that the results are consistent when I do not include 
the bank fixed effects. 
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In the tables of results, this paper presents the estimates of ߚଵ (also referred to as the D-D 
estimates). We can expect the estimate of ߚଵ to be positive in response to the events reflecting an 
increase in the authorities’ commitment towards the bail-in principle (e.g., the imposition of the 
bail-in provisions on Bankia or the approval of the BRRD), which are further referred to as the 
“positive bail-in events”. A positive estimate would indicate that the event has induced domestic 
- and often foreign - bond markets’ participants to reprice bond yields in order to incorporate an 
increased expectation of bail-in in cases of resolutions. Symmetrically, I expect the estimate of ߚଵ 
to be negative in response to the events displaying a decreased commitment of authorities towards 
the fundamental bail-in principle, as in the case of EU Commission’s permission for taxpayers’ 
support in favor of the Italian bank Monte dei Paschi di Siena (MPS) or in the pronouncement of 
unconstitutionality regarding the bail-in of the Austrian bank Hypo Alpe. These cases are further 
referred to as the “negative bail-in events”. Column (1) in Table 2 classifies all the events on the 
basis of the positive or negative commitment towards the bail-in scheme. 
To complement the investigations about the first hypothesis, placebo tests address the 
question of whether the estimates of ߚଵ, i.e., the reaction of the yield difference between bailinable 
and non-bailinable bonds, are crucially driven by the fact that bailinable bonds are junior to non-
bailinable ones, rather than by the bailinable status. These regression models essentially replicate 
the previous difference-in-differences models, apart from the fact that they do not compare 
bailinable and non-bailinable bonds. Instead, they compare two subcategories that differ in 
seniority while being both included in the same broad category of bailinable debt. The bail-in rule 
(described by the BRRD (2014) and the EU Commission’s Proposal 280/2012) indicates that the 
secured status of a liability is the relevant characteristic for excluding with certainty an instrument 
from future bail-ins. Therefore, an indication of authorities’ commitment to this rule should not 
significantly affect the yield spread between two subcategories that have different seniorities and 
equal bailinable status. The regression model regarding the placebo tests is the following: 
𝑦𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛼𝑗 + 𝛽2 ൈ 𝑏𝑙𝑛𝑝𝑙𝑐𝑏𝑖𝑗 ൈ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿3 ൈ 𝑏𝑙𝑛𝑝𝑙𝑐𝑏𝑖𝑗 + 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑡 + 𝛿4 ൈ 𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑗𝑡 + ݑ𝑖𝑡               (2) 
The subscripts ݅, ݆ and ݐ refer to the bailinable status, the bank and the day, respectively. 
Thus, the units of observation relative to all regressions performed using model (2) are the yields 
relative to a specific representative bond, to a specific bank and to a specific day. The bond- and 
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bank-specific “placebo bailinable” status is 𝑏𝑙𝑛𝑝𝑙𝑐𝑏. It is valued zero if the representative bond is 
composed of bonds belonging to the subcategory of “senior unsecured” which is a type of senior 
bailinable debt; it is valued one if the representative bond is composed of bonds belonging to all 
other bailinable subcategories, namely “unsecured”, “senior subordinated”, “subordinated” and 
“junior subordinated”. 
A positive 𝛽2 indicates that the indication of commitment to the bail-in regulation increases 
the yield spread of the senior bailinable bonds compared to the junior bailinable bonds. Instead, 
an insignificant 𝛽2 would suggest that the bail-in rule - with its designation of the secured bonds 
as the non-bailinable instruments - is the relevant benchmark for markets’ repricing activity, 
thereby suggesting that seniority per se is not a factor driving the repricing of the bonds. 
 
 
4.1 Aggregated Difference-in-Differences and Placebo Tests 
This sub-section provides a classification of the bail-in events according to whether the events 
reflect a positive or a negative indication of commitment towards the bail-in principle. In addition, 
by performing the regression models (1) and (2) on the aggregate sample that consists of all the 
banks in the six countries described in this research, this sub-section presents the estimates relative 
to the main difference-in-differences and to the placebo tests. This high level of aggregation intends 
to provide an overview of the results, while the focus on lower levels of aggregation characterizing 
next sub-sections allow to investigate the heterogeneity across countries and events and, thus, 
allow to establish a series of empirical regularities. 
The column (1) of Table 2 classifies the 19 events in my sample based on whether an event 
represents an increase or, otherwise, a decrease of the authorities’ commitment towards the bail-
in scheme. The Appendix II describes the context in which the events are collocated. According 
to the first hypothesis, we should observe a positive difference-in-differences estimate for the 
positive events and a negative difference-in-differences estimate for the negative events. In 
addition, concerning the placebo difference-in-differences, we can expect insignificant coefficients 
for all the events, which corroborates the fact that seniority per se does not motivate the repricing 
of the bonds. 
22 
 
Panel A in Table 2 shows the relevant regression outputs from model (1) for the entire sample 
and for each one of the 19 events, where the approach of generating a regression output per each 
event is in line with the event studies of Shafer et al. (2016) and Acharya et al. (2016) and allows 
to verify the extent to which each event is in line with the hypotheses and which are the events 
with the strongest effect. Panel A contains the coefficient of interest 𝛽1 - i.e., the difference-in-
differences estimate - in addition to the number of observations and the adjusted R-squared. While 
the analyses proposed in this subsection serve as an introduction for the subsequent analyses, the 
coefficients already show a pattern that is in line with the first hypothesis. Although some events 
exhibit an insignificant difference-in-differences estimate, the reaction of the yield spread has been 
positive for the cases related to the bail-ins in Cyprus, in Portugal and in Greece and for the EU 
Parliament’s approval of the BRRD. Interestingly, by observing the cases linked to the public 
support of MPS (December 2012) and to the verdict of unconstitutionality for the bail-in of Hypo 
Alpe (August 2015), we notice that the effect of authorities’ actions on bond market’s expectations 
operates also in the opposite direction: when the commitment decreases, the yield spread between 
unsecured and secured bonds reduces.  
We notice that the adjusted R-squared is very high, even in comparison with other event 
studies. With a set of robustness checks, I show that the bank fixed effects are responsible for 
explaining most of the variation of the dependent variable. Indeed, when they are not included, 
the adjusted R-squared declines to approximately 10% (which is in line with other event studies) 
and the results are robust. The reason why the bank fixed effects explain such a large portion of 
the yields variability is due to the tight time window, which makes the fixed effects capture several 
crucial characteristics like the size, capital structure or the risk-taking. 
Panel B illustrates the event-specific outputs of model (2), among which the placebo 
difference-in-differences estimates are of particular interest: the insignificant coefficients for all the 
events corroborates the idea that the fact that unsecured bonds are junior compared to secured 
ones does not explain the yield spread reaction in response to the events. 
 
 
4.2 State-level Difference-in-Differences Tests 
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This sub-section uses the wide heterogeneity provided by the state-level analyses for studying 
with further detail the hypothesis that the bail-in events have induced market participants to 
reprice bonds according to the bail-in scheme. The state-level investigation of such hypothesis 
consists in performing the regression model (1) for each country and each event.  
Additionally, this level of aggregation allow the analysis of the relation between the yield 
spread reaction and two covariates. Although this paper acknowledges that establishing an 
appropriate causal relation between these two covariates and bail-in’s expectations goes beyond 
the scope of this research, these additional analyses allow to establish and discuss two empirical 
regularities that contribute to the debate about bail-in’s effects. 
The first covariate is based on the cross-country heterogeneity resulting from different fiscal 
capacities. A country’s public debt can be correlated with bail-in’s market reaction through several 
mechanism and in different directions. For instance, the banks of a country with small fiscal 
capacity might already have an extremely low probability of public support; thus, the bail-in - a 
policy that limits public supports - might have an impact on bond prices that is weaker in high-
debt countries than in low-debt countries. 
On the other hand, a negative correlation between fiscal capacity and bail-in’s effect might 
arise for the fact that the bail-in regulation does not completely ban all the types of public support 
for banks. Importantly, the public support schemes for banks and the “deviations” from the bail-
in principle remarkably depend on a country’s fiscal capacity. For instance, such dependence may 
take three forms. First, the bail-in regulation allows (with the notion of “precautionary 
recapitalization” under the article 32(4)(d)) to decrease the probability that a bail-in is imposed 
on a distressed bank, by recurring to the national public finances. Second, a larger fiscal capacity 
facilitates the creation of support schemes in favor of the unsophisticated portion of unsecured 
bondholders of bailed-in banks. Third, a government with larger fiscal capacity can more easily 
invest its funds to indirectly support banks by supporting their borrowing firms (e.g., with the 
fiscal policy). In these three examples, the fiscal capacity mitigates bail-in’s effect because it 
weakens the negative impact on unsecured bonds and transfers the costs of this mitigation on the 
public finances thus deteriorating the condition of investors whose securities are secured by a 
national guarantee. 
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The second covariate is based on the heterogeneity across bail-in events. This research 
analyzes a subset of bail-in events - such as the national transpositions of the BRRD or the 
Austrian Parliament’s approval of the bail-in of Hypo Alpe - that directly affects a given country 
and whose specific occurrence involves only domestic authorities and does not reflect decisions of 
European authorities. It is possible to conjecture that the impact on markets’ expectations exerted 
by such type of events is different compared to a second type of events that, requiring negotiations 
with authorities from supranational institutions, provide new information about the commitment 
of these supranational authorities. In particular, this different impact on market’s expectations 
would be linked to the fact that a given supranational authority involved in a bail-in event might 
have a considerable decision power not only about a current bail-in event directly affecting a given 
country, but also in subsequent resolutions affecting banks in other countries. In this context, a 
given bail-in event may inform also about the commitment the supranational authorities will 
exhibit in cases of bank resolutions in countries that might not be the most directly affected by 
the given bail-in event. 
Specifically, this paper distinguishes between events involving supranational authorities and 
events involving only national authorities on the basis of the presence of negotiations (detected in 
the official documents or in the news regarding the events) with the ECB, EU Commission, 
Eurogroup, IMF or EU Parliament. With regard to this classification, Appendix II provides 
information specific to each event. 
 
4.2.1 Results for State-level Difference-in-Differences Tests 
This subsection presents the results of the state-level difference-in-differences, which are 
designed to test the hypothesis postulating a positive difference-in-differences estimate for the 
positive events and a negative difference-in-differences estimate for the negative events. This 
finding would support the notion that markets have adjusted their expectations in a way that 
follows the commitment of the authorities. Column (1), from Table 3 to Table 13, describes the 
dichotomous variable that provides information about whether a specific event is a positive or a 
negative indication of commitment towards the bail-in’s fundamental principle of imposing losses 
on classes of unsecured bondholders before public support. It is labelled as “Commitment”. 
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In addition, this subsection investigates whether bail-in’s repricing is associated with fiscal 
capacity and whether it covaries with the fact that a given event derives from interventions of 
supranational authorities or, alternatively, involves national authorities only. Column (2), from 
Table 3 to Table 13, provides information about the “Authority”: events involving negotiations 
between national and supranational authorities are labelled as “Supranational”, whereas events 
involving national authorities only are labelled as “National”.  
Concerning the fiscal capacity, this subsection investigates whether the repricing produced by 
the bail-in is contingent on the fiscal capacity of a given country. I explore this possible empirical 
regularity regarding countries’ debt-to-GDP and bail-in’s impact by displaying the difference-in-
differences estimates per each country, where the countries are collocated in panels from A to E 
in ascending order according to their debt-to-GDP ratio during the bail-in event.19  
The results of this subsection corroborate the hypothesis that positive (negative) indications 
of commitment generate an increase (decrease) of the yield spread. Concerning the heterogeneity 
across events, evidence suggest that events mandated only by national authorities generate a 
repricing only for the banks headquartered in the country whose domestic authorities have decided 
the bail-in event. On the other hand, events resulting from interventions of supranational 
authorities appear to produce a repricing not only in the country that is the most directly affected 
by the event but in foreign countries, too. Regarding the fiscal capacity, the difference-in-
differences estimates illustrate that the reactions to the events are generally more intense for the 
countries with a higher debt-to-GDP ratio.20  
 
Bail-in of Bankia and other Spanish banks: positive bail-in events 
Table 3 illustrates the estimates of the events related to the distressed Spanish banks in 2012. 
This set of events contain positive bail-in events involving the European authorities. We observe 
                                                            
19 The data about the debt-to-GDP are provided by Eurostat. 
20 I recognize that the fact that the fiscal capacity appears negatively associated with the bail-in’s average 
reaction might be driven by the fact that average bank in states with low debt-to-GDP ratio may be closer 
to distress and hence to bail-in. However, the triple-differencing analyses in Section 5 show that the banks’ 
risk is not the crucial driver of this empirical regularity, given that bail-in’s repricing remains generally 
stronger for high debt countries even when we control for each bank’s risk of default. 
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that the coefficients relative to Spain are always positive and significant, supporting the hypothesis 
that an indication of commitment induces a change in market’s expectations about the bail-in. 
Interestingly, the shock was not confined only to Spanish banks but it positively impacted the 
yield spread relative to French and Italian bank, which is in line with the notion that events 
involving supranational authorities may affect also banks from countries that are not directly 
affected by the bail-in event.21 In addition, we can notice that the states affected by these decisions 
have a relatively high debt-to-GDP. 
 
MPS receives government support without bail-in: negative bail-in events 
Table 4 shows the coefficients relative to the EU Commission’s decision not to impose any 
bail-in provision on MPS in response to the external support provided by the Italian government.22 
This case is classified as a negative bail-in event that involves supranational authorities. We detect 
a negative and significant coefficient for the Italian banks, which corroborates the hypothesis that 
a negative indication of commitment induce market to reduce the yield spread between bailinable 
and non-bailinable bonds. We can notice that the repricing is not limited only to the Italian 
banking system, as illustrated by the negative coefficients regarding French and British banks. 
This effect is coherent with the fact that events resulting from negotiations with supranational 
authorities might generate a change in market expectations that concerns also other countries. 
Moreover, we can observe that the states reacting to this event do not generally have a large fiscal 
capacity. 
 
Bail-in of SNS Reaal, Netherlands: positive bail-in event 
                                                            
21 It is interesting also to notice that the difference-in-differences estimates for German banks exhibit a 
particularly large magnitude, even though they are insignificant in all of the 19 events - except for one - . 
This insignificance is motivated by the particularly large variance of the German yield spread, compared to 
the other countries. 
22 In the weeks before this event, markets participants were contemplating the possibility that bail-in 
provisions could be included in the plan to restructure MPS in response to the acquisition of external 
support. For instance, in late October Moody’s (2012) explains that the unsecured bonds of MPS have to 
be downgraded because it envisages a heightened risk of imposition of mechanisms aiming at allocating 
losses on classes of unsecured bonds, in the eventuality of an external support. 
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Table 5 presents the estimates concerning the bail-in SNS Reaal in response to its 
nationalization. This circumstance is categorized as a positive bail-in event that involves 
supranational authorities. We can notice a significantly positive estimate for the Italian, French 
and British banks, which supports the hypothesis that a positive commitment induces an increase 
in the yield spread and it is in line with the fact that the involvement of European authorities is 
associated with an impact on multiple countries. Also in this case we can notice that the reaction 
is significant for countries that are not featured by a particularly large fiscal capacity. 
 
Bail-in of Bank of Cyprus and Laiki: positive bail-in event 
Table 6 illustrates the results regarding the bail-in of Bank of Cyprus and Laiki, which has 
even imposed losses to unsecured depositors. This case is a positive bail-in event that resulted from 
the negotiations between Cyprian government and European authorities. The coefficients are 
significantly positive in both events for the Italian, French and Spanish banking systems (also the 
Austrian and British banks exhibit a positive reaction in one of the events), which corroborates 
the hypothesis that a positive commitment generates an increase in the yield spread. Moreover, 
this result is coherent with the idea that the involvement of European authorities is correlated 
with a yield spread reaction in several countries and it is also in line with the fact that a large 
debt to GDP ratio is associated with a more significant reaction to the bail-in. 
 
Legislative process of BRRD: positive bail-in events 
Table 7 shows the estimates concerning the legislative process of the BRRD, the European 
directive mandating the bail-in in cases of banking resolution. This case is a positive bail-in event 
that derive from decisions of European authorities. The estimates are significantly positive for the 
EU Parliament’s approval of the BRRD, while it is insignificant in the case of the EU Finance 
Ministers agreement on the BRRD proposal. These results are partially supporting the hypothesis 
of an increase in the yield spread. With regard to the parliamentary approval of the BRRD, the 
estimates are in line with the fact that the involvement of supranational authorities is associated 
with a reaction in several countries and, in addition, it is coherent with the idea that a larger debt-
to-GDP is connected with a more intense yield-spread reaction. 
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Moreover, this evidence - similarly to subsequent events - shows that the spread reacts also 
to events linked to the legislative process, which do not produce an increased banking distress, as 
illustrated by Schafer et al. (2016). This finding supports the idea that the yield spread between 
bailinable and non-bailinable bonds reflect the legal specificity of the bail-in, rather than the 
increase in the default probability. 
 
Bail-in of Banco Espirito Santo, Portugal: positive bail-in event 
Table 8 presents the results regarding the bail-in of Banco Espirito Santo (BES), which is 
categorized as a positive bail-in event that results from negotiations between the Portuguese 
government and European institutions. The estimates are significantly positive for the Spanish, 
Italian and German banks. These estimates support the hypothesis of an increase in the yield 
spread and they are coherent with the notion that the intervention of supranational authorities 
may drive a propagation of the effect into multiple countries. In addition, the evidence partially 
supports the idea that a smaller fiscal capacity is correlated with a stronger reaction to the bail-
in, even though we notice that the positive reaction of German banks seems not to corroborate 
this correlation. 
 
Austrian Parliament’s approval of Hypo Alpe’s bail-in and BRRD: positive bail-in 
events 
Table 9 illustrates the estimates concerning two approvals of the Austrian Parliament: one 
regards the imposition of the bail-in on Hypo Alpe and a second one transposes in Austria the EU 
directive BRRD. In these cases, we do not detect any intervention of supranational authorities. 
The coefficients are significantly positive for the Austrian banks, which not only support the 
hypothesis of an increase in the yield spread but they are also coherent with the notion that the 
intervention of national authorities only may be associated with bail-in effects only for the domestic 
banks. 
 
Uncostitutionality of the bail-in of Hypo Alpe: negative bail-in events 
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Table 10 shows the coefficients concerning two negative bail-in events regarding the 
uncostitutionality verdict of Hypo Alpe’s bail-in. We observe a negative but insignificant impact 
in the first event, which is interpretable in the light of the large uncertainty around the 
uncostitutionality decision that has been fostered by the Finance Minister’s reiteration that the 
bail-in was going to be concluded anyways. The negative and significant coefficient relative to the 
second event, instead, corroborates the hypothesis that a negative bail-in event decreases the yield 
spread. In addition, this evidence is in consistent with the idea that an event decided by national 
authorities only is correlated with bail-in effects only for the domestic banks. 
 
Law regarding the bail-in of Greek banks: positive bail-in event 
Table 11 presents the results regarding the bail-in of Greek banks, which involved negotiations 
with supranational authorities. The coefficients are significantly positive for the three countries 
with the highest debt-to-GDP, namely Italy, Spain and France. These estimates are consistent 
with the fact that the events involving supranational authorities may be associated with a yield 
spread reaction for multiple countries.  
 
France’s transposition of BRRD: positive bail-in event 
Table 12 illustrates the estimates regarding the national transposition of the BRRD in France, 
which is a positive event that did not entail any intervention of supranational authorities. The 
coefficient is significantly positive for the French banks, which not only support the hypothesis of 
an increase in the yield spread but they are also coherent with the notion that the intervention of 
national authorities only may be associated with bail-in effects only for the domestic banks. 
 
Italy’s transposition of BRRD and media coverage of bail-in: positive bail-in event 
Table 13 presents the results concerning the Italian national transposition of the BRRD and 
the vast media coverage subsequent to the suicide of a retail unsecured bondholders. These are 
positive events that did not involve supranational authorities. The coefficients are significantly 
positive for the Italian banks, which not only support the hypothesis of an increase in the yield 
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spread but they are also coherent with the notion that the intervention of national authorities 
only may be associated with bail-in effects only for the domestic banks. 
 
4 Region-level Difference-in-differences Analyses 
The previous subsection has presented analyses at the lowest level of aggregation, namely the 
state level. However, all the analyses presented and discussed in the subsequent subsections - i.e., 
placebo difference-in-differences, the restricted difference-in-differences and the triple-differencing 
- require a higher level of aggregation for reasons linked to the number of observations. The placebo 
difference-in-differences test and the restricted difference-in-differences estimation entail the 
impossibility to use a significant part of the sample, with a reduction in observations of more than 
40%, on average.23 On the other hand, the triple-differencing analyses about the impact of bail-in 
on market discipline necessitate a higher number of observations compared to the difference-in-
differences because, by comparing groups that are more narrowly defined, the triple-differencing 
may more easily incur an insufficient statistical power (Roberts and Whited (2012)). 
Thus, instead of performing the regression models for each event and each country as in the 
state-level difference-in-differences, this subsection (and all subsequent ones) performs the 
regression models for each event and each group of countries, called regions. This paper defines 
two regions by splitting the sample of countries into two parts. Specifically, in the light of the 
evidence of the previous subsection showing that high debt states appear to react differently 
compared to low debt states, the sample of countries is split into two regions on the basis of their 
debt-to-GDP ratio. The median debt-to-GDP ratio during each bail-in event is used as the relevant 
                                                            
23 The observations employed in the placebo difference-in-differences have to correspond to a bank that in a 
given day has to satisfy two conditions: holding at least a bond that is “senior unsecured” and holding at 
least a bond that is “unsecured”, “senior subordinated”, “subordinated” or “junior subordinated”. The 
observations employed in the restricted difference-in-differences have to correspond to a bank that in a given 
day has to satisfy two conditions: holding at least a bond that is “secured”, “senior secured” or “asset 
backed” and holding at least a bond that is “senior unsecured”, “unsecured”, “senior subordinated”, 
“subordinated” or “junior subordinated”. 
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threshold and, as a result, the region with relatively high debt contains Italy, Spain and France 
whereas the region with relatively low debt region contains U.K., Austria and Germany.24 
 
4.1 Region-level Difference-in-Differences 
Before showing and discussing the results relative to the region-level placebo and restricted 
difference-in-differences, it is worth to illustrate whether the region-level difference-in-differences 
estimates are coherent with the state-level difference-in-differences estimates. Thus, this subsection 
employs region-level difference-in-differences to test the hypothesis that the bail-in events have 
induced market participants to reprice bonds according to the bail-in scheme. The region-level 
investigation of such hypothesis consists in performing the regression model (1) for each region 
and each event. In principle, the expected results for this test are the same as the state-level 
difference-in-differences (whose results are shown from Table 3 to Table 13); however, the 
aggregation at region-level is supposed to largely attenuate the estimates of national bail-in events 
because the impact might not be large enough to compensate the noise due to the higher level of 
aggregation. In the previous section, we have observed the regularity that the bail-in impact is 
stronger for countries with relatively high debt and that it affects more countries in cases of events 
involving the supranational authorities. Thus, mechanically, we can expect significant difference-
in-differences estimates, in particular, for the banks in the region countries with relatively high 
debt and for events involving supranational authorities. 
Table 14 shows that the positive events involving European authorities exhibit positive and 
significant estimates, which is coherent with the results of the state-level difference-in-differences. 
The difference-in-differences estimates relative to the bail-in of Dutch bank SNS Reaal and to the 
EU Finance Ministers’ approval of the BRRD are both insignificant; nevertheless, also these two 
insignificant estimates are in line with the results of the state-level difference-in-differences. Indeed, 
Table 5 shows that the impact of the bail-in of SNS Reaal has not been very intense for the high-
                                                            
24 The division of the countries between those with relatively high-debt and those with relatively low-debt 
is not altered if, as the relevant threshold, we choose the average debt-to-GDP of the six countries in this 
study or the average debt-to-GDP of the Europe-19 group. 
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debt countries while, instead, it has affected the banks in U.K., which is included among the low-
debt countries. Concerning the EU Finance Ministers’ approval of the BRRD, the insignificant 
coefficient is consistent with Table 7’s evidence showing that this event did not induce the market 
to reprice bonds in all the countries. 
It is interesting to notice the significantly negative estimate relative to the negative events 
linked to the public support of Italian MPS (December 2012) and to the uncostitutionality verdict 
in Austria (August 2015), which is in line with the results of Table 4 and Table 10. In addition, 
we observe that, apart from the events relative to the uncostitutionality verdict in Austria and to 
the transposition of the BRRD in Italy, the events involving national authorities only deliver 
insignificant estimates. We also notice that the banks in relatively low-debt countries generally 
exhibit insignificant results, apart from the aforementioned event linked to bail-in’s 
uncostitutionality and to the bail-in of BES, which has significantly affected German banks, as 
shown by Table 8. 
 
4.2 Placebo Difference-in-differences 
This sub-section addresses the question of whether the difference-in-differences estimates can 
be attributed to the changes in the legal treatment of bailinable bonds, compared to non-bailinable 
ones. To address this point, this subsection employs the regression model (2) and, in particular, 
these regressions are performed for each region and each event. We can expect these placebo 
difference-in-differences estimates to be generally insignificant if seniority per se is not a significant 
driver of the changes in yields’ spread. 
Table 15 illustrates that all placebo difference-in-differences coefficients are insignificant, 
apart from the case relative to the bail-in of Greek banks. Thus, these results generally suggest 
that in the dates of the bail-in events significant changes in expectations involve the difference 
between bailinable and non-bailinable bonds, not the difference between two bailinable 
subcategories. 
 
4.3 Restricted Difference-in-Differences 
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The difference-in-differences estimation defined by the model (1) regresses the vector of 
unsecured and secured bonds’ yields, on the typical interaction between the time dummy and the 
treatment dummy that characterizes the difference-in-differences literature (Derrien and Kecskes 
(2013)). This sub-section offers an alternative specification with respect to the model (1) that 
provides a tighter control for bank- and day-specific factors by computing the yield spread as the 
difference between bailinable and non-bailinable bond yields of each bank and per each day. The 
model is: 
𝑢𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑦𝑙𝑑𝑗 𝑡 − 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑦𝑙𝑑𝑗 𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛼𝑗 + 𝛽3 ൈ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿5 ൈ 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑗 𝑡 + ݑ𝑖 𝑡                             (3) 
In this specification, I regress the bank-specific and day-specific difference in yields between 
the unsecured and the secured bond, (𝑢𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑦𝑙𝑑 − 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑦𝑙𝑑), on the time dummy, 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 . I also control 
for the bank fixed effects and for the difference in maturities between unsecured and secured bonds, 
𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡𝑚 . The units of observation relative to all the regressions performed using model (3) are the 
yields relative to a specific bank and to a specific day. If the standard assumptions regarding the 
difference-in-differences (Angrist and Pischke (2008)) hold in my setting, results should not be 
very different from the ones of model (1) displayed in Table 14. 
As with the region-level difference-in-differences, we conjecture positive or negative estimates 
for states with relatively low fiscal capacity in response to the positive or negative events with 
supranational authorities and we expect significant estimates for low-debt countries in response to 
events involving only national authorities if the intensity of the impact is large enough. 
Table 16 illustrates that the positive events involving supranational authorities generally 
deliver positive and significant estimates. The negative event linked to the government rescue of 
MPS produces a significantly negative estimate, like in the Table 14. The coefficients of the events 
involving only national authorities as well as the coefficients regarding the countries with relatively 
low debt. This set of outcomes generally indicate a strong consistency between this methodology 
and the model (1) that produced the results in Table 14. 
 
 
4.4 Bail-in’s Effects and Bank Size 
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From a policy assessment perspective, it is essential to assess whether the regulation was more 
effective for larger institutions. As argued by Goodhart, Avgouleas (2014) and by the ECB board 
(2015), the bail-in, with its emphasis on early intervention, orderly resolution and going concern, 
has been designed, in particular, to attenuate the “too-big-to-fail” phenomenon that has allowed 
large banks to be supported by disproportionate explicit and implicit public guarantees. In addition 
to this policy assessment, it is important to evaluate whether larger banks are more affected by 
the bail-in because this evaluation improves the econometric identification of the impact of bail-
in on market discipline, which is examined in the subsequent section.  
To test if the impact of the bail-in on the yield spread between bailinable and non-bailinable 
bonds is more intense for the large banks, I use the following triple-differencing approach: 
𝑦𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽4 ൈ 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑗 ൈ 𝑏𝑙𝑛𝑖 ൈ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛾1 ൈ 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑗 ൈ 𝑏𝑙𝑛𝑖 + 𝛾2 ൈ 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑗 ൈ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡             
+ 𝛾3 ൈ 𝑏𝑙𝑛𝑖 ൈ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿5 ൈ 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑗 + 𝛿6 ൈ 𝑏𝑙𝑛𝑖 + 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑡 + 𝛿7 ൈ 𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑖𝑗𝑡
+ 𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑡                                                                                           (4) 
The measure of bank’s size is based on a bank’s value of total assets - the results are robust 
when I use or the logarithm of total assets or the dummy variable relative to the ECB classification 
of “significant” institution - . The coefficient 𝛽4 is the outcome of interest relative to model (4) 
and it is the D-D-D estimate presented in Table 17, for each region and each event. A positive 𝛽4  
indicates that a given bail-in event increases the yield spread more for a bank that is larger. 
Appendix IV provides further details about the interpretation of 𝛽4.  
In principle, if the introduction of the bail-in has, on average, decreased the support in favor 
of the large banks, we should expect a positive (negative) and significant D-D-D estimate in 
response to positive (negative) indications of commitment towards the bail-in. However, in line 
with the previous region-level analyses, the effect might be largely weakened by the noise due to 
the regional level of aggregation. Thus, we can expect significantly positive (negative) difference-
in-differences estimates in response to the positive (negative) events especially for countries with 
relatively high debt and for events involving supranational authorities. 
The outcomes in Table 17 show that the D-D-D estimates generally corroborate the 
hypothesis that the bail-in has affected more intensely the banks that are larger, on average, in 
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that we observe significantly positive estimates in several positive indications of commitment 
(although the coefficients are insignificant in some cases) and we detect a negative estimate relative 
to the public support for MPS without bail-in provisions. 
  
5 Second Hypothesis: Bail-in’s Effect on Market Discipline  
The second hypothesis of this paper is that the authorities’ indications of commitment to the 
bail-in have increased investors’ incentives to incorporate a bank’s risk while repricing its bonds, 
which would corroborate an increase of market discipline. Given that the literature on market 
discipline has typically gauged these incentives by means of the correlation between risk and yield, 
the elected empirical methodology is a triple-differencing model adding the dimension of banks’ 
risk to the previous difference-in-differences regression. This model is reminiscent of the triple-
differencing model employed by Acharya et al. (2016) to study market discipline. 
𝑦𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽5 ൈ 𝑟𝑠𝑘𝑗𝑡 ൈ 𝑏𝑙𝑛𝑖 ൈ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛾1 ൈ 𝑟𝑠𝑘𝑗𝑡 ൈ 𝑏𝑙𝑛𝑖 + 𝛾2 ൈ 𝑟𝑠𝑘𝑗𝑡 ൈ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡             
+ 𝛾3 ൈ 𝑏𝑙𝑛𝑖 ൈ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿5 ൈ 𝑟𝑠𝑘𝑗𝑡 + 𝛿6 ൈ 𝑏𝑙𝑛𝑖 + 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑡 + 𝛿7 ൈ 𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑖𝑗𝑡
+ 𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑡                                                                                           (5) 
The date-specific time dummy is 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡. It takes the value of zero in the seven days before the 
event and one in the day of the event.25 The measure of bank risk, 𝑟𝑠𝑘 , is the Bloomberg’s 1-year 
default probability, which is a comprehensive daily measure of risk using data about the CDS 
spread, the volatility of the stock price, the net income, non-performing loans, market-to-book 
ratio, total assets, short-term leverage, long-term leverage and loan losses reserves.26 
A positive 𝛽5 indicates that the bail-in event increases the yield-risk sensitivity. Indeed, 𝛽5 
describes whether the risk premium component of bailinable bond yields increases in response to 
the event, while netting this time series increase with the response of the risk premium component 
                                                            
25In Appendix III, Table A14, I also use windows of (-7; +2) and the results corroborate the second hypothesis 
- concerning the market discipline - . 
26 As a robustness tests, I use a measure of risk that is lagged with respect to the yield and the results are 
consistent. 
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of non-bailinable bond yields. This netting intends to ensure that the effect on market discipline 
described by 𝛽5 is largely attributable to the legal specificity of the bail-in and it introduction of 
a divergence between bailinable and non-bailinable. Appendix V provides further details about the 
interpretation of 𝛽5.  
 
5.1 Results Concerning Market Discipline  
In this section, I investigate the impact on market discipline exerted by the list of bail-in 
events we have analyzed in the previous sections. I calculate the triple-differencing estimates 
relative to 𝛽5 (also referred to as the D-D-D estimates) by performing the triple-differencing model 
(5) for each event and each region in order to ensure the appropriate statistical power. We expect 
significantly positive (negative) triple-differencing coefficients in response to the positive (negative) 
bail-in events, although the aggregation at region-level might strongly attenuate the effect on 
market discipline exerted by the bail-in events. 
Table 18 illustrates that in the bail-in dates, the triple differencing estimates are statistically 
equal or greater than zero. In particular, for the high debt countries the coefficients are positive 
in the case of the first announcement of Bankia’s bail-in, in the EU Parliament approval of the 
BRRD and in occasion of the exceptional media coverage about the bail-in in Italy. This evidence 
corroborates the existence of a weak positive impact on the market discipline. However, it is worth 
noticing that this effect is remarkably attenuated by the combination of two circumstances, as 
discussed in the next subsection. 
 
5.2 Market Discipline and Banks’ Size  
As anticipated in the previous subsection, the triple-differencing estimates of Table 18 are 
attenuated by the concurrence of two circumstances. First, the banks with higher risk are also the 
37 
 
ones that are smaller, on average.27 Second, smaller banks may exhibit a smaller increase in yield 
spread (between bailinable and non-bailinable bonds) in response to the bail-in, as shown in the 
previous section.  
More precisely, these two circumstances weaken the triple-differencing estimation because a 
positive (negative) D-D-D coefficient can be interpreted with the fact that the increase in yield 
spread - between bailinable and non-bailinable bonds - in response to the bail-in event has been 
more positive (negative) for the riskier banks.28 Thus, supposing that the “true” triple-differencing 
estimate is positive and significant - in case of positive events – is equivalent to the conjecture 
that the yield spread reaction is stronger for riskier banks. However, this possible stronger reaction 
is counterbalanced by the fact that the riskier banks are also the smaller ones, which are the ones 
that exhibit a weaker reaction to the bail-in events since they had a smaller public guarantee. 
Ideally, to address this point, we should compare the triple-differencing estimates among 
banks that have the same size. However, we cannot impose clusters that are too narrow given that 
an enough high number of observations must be ensured in order to attain a sufficient statistical 
power. Thus, this subsection focuses on a set of banks that is more homogeneous in terms of size 
and, specifically, I focus on the banks that are larger than a given threshold determined by the 
size of the median bank or by the ECB’s definition of “significant” institution.29   
Table 19 shows the triple-differencing estimates specific to large banks in countries with 
relatively high debt and in countries with relatively low debt, where the large banks are the ones 
with total assets greater than the median institution. We notice that the coefficients are greater 
than the ones in Table 18. In particular, they are significantly positive in response to the bail-ins 
of Bankia and SNS Reaal and they are positive also in reaction to the agreement of the EU Finance 
Ministers about the BRRD proposal, the EU Parliament vote in favor of the BRRD, and during 
the exceptional media coverage about the bail-in in Italy. For robustness, Table 20 illustrates the 
                                                            
27 Untabulated results show that by regressing the Bloomberg’s 1-year default probability on measures of 
banks size (total assets, logarithm of total assets or the ECB definition of significant financial institution) 
the estimate relative to the size is always negative and significant. 
28 Appendix V discusses this interpretation of the triple-differencing estimate. 
29 The set of small banks are not included in this analysis because their statistical power is not enough. For 
instance, for countries with relatively high-debt, the number of banks with secured bonds is 4 on average, 
which is insufficient to ensure an appropriate statistical power. 
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region-level triple-differencing estimates relative to large banks, where the large banks are the ones 
classified by the ECB as significant institution. We observe that the estimates are greater than 
those in Table 18 and, in addition, they are comparable to the ones in Table 19. 
The results in Table 19 and 20 appear to corroborate an increase of the market discipline for 
the set of large banks, as conjectured by Goodhart, Avgouleas (2014) and by the ECB board 
(2015), the DDD estimates of the large institutions suggest that they have been the target of a 
relatively higher growth in market discipline, compared to smaller banks. 
 
6 Additional Tests 
Results concerning Economic Significance 
In order to provide an idea about the magnitude of the effect of bail-in events, this subsection 
illustrates the results concerning the economic significance of the state-level difference-in-
differences coefficients. Table A15 in Appendix VII provides two parameters per each country: 
first, the ratio between the difference-in-differences estimate and the average difference in yields 
between bailinable and non-bailinable bonds in the seven days before the event; second, the ratio 
of the difference-in-differences estimate and the standard deviation of the aforementioned mean 
difference. 
Results show that the average ratio between difference-in-differences estimate and the average 
difference is approximately 0.04 and that the average ratio between difference-in-differences 
estimate and standard deviation of the average difference is approximately 1.8 . This assessment 
illustrates a relevant economic significance. 
 
Analyses without bank fixed effects  
All the previous empirical analyses have included the bank fixed effects ߙ௝ to control for bank-
specific and time-invariant components in the bailinable and non-bailinable bond yield. As a 
robustness check, this subsection tests the first hypothesis - concerning the average yield spread 
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reaction - , the placebo difference-in-differences and the second hypothesis - concerning the market 
discipline - without including the bank fixed effects. 
Table A16 shows the outcomes of the region-level difference-in-differences, Table A17 displays 
the results concerning the placebo region-level difference-in-differences and in Table A18 we find 
the region-level triple-differencing estimates. We can notice that these coefficients are not 
dramatically different from the Tables 14, 15 and 18, respectively. 
 
Lagged measure of default probability 
In order to ensure that the default probability of a given bank is not affected by the occurrence 
of a bail-in event, this subsection uses a lagged measure of 1-year default probability instead of 
the contemporaneous value. Table A19 presents the results relative to this specification and we 
can notice that, compared to Table 18, there are more events in which there is a positive and 
significant reaction of the market discipline. 
 
Triple-differencing for banks larger and smaller than 95th percentile 
Some authors observe that the bail-in regulation might leave the authorities the discretion to 
impose weaker bail-in, especially in cases of distress of very large institutions (with the notion of 
precautionary recapitalizations, for instance). In this subsection, I investigate whether the very 
large banks display a specific reaction to the bail-in events. I implement the following triple-
differencing model: 
𝑦𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽6 ൈ 95𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑗 ൈ 𝑏𝑙𝑛𝑖 ൈ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛾1 ൈ 95𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑗 ൈ 𝑏𝑙𝑛𝑖 + 𝛾2 ൈ 95𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑗 ൈ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡               
+ 𝛾3 ൈ 𝑏𝑙𝑛𝑖 ൈ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿5 ൈ 95𝑝𝑒𝑟 + 𝛿6 ൈ 𝑏𝑙𝑛𝑖 + 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑡 + 𝛿7 ൈ 𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑖𝑗𝑡
+ 𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑡                                                                                           (6) 
In this model 95𝑝𝑒𝑟 is the dummy variable that takes the value of 1 in case the bank is larger 
than the 95th percentile in a given region and a given event window. Table A20 presents the results 
of this triple-differencing and we observe that there are three bail-in events in which the difference-
in-differences reaction of the banks in the top 5% has been weaker than the 95% of the banks. 
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Conclusions 
This paper has investigated the impact of the bail-in regulations on the prices of banks bonds 
in six major European countries. It has examined the principal events regarding both the legislative 
process and the impositions of bail-in on specific banks. Difference-in-differences tests have 
illustrated that positive (negative) indications of commitment amplified (reduced) the difference 
in yield between unsecured (i.e., bailinable) and secured (i.e., non-bailinable) bonds. Placebo tests 
have highlighted that these results are not due to a general banking crisis. A triple-differencing 
framework has suggested that bail-in events increased investors’ incentives to incorporate a bank’s 
risk while pricing its securities, corroborating an expansion of market discipline.  
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Figures  
 
Figure 1. Reaction of Italian banks’ bond yields to the bail-in of Bankia. 
 
 
                   Panel A                    Panel B 
 
 
 
Panel A in Figure 1 depicts the national daily unconditional means of the yields of unsecured and 
secured bonds issued by Italian banks. The time window is (-7; +7) centered on Oct. 29, 2012 
(Appendix II provides information about this bail-in event). The yield is expressed in percentage 
(%). The secured bonds comprehend the subcategories: “secured”, “senior secured”, “asset 
backed”. The unsecured bonds comprehend the subcategories: “senior unsecured”, “unsecured”, 
“senior subordinated”, “subordinated” and “junior subordinated”. 
Panel B in Figure 1 depicts the national daily unconditional means of the yields of junior unsecured 
and senior unsecured bonds issued by Italian banks. The time window is (-7; +7) centered on Oct. 
29, 2012 (Appendix II provides information about this bail-in event). The yield is expressed in 
percentage (%). The senior unsecured bonds comprehend the subcategories: “senior unsecured”. 
The junior unsecured bonds comprehend the subcategories: “unsecured”, “senior subordinated”, 
“subordinated” and “junior subordinated”. 
  
45 
 
Figure 2. Reaction of bond yields spread to the bail-in of Bankia. 
The graphs in Figure 2 plot the daily differences between the unconditional means of the yields 
of unsecured and the unconditional means of the yields of secured bonds. The time window is (-
7; +7) centered on Oct. 29, 2012 (Appendix II provides information about this bail-in event). 
The yield is expressed in percentage (%). The secured bonds comprehend the subcategories: 
“secured”, “senior secured”, “asset backed”. The unsecured bonds comprehend the subcategories: 
“senior unsecured”, “unsecured”, “senior subordinated”, “subordinated” and “junior 
subordinated”. 
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Figure 3. Time trends of the unconditional means of bond yields. 
Figure 3 illustrates the monthly unconditional means of the bailinable bond yields and the monthly 
unconditional means of the non-bailinable bond yields. The time window starts in June 2012 and 
ends in January 2016. The dataset relative to this graph contain all the bonds of the six countries 
in my sample. The yield is expressed in percentage (%). 
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Tables 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics relative to the variables used in the regression models. 
This table illustrates the summary statistics for the entire sample relative to the total assets, time 
to maturity, the bailinable dummy variable (which take the value of one if the debt is unsecured 
and zero if the debt is secured) and the yield to maturity. The yield is expressed in percentage 
(%). 
 
 
 
 
     
Variables Mean Median St.Dev. N 
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ 
Tot. Assets (Mln Euro) 233,749 36,340 459,817 383,081 
   
Time to Mat. (days) 2,905 2,263 2,036 383,081 
   
Bailinable status 0.717 1.000 0.450 383,081 
   
Yield to Mat. 4.118 3.086 9.792 383,081 
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Table 2. Difference-in-Differences and Placebo Difference-in-Differences for the entire sample. 
The D-D coefficient in Panel A is the estimate of ߚଵ relative to the model 𝑦𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛼𝑗 + 𝛽1 ൈ 𝑏𝑙𝑛𝑖𝑗 ൈ
𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿1 ൈ 𝑏𝑙𝑛𝑖𝑗 + 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑡 + 𝛿2 ൈ 𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 ; N is the number of observations in the (-7; 0) window; the 
Adj.R2 is the adjusted R-squared. The D-D coefficient in Panel B is the estimate of ߚଶ relative to 
the model 𝑦𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛼𝑗 + 𝛽1 ൈ 𝑏𝑙𝑛𝑝𝑙𝑐𝑏𝑖𝑗 ൈ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿1 ൈ 𝑏𝑙𝑛𝑝𝑙𝑐𝑏𝑖𝑗 + 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑡 + 𝛿2 ൈ 𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡. The variable 
Commitment describes whether the event indicates a positive or a negative commitment towards 
the bail-in principle.  Appendix II provides information about these bail-in events. Standard errors 
are adjusted for both heteroscedasticity and within correlation clustered at the bank level. ***, 
**, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% two-tailed levels, respectively. 
 
 
(1)
Date Event Commitment D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2
------- ----------------- ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- -------
10.07.12 Spanish bail-in plan Positive -0.021 1446 0.94 0.008 982 0.97
19.07.12 Germany vote Spain’ rescue Positive 0.712 1453 0.81 0.917 996 0.83
23.08.12 Spanish Gov. proposes bail-in Positive 0.015 1464 0.98 0.008 1000 0.99
29.10.12 SAREB conversion details Positive -0.047 1512 0.98 -0.05 1000 0.99
18.12.12 EU: no bail-in for MPS Negative -0.084** 1552 0.98 -0.078 991 0.99
01.02.13 Bail-in SNS Reaal Positive -0.036 1576 0.98 -0.067 1027 0.99
18.03.13 Cyprus rescue plan Positive 0.082** 1600 0.97 0.062 1040 0.99
02.04.13 Cyprus accord signed Positive 0.048* 1428 0.97 0 791 0.99
28.06.13 Finance Ministers back BRRD Positive -0.105 1664 0.96 -0.095 1072 0.97
15.04.14 EU Parliament backs proposal Positive 0.025* 2282 0.91 0.016 1413 0.85
08.07.14 Law for Hypo Alpe’s bail-in Positive 0.022 2343 0.92 -0.006 1472 0.83
05.08.14 BES bail-in Positive 0.051*** 2361 0.86 0.003 1491 0.73
22.09.14 Austrian BRRD transposition Positive 0.007 2393 0.86 0.024 1513 0.72
03.07.15 Italian BRRD transposition Positive 0.024 2586 0.7 0.053 1600 0.62
28.07.15 Uncostitutionality verdict Negative 0.048 2600 0.65 -0.007 1608 0.57
05.08.15 Moody’s downgrading Negative -0.043** 2600 0.65 0.047 1612 0.57
12.08.15 Greek banks’ bail-in Positive 0.035*** 2600 0.65 0.002 1616 0.57
14.09.15 French BRRD transposition Positive 0.036 2600 0.66 0.006 1616 0.57
09.12.15 Bail-in media coverage Positive 0.048 2648 0.66 0.112 1648 0.56
Panel A Panel B
Diff-in-Diff - Entire sample Placebo - Entire sample
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Table 3. Spanish banks’ bail-in.  
The D-D coefficient is the estimate of ߚଵ relative to the model 𝑦𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛼𝑗 + 𝛽1 ൈ 𝑏𝑙𝑛𝑖𝑗 ൈ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿1 ൈ 𝑏𝑙𝑛𝑖𝑗 + 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑡 + 𝛿2 ൈ 𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡  ; N is the number 
of observations in the (-7; 0) window; the Adj.R2 is the adjusted R-squared. The variable Commitment describes whether the event indicates a 
positive or a negative commitment towards the bail-in principle. The variable Authority describes whether the negotiations regarding the event 
have involved only national authorities or supranational authorities, too. Appendix II provides information about these bail-in events. Standard 
errors are adjusted for both heteroscedasticity and within correlation clustered at the bank level. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% two-tailed levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
(1) (2)
Date Event Commitment Authority D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2
--------- ------------------ --------- --------- ------- ---- ------ ------- ---- ------ ------- ---- ------ ------- ---- ------ ------- ---- ------ ------- ---- ------
10.07.12 Spanish bail-in plan Positive Supranational -0.08 160 0.67 0.10*** 104 0.85 0.03* 204 0.99 0.56 472 0.98 0.02 136 0.91 -0.38 370 0.95
19.07.12 Germany votes Spain’ rescue Positive Supranational 0.12*** 160 0.86 0.18* 104 0.88 0.05*** 206 0.99 -0.04 472 0.97 0.11 136 0.92 3,26 375 0.80
23.08.12 Spain initiates bail-in law Positive Supranational 0.09** 160 0.93 0.06** 104 0.88 0.04*** 204 0.99 0.02 480 0.97 0.08 136 0.83 0.09 380 0.99
29.10.12 Bail-in conversion details Positive Supranational 0.10** 160 0.98 0.13*** 104 0.85 0.06** 218 0.99 -0.04 496 0.96 0.03 144 0.85 -0.33 390 0.99
Italy Spain France U.K. Austria Germany
Panel A Panel B Panel C Panel C Panel D Panel E
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Table 4. Italian government supports Monte dei Paschi di Siena without bail-in provisions. 
The D-D coefficient is the estimate of ߚଵ relative to the model 𝑦𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛼𝑗 + 𝛽1 ൈ 𝑏𝑙𝑛𝑖𝑗 ൈ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿1 ൈ 𝑏𝑙𝑛𝑖𝑗 + 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑡 + 𝛿2 ൈ 𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 ; N is the number 
of observations in the (-7; 0) window; the Adj.R2 is the adjusted R-squared. The variable Commitment describes whether the event indicates a 
positive or a negative commitment towards the bail-in principle. The variable Authority describes whether the negotiations regarding the event 
have involved only national authorities or supranational authorities, too. Appendix II provides information about these bail-in events. Standard 
errors are adjusted for both heteroscedasticity and within correlation clustered at the bank level. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% two-tailed levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
(1) (2)
Event Commitment Authority D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2
------------------ --------- --------- ------- ---- ------ ------- ---- ------ ------- ---- ------ ------- ---- ------ ------- ---- ------ ------- ---- ------
EU: no bail-in for MPS Negative Supranational -0.15*** 160 0.99 -0.07 104 0.89 -0.03* 234 0.99 -0.08** 512 0.99 -0.08 144 0.87 -0.23 398 0.99
Italy Spain France U.K. Austria Germany
Panel A Panel B Panel C Panel C Panel D Panel E
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Table 5. Bail-in of the Dutch bank SNS Reaal. 
The D-D coefficient is the estimate of ߚଵ relative to the model 𝑦𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛼𝑗 + 𝛽1 ൈ 𝑏𝑙𝑛𝑖𝑗 ൈ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿1 ൈ 𝑏𝑙𝑛𝑖𝑗 + 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑡 + 𝛿2 ൈ 𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 ; N is the number 
of observations in the (-7; 0) window; the Adj.R2 is the adjusted R-squared. The variable Commitment describes whether the event indicates a 
positive or a negative commitment towards the bail-in principle. The variable Authority describes whether the negotiations regarding the event 
have involved only national authorities or supranational authorities, too. Appendix II provides information about these bail-in events. Standard 
errors are adjusted for both heteroscedasticity and within correlation clustered at the bank level. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% two-tailed levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
(1) (2)
Event Commitment Authority D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2
------------------ --------- --------- ------- ---- ------ ------- ---- ------ ------- ---- ------ ------- ---- ------ ------- ---- ------ ------- ---- ------
Bail-in SNS Reaal Positive Supranational 0.06* 168 0.99 0.03 112 0.89 0.01* 236 0.99 0.03** 512 0.96 -0.05 144 0.84 -0.20 404 0.98
Italy Spain France U.K. Austria Germany
Panel A Panel B Panel C Panel C Panel D Panel E
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Table 6. Bail-in of Cyprian banks. 
The D-D coefficient is the estimate of ߚଵ relative to the model 𝑦𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛼𝑗 + 𝛽1 ൈ 𝑏𝑙𝑛𝑖𝑗 ൈ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿1 ൈ 𝑏𝑙𝑛𝑖𝑗 + 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑡 + 𝛿2 ൈ 𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 ; N is the number 
of observations in the (-7; 0) window; the Adj.R2 is the adjusted R-squared. The variable Commitment describes whether the event indicates a 
positive or a negative commitment towards the bail-in principle. The variable Authority describes whether the negotiations regarding the event 
have involved only national authorities or supranational authorities, too. Appendix II provides information about these bail-in events. Standard 
errors are adjusted for both heteroscedasticity and within correlation clustered at the bank level. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% two-tailed levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
(1) (2)
Event Commitment Authority D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2
------------------ --------- --------- ------- ---- ------ ------- ---- ------ ------- ---- ------ ------- ---- ------ ------- ---- ------ ------- ---- ------
Cyprus rescue plan Positive Supranational 0.10*** 168 0.99 0.10** 112 0.89 0.02* 238 0.99 0.03 520 0.94 0.04*** 144 0.87 0.19 418 0.98
Cyprus accord signed Positive Supranational 0.11*** 126 0.99 0.06** 84 0.90 0.04*** 216 0.99 0.01* 535 0.96 0.00 108 0.89 0.07 359 0.98
Italy Spain France U.K. Austria Germany
Panel A Panel B Panel C Panel C Panel D Panel E
53 
 
Table 7. Approvals of BRRD at European level. 
The D-D coefficient is the estimate of ߚଵ relative to the model 𝑦𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛼𝑗 + 𝛽1 ൈ 𝑏𝑙𝑛𝑖𝑗 ൈ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿1 ൈ 𝑏𝑙𝑛𝑖𝑗 + 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑡 + 𝛿2 ൈ 𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 ; N is the number 
of observations in the (-7; 0) window; the Adj.R2 is the adjusted R-squared. The variable Commitment describes whether the event indicates a 
positive or a negative commitment towards the bail-in principle. The variable Authority describes whether the negotiations regarding the event 
have involved only national authorities or supranational authorities, too. Appendix II provides information about these bail-in events. Standard 
errors are adjusted for both heteroscedasticity and within correlation clustered at the bank level. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% two-tailed levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
(1) (2)
Event Commitment Authority D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2
------------------ --------- --------- ------- ---- ------ ------- ---- ------ ------- ---- ------ ------- ---- ------ ------- ---- ------ ------- ---- ------
Finance Ministers approve BRRD Positive Supranational 0.00 168 0.94 0.02 112 0.86 0.01 237 0.99 -0.02 560 0.99 0.01 144 0.89 0.00 433 0.92
EU Parliament approve BRRD Positive Supranational 0.10* 277 0.94 0.04** 120 0.86 0.03*** 308 0.99 0.07 722 0.99 -0.02 272 0.89 0.00 583 0.92
Italy Spain France U.K. Austria Germany
Panel A Panel B Panel C Panel C Panel D Panel E
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Table 8. BES Bail-in, Portugal. 
The D-D coefficient is the estimate of ߚଵ relative to the model 𝑦𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛼𝑗 + 𝛽1 ൈ 𝑏𝑙𝑛𝑖𝑗 ൈ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿1 ൈ 𝑏𝑙𝑛𝑖𝑗 + 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑡 + 𝛿2 ൈ 𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 ; N is the number 
of observations in the (-7; 0) window; the Adj.R2 is the adjusted R-squared. The variable Commitment describes whether the event indicates a 
positive or a negative commitment towards the bail-in principle. The variable Authority describes whether the negotiations regarding the event 
have involved only national authorities or supranational authorities, too. Appendix II provides information about these bail-in events. Standard 
errors are adjusted for both heteroscedasticity and within correlation clustered at the bank level. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% two-tailed levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
(1) (2)
Event Commitment Authority D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2
------------------ --------- --------- ------- ---- ------ ------- ---- ------ ------- ---- ------ ------- ---- ------ ------- ---- ------ ------- ---- ------
BES bail-in Positive Supranational 0.07** 301 0.97 0.01* 120 0.84 0.01 313 0.99 0.04 760 0.99 0.00 280 0.88 0.12* 587 0.85
Italy Spain France U.K. Austria Germany
Panel A Panel B Panel C Panel C Panel D Panel E
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Table 9. Austrian Parliament approvals for Hypo Alpe’s bail-in and for the national transposition of the BRRD. 
The D-D coefficient is the estimate of ߚଵ relative to the model 𝑦𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛼𝑗 + 𝛽1 ൈ 𝑏𝑙𝑛𝑖𝑗 ൈ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿1 ൈ 𝑏𝑙𝑛𝑖𝑗 + 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑡 + 𝛿2 ൈ 𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 ; N is the number 
of observations in the (-7; 0) window; the Adj.R2 is the adjusted R-squared. The variable Commitment describes whether the event indicates a 
positive or a negative commitment towards the bail-in principle. The variable Authority describes whether the negotiations regarding the event 
have involved only national authorities or supranational authorities, too. Appendix II provides information about these bail-in events. Standard 
errors are adjusted for both heteroscedasticity and within correlation clustered at the bank level. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% two-tailed levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
(1) (2)
Event Commitment Authority D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2
------------------ --------- --------- ------- ---- ------ ------- ---- ------ ------- ---- ------ ------- ---- ------ ------- ---- ------ ------- ---- ------
Law for Hypo Alpe’s bail-in Positive National 0.01 296 0.97 0.02 120 0.84 0.05* 317 0.99 0.04 743 0.99 0.04** 280 0.90 0.04 587 0.91
Austrian BRRD transposition Positive National -0.01 304 0.97 0.01 120 0.85 0.00 317 0.99 -0.01 776 0.99 0.20* 280 0.88 -0.04 596 0.84
Italy Spain France U.K. Austria Germany
Panel A Panel B Panel C Panel C Panel D Panel E
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Table 10. Uncostitutionality verdict for the bail-in of Austrian bank Hypo Alpe. 
The D-D coefficient is the estimate of ߚଵ relative to the model 𝑦𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛼𝑗 + 𝛽1 ൈ 𝑏𝑙𝑛𝑖𝑗 ൈ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿1 ൈ 𝑏𝑙𝑛𝑖𝑗 + 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑡 + 𝛿2 ൈ 𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 ; N is the number 
of observations in the (-7; 0) window; the Adj.R2 is the adjusted R-squared. The variable Commitment describes whether the event indicates a 
positive or a negative commitment towards the bail-in principle. The variable Authority describes whether the negotiations regarding the event 
have involved only national authorities or supranational authorities, too. Appendix II provides information about these bail-in events. Standard 
errors are adjusted for both heteroscedasticity and within correlation clustered at the bank level. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% two-tailed levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
(1) (2)
Event Commitment Authority D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2
------------------ --------- --------- ------- ---- ------ ------- ---- ------ ------- ---- ------ ------- ---- ------ ------- ---- ------ ------- ---- ------
Uncostitutionality of bail-in Negative National 0.05 304 0.98 0.00 136 0.83 -0.01 387 0.99 0.00 840 0.97 -0.04 296 0.83 0.10 637 0.63
Moody’s downgrading Negative National -0.01 304 0.99 -0.01 136 0.83 -0.01 388 0.99 -0.01 840 0.97 -0.07* 296 0.82 -0.05 636 0.63
Italy Spain France U.K. Austria Germany
Panel A Panel B Panel C Panel C Panel D Panel E
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Table 11. Greek government agrees to prepare a law for the bail-in of Greek banks. 
The D-D coefficient is the estimate of ߚଵ relative to the model 𝑦𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛼𝑗 + 𝛽1 ൈ 𝑏𝑙𝑛𝑖𝑗 ൈ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿1 ൈ 𝑏𝑙𝑛𝑖𝑗 + 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑡 + 𝛿2 ൈ 𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 ; N is the number 
of observations in the (-7; 0) window; the Adj.R2 is the adjusted R-squared. The variable Commitment describes whether the event indicates a 
positive or a negative commitment towards the bail-in principle. The variable Authority describes whether the negotiations regarding the event 
have involved only national authorities or supranational authorities, too. Appendix II provides information about these bail-in events. Standard 
errors are adjusted for both heteroscedasticity and within correlation clustered at the bank level. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% two-tailed levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
(1) (2)
Event Commitment Authority D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2
------------------ --------- --------- ------- ---- ------ ------- ---- ------ ------- ---- ------ ------- ---- ------ ------- ---- ------ ------- ---- ------
Greek banks’ bail-in Positive Supranational 0.03*** 304 0.99 0.02** 136 0.83 0.02** 390 0.99 -0.01 840 0.96 0.02 296 0.82 0.03 634 0.64
Italy Spain France U.K. Austria Germany
Panel A Panel B Panel C Panel C Panel D Panel E
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Table 12. France’s transposition of the BRRD.  
The D-D coefficient is the estimate of ߚଵ relative to the model 𝑦𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛼𝑗 + 𝛽1 ൈ 𝑏𝑙𝑛𝑖𝑗 ൈ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿1 ൈ 𝑏𝑙𝑛𝑖𝑗 + 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑡 + 𝛿2 ൈ 𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 ; N is the number 
of observations in the (-7; 0) window; the Adj.R2 is the adjusted R-squared. The variable Commitment describes whether the event indicates a 
positive or a negative commitment towards the bail-in principle. The variable Authority describes whether the negotiations regarding the event 
have involved only national authorities or supranational authorities, too. Appendix II provides information about these bail-in events. Standard 
errors are adjusted for both heteroscedasticity and within correlation clustered at the bank level. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% two-tailed levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
(1) (2)
Event Commitment Authority D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2
------------------ --------- --------- ------- ---- ------ ------- ---- ------ ------- ---- ------ ------- ---- ------ ------- ---- ------ ------- ---- ------
French BRRD transposition Positive National 0.07 304 0.99 0.01 136 0.83 0.03* 389 0.99 0.01 840 0.96 -0.02 296 0.83 0.07 635 0.65
Italy Spain France U.K. Austria Germany
Panel A Panel B Panel C Panel C Panel D Panel E
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Table 13. Italy’s bail-in events. 
The D-D coefficient is the estimate of ߚଵ relative to the model 𝑦𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛼𝑗 + 𝛽1 ൈ 𝑏𝑙𝑛𝑖𝑗 ൈ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿1 ൈ 𝑏𝑙𝑛𝑖𝑗 + 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑡 + 𝛿2 ൈ 𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 ; N is the number 
of observations in the (-7; 0) window; the Adj.R2 is the adjusted R-squared. The variable Commitment describes whether the event indicates a 
positive or a negative commitment towards the bail-in principle. The variable Authority describes whether the negotiations regarding the event 
have involved only national authorities or supranational authorities, too. Appendix II provides information about these bail-in events. Standard 
errors are adjusted for both heteroscedasticity and within correlation clustered at the bank level. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% two-tailed levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2)
Event Commitment Authority D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2
------------------ --------- --------- ------- ---- ------ ------- ---- ------ ------- ---- ------ ------- ---- ------ ------- ---- ------ ------- ---- ------
Italian BRRD transposition Positive National 0.02*** 304 0.99 -0.01 136 0.84 0.05 382 0.99 0.02 834 0.97 0.00 296 0.85 0.02 634 0.69
Bail-in media coverage Positive National 0.05*** 304 0.98 -0.19 136 0.77 0.01 389 0.99 0.03 864 0.97 0.02 296 0.79 0.24 659 0.65
Italy Spain France U.K. Austria Germany
Panel A Panel B Panel C Panel C Panel D Panel E
60 
 
Table 14. Region-level difference-in-differences. 
The D-D coefficient is the estimate of ߚଵ relative to the model 𝑦𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛼𝑗 + 𝛽1 ൈ 𝑏𝑙𝑛𝑖𝑗 ൈ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿1 ൈ
𝑏𝑙𝑛𝑖𝑗 + 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑡 + 𝛿2 ൈ 𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 ; N is the number of observations in the (-7; 0) window; the Adj.R2 is 
the adjusted R-squared. Appendix II provides information about these bail-in events. The group 
of countries with relatively high debt contains Italy, Spain and France. The group of countries 
with relatively high debt contains U.K., Austria and Germany. Standard errors are adjusted for 
both heteroscedasticity and within correlation clustered at the bank level. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% two-tailed levels, respectively. 
 
 
  
(1) (2)
Date Event Commitment Authority D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2
---- ------------------ ----------- ----------- ----------- ---- ---- ----------- ---- ----
7.12 Spanish bail-in plan Positive Supranational 0.062* 468 0.91 -0.11 978 0.96
7.12 Germany votes Spain’ rescue Positive Supranational 0.066** 470 0.92 0.454 983 0.8
8.12 Spain initiates bail-in law Positive Supranational 0.064*** 469 0.93 0.004 995 0.98
10.12 Bail-in conversion details Positive Supranational 0.100*** 482 0.94 -0.12 1030 0.98
12.12 EU: no bail-in for MPS Negative Supranational -0.043* 498 0.96 -0.10 1054 0.98
2.13 Bail-in SNS Reaal Positive Supranational 0.019 516 0.96 -0.06 1060 0.98
3.13 Cyprus rescue plan Positive Supranational 0.069*** 518 0.95 0.081 1082 0.97
4.13 Cyprus accord signed Positive Supranational 0.114*** 426 0.95 0.012 1002 0.97
8.13 Finance Ministers approve BRRD Positive Supranational 0.000 517 0.97 -0.15 1147 0.96
4.14 EU Parliament approve BRRD Positive Supranational 0.045* 705 0.96 0.031 1577 0.91
7.14 Law for Hypo Alpe’s bail-in Positive National 0.008 733 0.97 0.031 1610 0.91
8.14 BES bail-in Positive Supranational 0.043*** 734 0.97 0.058* 1627 0.85
9.14 Austrian BRRD transposition Positive National 0.001 741 0.97 0.011 1652 0.85
7.15 Italian BRRD transposition Positive National 0.032* 822 0.98 0.02 1764 0.69
7.15 Uncostitutionality of bail-in Negative National 0.015 827 0.98 0.034 1773 0.64
8.15 Moody’s downgrading Negative National -0.01 828 0.98 -0.05* 1772 0.64
8.15 Greek banks’ bail-in Positive Supranational 0.026*** 830 0.98 0.015 1770 0.64
9.15 French BRRD transposition Positive National 0.011 830 0.98 0.013 1770 0.65
12.15 Bail-in media coverage Positive National -0.06 829 0.98 0.105 1819 0.65
Panel A Panel B
High-debt countries Low-debt countries
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Table 15. Region-level Placebo difference-in-differences. 
The D-D coefficient is the estimate of ߚଶ relative to the placebo diff-in-diff model 𝑦𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛼𝑗 +
𝛽2 ൈ 𝑏𝑙𝑛𝑝𝑙𝑐𝑏𝑖𝑗 ൈ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿1 ൈ 𝑏𝑙𝑛𝑝𝑙𝑐𝑏𝑖𝑗 + 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑡 + 𝛿2 ൈ 𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 ; N is the number of observations in the (-7; 
0) window; the Adj.R2 is the adjusted R-squared. Appendix II provides information about these 
bail-in events. The group of countries with relatively high debt contains Italy, Spain and France. 
The group of countries with relatively high debt contains U.K., Austria and Germany. Standard 
errors are adjusted for both heteroscedasticity and within correlation clustered at the bank level. 
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% two-tailed levels, respectively. 
 
(1) (2)
Date Event Commitment Authority D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2
---- ------------------ ----------- ----------- ----------- ---- ---- ----------- ---- ----
7.12 Spanish bail-in plan Positive Supranational 0.256 286 0.72 -0.14 688 0.99
7.12 Germany votes Spain’ rescue Positive Supranational -0.15 296 0.75 0.845 693 0.83
8.12 Spain initiates bail-in law Positive Supranational 0.053 296 0.88 -0.02 696 0.99
10.12 Bail-in conversion details Positive Supranational 0.051 296 0.95 -0.12 696 0.99
12.12 EU: no bail-in for MPS Negative Supranational 0.008 286 0.96 -0.11 697 0.99
2.13 Bail-in SNS Reaal Positive Supranational 0.027 307 0.97 -0.11 712 0.99
3.13 Cyprus rescue plan Positive Supranational -0.02 312 0.96 0.094 720 0.99
4.13 Cyprus accord signed Positive Supranational -0.01 234 0.96 0.016 551 0.99
8.13 Finance Ministers approve BRRD Positive Supranational 0.04 312 0.94 -0.14 752 0.97
4.14 EU Parliament approve BRRD Positive Supranational 0.000 437 0.9 0.006 968 0.85
7.14 Law for Hypo Alpe’s bail-in Positive National 0.006 472 0.9 0.000 984 0.83
8.14 BES bail-in Positive Supranational 0.019 475 0.9 0.001 1000 0.73
9.14 Austrian BRRD transposition Positive National 0.05 489 0.88 0.02 1008 0.72
7.15 Italian BRRD transposition Positive National 0.006 504 0.89 0.075 1080 0.62
7.15 Uncostitutionality of bail-in Negative National 0.033 504 0.87 0.019 1088 0.57
8.15 Moody’s downgrading Negative National 0.000 504 0.87 0.081 1092 0.57
8.15 Greek banks’ bail-in Positive Supranational 0.017** 504 0.87 -0.03 1096 0.57
9.15 French BRRD transposition Positive National -0.01 504 0.87 0.07 1096 0.57
12.15 Bail-in media coverage Positive National 0.018 504 0.88 0.128 1128 0.55
High-debt countries Low-debt countries
Panel A Panel B
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Table 16. Restricted Diff-in-Diff test for high-debt and low-debt countries.  
The D-D coefficient is the estimate of ߚଷ relative to the restricted diff-in-diff model 𝑢𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑦𝑙𝑑𝑗𝑡 −
𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑦𝑙𝑑𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛼𝑗 + 𝛽3 ൈ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿2 ൈ 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡; N is the number of observations in the (-7; 0) window; 
the Adj.R2 is the adjusted R-squared. Appendix II provides information about these bail-in events. 
The group of countries with relatively high debt contains Italy, Spain and France. The group of 
countries with relatively high debt contains U.K., Austria and Germany. Standard errors are 
adjusted for both heteroscedasticity and within correlation clustered at the bank level. ***, **, 
and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% two-tailed levels, respectively. 
 
(1) (2)
Date Event Commitment Authority D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2
---- ------------------ ----------- ----------- ----------- ---- ---- ----------- ---- ----
7.12 Spanish bail-in plan Positive Supranational 0.102*** 208 0.99 0.011 496 0.99
7.12 Germany votes Spain’ rescue Positive Supranational 0.173*** 208 0.99 0.063 506 0.99
8.12 Spain initiates bail-in law Positive Supranational 0.068* 208 0.99 0.040* 512 0.99
10.12 Bail-in conversion details Positive Supranational 0.150*** 208 0.99 0.000 512 0.99
12.12 EU: no bail-in for MPS Negative Supranational -0.09** 208 0.99 -0.15 514 0.99
2.13 Bail-in SNS Reaal Positive Supranational 0.001 208 0.99 0.007 528 0.99
3.13 Cyprus rescue plan Positive Supranational 0.121*** 208 0.99 0.072 544 0.99
4.13 Cyprus accord signed Positive Supranational 0.091*** 164 0.99 0.034* 472 0.99
8.13 Finance Ministers approve BRRD Positive Supranational -0.01 208 0.99 0.018 560 0.99
4.14 EU Parliament approve BRRD Positive Supranational 0.043*** 256 0.99 0.001 688 0.99
7.14 Law for Hypo Alpe’s bail-in Positive National 0.011 256 0.99 0.025 688 0.99
8.14 BES bail-in Positive Supranational 0.000 266 0.99 0.000 688 0.99
9.14 Austrian BRRD transposition Positive National -0.03 272 0.99 0.121* 688 0.99
7.15 Italian BRRD transposition Positive National 0.028 288 0.98 0.147 704 0.99
7.15 Uncostitutionality of bail-in Negative National 0.000 288 0.99 0.056 704 0.99
8.15 Moody’s downgrading Negative National 0.000 288 0.99 -0.07 704 0.99
8.15 Greek banks’ bail-in Positive Supranational 0.004* 252 0.99 0.000 616 0.99
9.15 French BRRD transposition Positive National 0.014 288 0.99 -0.02 704 0.99
12.15 Bail-in media coverage Positive National 0.024 288 0.99 0.164 704 0.99
Panel A Panel B
High-debt countries Low-debt countries
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Table 17. Bail-in impact and bank size. Region-level Triple-differencing.  
The D-D-D coefficient is the estimate of ߚସ relative to the model ݕ݈݀௜	௝	௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߙ௜ ൅ ߚସ ൈ ݏ݅ݖ ௝݁ ൈ ܾ݈݊௜ ൈ
݌݋ݏݐ௧ ൅ ߛଵ ൈ ݏ݅ݖ ௝݁ ൈ ܾ݈݊௜ ൅ ߛଶ ൈ ݏ݅ݖ ௝݁ ൈ ݌݋ݏݐ௧ ൅ ߛଷ ൈ ܾ݈݊௜ ൈ ݌݋ݏݐ௧ ൅ ߜହ ൈ ݏ݅ݖ ௝݁ ൅ ߜ଺ ൈ ܾ݈݊௜ ൅ ݀ܽݕ௧ ൅ ߜ଻ ൈ ݐݐ݉௜	௧ ൅ ݑ௜	௝	௧; N 
is the number of observations in the (-7; 0) window; the Adj.R2 is the adjusted R-squared. 
Appendix II provides information about these bail-in events. The group of countries with relatively 
high debt contains Italy, Spain and France. The group of countries with relatively high debt 
contains U.K., Austria and Germany. The size is measured by the bank’s total assets. Standard 
errors are adjusted for both heteroscedasticity and within correlation clustered at the bank level. 
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% two-tailed levels, respectively. 
  
 
 
(1) (2)
Date Event Commitment Authority D-D-D N Adj.R2 D-D-D N Adj.R2
---- ------------------ ----------- ----------- ----------- ---- ---- ----------- ---- ----
7.12 Spanish bail-in plan Positive Supranational 0,124* 468 0,95 0,464 978 0,96
7.12 Germany votes Spain’ rescue Positive Supranational 0,112** 470 0,95 -1,261 983 0,81
8.12 Spain initiates bail-in law Positive Supranational -0,051 469 0,96 0,279 995 0,99
10.12 Bail-in conversion details Positive Supranational -0,021 482 0,96 0,424 1030 0,98
12.12 EU: no bail-in for MPS Negative Supranational -0,072* 498 0,96 -0,091 1054 0,98
2.13 Bail-in SNS Reaal Positive Supranational 0,016 516 0,98 0,276 1060 0,98
3.13 Cyprus rescue plan Positive Supranational 0,067*** 518 0,98 0,253 1082 0,98
4.13 Cyprus accord signed Positive Supranational 0,051** 426 0,98 0,355 1002 0,97
8.13 Finance Ministers approve BRRD Positive Supranational -0,004 517 0,99 0,697 1147 0,97
4.14 EU Parliament approve BRRD Positive Supranational -0,031 705 0,97 0,391 1577 0,92
7.14 Law for Hypo Alpe’s bail-in Positive National 0,002 733 0,97 0,108 1610 0,91
8.14 BES bail-in Positive Supranational 0,006 734 0,97 0,295 1627 0,86
9.14 Austrian BRRD transposition Positive National 0,014 741 0,97 0,386 1652 0,85
7.15 Italian BRRD transposition Positive National 0,012 822 0,99 1,191 1764 0,69
7.15 Uncostitutionality of bail-in Negative National 0,039 827 0,99 1,047 1773 0,64
8.15 Moody’s downgrading Negative National 0,035 828 0,99 1,047 1772 0,64
8.15 Greek banks’ bail-in Positive Supranational 0,052** 830 0,99 1,139 1770 0,64
9.15 French BRRD transposition Positive National 0,056* 830 0,98 0,946 1770 0,65
12.15 Bail-in media coverage Positive National 0,087** 829 0,98 0,081 1819 0,65
Panel A Panel B
High-debt countries Low-debt countries
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Table 17. Triple-differencing model for high-debt and low-debt countries.  
The D-D-D coefficient is the estimate of ߚସ relative to the model ݕ݈݀௜	௝	௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߙ௜ ൅ ߚସ ൈ ݎݏ ௝݇	௧ ൈ ܾ݈݊௜ ൈ
݌݋ݏݐ௧ ൅ ߛଵ ൈ ݎݏ ௝݇	௧ ൈ ܾ݈݊௜ ൅ ߛଶ ൈ ݎݏ ௝݇	௧ ൈ ݌݋ݏݐ௧ ൅ ߛଷ ൈ ܾ݈݊௜ ൈ ݌݋ݏݐ௧ ൅ ߜହ ൈ ݎݏ ௝݇	௧ ൅ ߜ଺ ൈ ܾ݈݊௜ ൅ ݀ܽݕ௧ ൅ ߜ଻ ൈ ݐݐ݉௜	௧ ൅ ݑ௜	௝	௧; 
N is the number of observations in the (-7; 0) window; the Adj.R2 is the adjusted R-squared. 
Appendix II provides information about these bail-in events. The group of countries with relatively 
high debt contains Italy, Spain and France. The group of countries with relatively high debt 
contains U.K., Austria and Germany. Standard errors are adjusted for both heteroscedasticity and 
within correlation clustered at the bank level. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% two-tailed levels, respectively. 
 
 
(1) (2)
Date Event Commitment Authority D-D-D N Adj.R2 D-D-D N Adj.R2
---- ------------------ ----------- ----------- ----------- ---- ---- ----------- ---- ----
7.12 Spanish bail-in plan Positive Supranational 0.050* 468 0.92 0.017 978 0.96
7.12 Germany votes Spain’ rescue Positive Supranational 0.010 470 0.92 -0.09 983 0.8
8.12 Spain initiates bail-in law Positive Supranational 0.000 469 0.93 0.009 995 0.98
10.12 Bail-in conversion details Positive Supranational 0.025 482 0.94 0.000 1030 0.98
12.12 EU: no bail-in for MPS Negative Supranational 0.000 498 0.96 0.000 1054 0.98
2.13 Bail-in SNS Reaal Positive Supranational 0.000 516 0.96 0.004 1060 0.98
3.13 Cyprus rescue plan Positive Supranational 0.000 518 0.95 0.003 1082 0.97
4.13 Cyprus accord signed Positive Supranational 0.000 426 0.95 0.000 1002 0.97
8.13 Finance Ministers approve BRRD Positive Supranational 0.000 517 0.97 0.01 1147 0.96
4.14 EU Parliament approve BRRD Positive Supranational 0.043** 705 0.96 -0.01 1577 0.91
7.14 Law for Hypo Alpe’s bail-in Positive National 0.002 733 0.97 0.008 1610 0.91
8.14 BES bail-in Positive Supranational 0.004 734 0.97 0.006 1627 0.85
9.14 Austrian BRRD transposition Positive National 0.000 741 0.97 0.03 1652 0.85
7.15 Italian BRRD transposition Positive National 0.000 822 0.98 0.009 1764 0.69
7.15 Uncostitutionality of bail-in Negative National 0.000 827 0.98 0.001 1773 0.64
8.15 Moody’s downgrading Negative National 0.029 828 0.98 0.005 1772 0.64
8.15 Greek banks’ bail-in Positive Supranational 0.018 830 0.98 0.000 1770 0.64
9.15 French BRRD transposition Positive National -0.03 830 0.98 -0.02 1770 0.65
12.15 Bail-in media coverage Positive National 0.056* 829 0.98 0.000 1819 0.65
Panel A Panel B
High-debt countries Low-debt countries
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Table 18. Region-level triple-differencing for large banks. 
A financial institution is defined “large” on the basis of the median size of financial institutions. 
The D-D-D coefficient is the estimate of ߚସ relative to the model ݕ݈݀௜	௝	௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߙ௜ ൅ ߚସ ൈ ݎݏ ௝݇	௧ ൈ ܾ݈݊௜ ൈ
݌݋ݏݐ௧ ൅ ߛଵ ൈ ݎݏ ௝݇	௧ ൈ ܾ݈݊௜ ൅ ߛଶ ൈ ݎݏ ௝݇	௧ ൈ ݌݋ݏݐ௧ ൅ ߛଷ ൈ ܾ݈݊௜ ൈ ݌݋ݏݐ௧ ൅ ߜହ ൈ ݎݏ ௝݇	௧ ൅ ߜ଺ ൈ ܾ݈݊௜ ൅ ݀ܽݕ௧ ൅ ߜ଻ ൈ ݐݐ݉௜	௧ ൅ ݑ௜	௝	௧; 
N is the number of observations in the (-7; 0) window; the Adj.R2 is the adjusted R-squared. 
Appendix II provides information about these bail-in events. The group of countries with relatively 
high debt contains Italy, Spain and France. The group of countries with relatively high debt 
contains U.K., Austria and Germany. Standard errors are adjusted for both heteroscedasticity and 
within correlation clustered at the bank level. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% two-tailed levels, respectively. 
 
 
(1) (2)
Date Event Commitment Authority D-D-D N Adj.R2 D-D-D N Adj.R2
---- ------------------ ----------- ----------- ----------- ---- ---- ----------- ---- ----
7.12 Spanish bail-in plan Positive Supranational 0,062** 302 0,87 0,047 402 0,99
7.12 Germany votes Spain’ rescue Positive Supranational 0,015 312 0,89 0,004 402 0,99
8.12 Spain initiates bail-in law Positive Supranational -0,03 301 0,89 0,004 411 0,99
10.12 Bail-in conversion details Positive Supranational 0,014 306 0,90 -0,07 438 0,98
12.12 EU: no bail-in for MPS Negative Supranational 0.007 329 0,92 -0,02 438 0.99
2.13 Bail-in SNS Reaal Positive Supranational 0,066* 332 0,90 -0,00 436 0,99
3.13 Cyprus rescue plan Positive Supranational 0,000 334 0,90 0,023 450 0,99
4.13 Cyprus accord signed Positive Supranational 0,014 288 0,90 -0,03 418 0,99
8.13 Finance Ministers approve BRRD Positive Supranational 0,029* 357 0,92 0,331 467 0,89
4.14 EU Parliament approve BRRD Positive Supranational 0,058*** 465 0,89 -0,00 664 0,90
7.14 Law for Hypo Alpe’s bail-in Positive National 0,005 477 0,91 -0,00 683 0,90
8.14 BES bail-in Positive Supranational -0,00 481 0,90 -0,00 690 0,81
9.14 Austrian BRRD transposition Positive National 0,003 484 0,90 0,071*** 694 0,80
7.15 Italian BRRD transposition Positive National -0,00 514 0,94 0,079 768 0,59
7.15 Uncostitutionality of bail-in Negative National 0,017 515 0,93 0,033 773 0,47
8.15 Moody’s downgrading Negative National 0,213 516 0,94 -0,00 772 0,47
8.15 Greek banks’ bail-in Positive Supranational 0,008 518 0,94 -0,01 770 0,47
9.15 French BRRD transposition Positive National -0,02 518 0,94 -0,09 770 0,47
12.15 Bail-in media coverage Positive National 0,036*** 517 0,93 0,169 795 0,59
Large banks in high-debt states Large banks in low-debt states
Panel A Panel B
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Table 19. Region-level triple-differencing for large banks. 
A financial institution is defined “large” on the basis of the ECB definition of significant 
institutions. The D-D-D coefficient is the estimate of ߚସ relative to the model ݕ݈݀௜	௝	௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߙ௜ ൅ ߚସ ൈ
ݎݏ ௝݇	௧ ൈ ܾ݈݊௜ ൈ ݌݋ݏݐ௧ ൅ ߛଵ ൈ ݎݏ ௝݇	௧ ൈ ܾ݈݊௜ ൅ ߛଶ ൈ ݎݏ ௝݇	௧ ൈ ݌݋ݏݐ௧ ൅ ߛଷ ൈ ܾ݈݊௜ ൈ ݌݋ݏݐ௧ ൅ ߜହ ൈ ݎݏ ௝݇	௧ ൅ ߜ଺ ൈ ܾ݈݊௜ ൅ ݀ܽݕ௧ ൅ ߜ଻ ൈ
ݐݐ݉௜	௧ ൅ ݑ௜	௝	௧; N is the number of observations in the (-7; 0) window; the Adj.R2 is the adjusted R-
squared. Appendix II provides information about these bail-in events. The group of countries with 
relatively high debt contains Italy, Spain and France. The group of countries with relatively high 
debt contains U.K., Austria and Germany. Standard errors are adjusted for both heteroscedasticity 
and within correlation clustered at the bank level. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% two-tailed levels, respectively.  
  
(1) (2)
Date Event Commitment Authority D-D-D N Adj.R2 D-D-D N Adj.R2
---- ------------------ ----------- ----------- ----------- ---- ---- ----------- ---- ----
7.12 Spanish bail-in plan Positive Supranational 0.083* 302 0.86 0.02 426 0.61
7.12 Germany votes Spain’ rescue Positive Supranational 0.000 302 0.88 -0.07 431 0.59
8.12 Spain initiates bail-in law Positive Supranational -0.01 301 0.9 0.026 435 0.58
10.12 Bail-in conversion details Positive Supranational 0.012 298 0.9 0.01 438 0.55
12.12 EU: no bail-in for MPS Negative Supranational 0.001 302 0.9 -0.01 438 0.54
2.13 Bail-in SNS Reaal Positive Supranational 0.070* 308 0.9 0.000 436 0.55
3.13 Cyprus rescue plan Positive Supranational 0.000 310 0.89 0.143 434 0.53
4.13 Cyprus accord signed Positive Supranational 0.016 253 0.89 0.179 388 0.5
8.13 Finance Ministers approve BRRD Positive Supranational 0.03 309 0.92 0.000 435 0.51
4.14 EU Parliament approve BRRD Positive Supranational 0.058*** 369 0.86 0.000 516 0.5
7.14 Law for Hypo Alpe’s bail-in Positive National 0.010** 373 0.86 0.091 515 0.49
8.14 BES bail-in Positive Supranational -0.01 378 0.85 -0.06 515 0.49
9.14 Austrian BRRD transposition Positive National 0.005 380 0.84 0.061 516 0.49
7.15 Italian BRRD transposition Positive National 0.000 390 0.88 0.56 514 0.47
7.15 Uncostitutionality of bail-in Negative National 0.015 387 0.88 0.264 517 0.47
8.15 Moody’s downgrading Negative National 0.204 388 0.89 0.014 516 0.47
8.15 Greek banks’ bail-in Positive Supranational 0.012 390 0.89 -1.43 514 0.47
9.15 French BRRD transposition Positive National -0.02 390 0.89 -0.26 514 0.47
12.15 Bail-in media coverage Positive National 0.036*** 389 0.85 0.543 515 0.47
Panel A Panel B
Large banks in high-debt states Large banks in low-debt states
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Appendix I 
The following timeline presents all the events, the events’ dates and the related articles. The 
sources can be FT (Financial Times), BN (Bloomberg News), EU Com. (European Commission’s 
document), NG (National Gazzette), CS (Corriere della Sera). 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Date Event Article’s title Source
----------- ---------------------------------------------- ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ----
10.07.2012 Spanish bail-in plan Savers face losses in Spain bank rescue FT
19.07.2012 Germany vote Spain’ rescue Spain bailout-backed FT
23.08.2012 Spanish Gov. proposes bail-in Spain bank rules push FT
29.10.2012 SAREB conversion details Bankia group to transfer Euro12 bln of foreclosed assets to SAREB BN
18.12.2012 EU: no bail-in for MPS EU commission’s press release of 17 December 2012 EU Com.
01.02.2013 Bail-in SNS Reaal Torrid week for European banks FT
18.03.2013 Cyprus rescue plan Cyprus in crisis over tax on bank deposits FT
02.04.2012 Cyprus accord signed Cyprus government spokesman says have finalized troika talks BN
28.06.2013 Finance Ministers back BRRD EU bank rules deal FT
15.04.2014 EU Parliament approves BRRD EU banking reforms mark the biggest shake-up FT
08.07.2014 Law for Hypo-Alpe’s bail-in Austrian parliament approves hypo alpe law imposing bond losses BN
05.08.2014 BES bail-in BES knocked on bail-in FT
22.09.2014 Austrian BRRD ratification Austria Prepares to Put Senior Bank Creditors in Line for Losses BN
03.07.2015 Italian BRRD ratification Legge di delegazione europea 2014/59/UE NG
28.07.2015 Austria’s uncostitutionality verdict Austrian Court says 2014 Hypo Alpe Law uncostitutional BN
05.08.2015 Uncostitutionality causes downgrading Moody’s downgrades State of Carinthia’s rating BN
12.08.2015 Greek banks’ bail-in Greece Commits to Comprehensive Bank Plan BN
14.09.2015 French BRRD ratification Arrete du 11 septembre 2015 relatif au regime prudentiel NG
09.12.2015 Bail-in media coverage Perde 100mila euro col “salvabanche”. Pensionato si suicida a Civitavecchia CS
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Appendix II 
Bail-in of Bankia and other Spanish banks: positive bail-in events 
In May 2012, the stock prices of Bankia and of other smaller Spanish banks experienced a strong 
and steady decline. 
On July 10, 2012, the negotiations between Spanish government, Eurogroup and EU Commission 
produce the first proposal for the financial support of Bankia (and other banks) that contains the 
bail-in provision. 
On July 19, 2012, the German government, a crucial political counterparty during Spanish 
negotiations, backed the agreed general program for financial aid. 
On August 23, 2012, in order to implement the agreed project for bailing-in the distressed Spanish 
banks, the Spanish government starts the legislative process for the creation of a national bail-in 
regulation. 
On October 29, 2012, after prolonged discussions with European Commission, ECB and 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Spanish government agrees on the details of the bail-in 
of Bankia (and other banks), sets up the bad bank (SAREB) and concretely receives the agreed 
funds.  
Indication of commitment towards the bail-in mechanism: positive. 
Authorities involved: Spanish and supranational.  
 
MPS receives government support without bail-in: negative bail-in events 
On December 17, 2012, the European Commission allowed the Italian government to support 
without any bail-in provision the distressed Monte dei Paschi di Siena (MPS), the third largest 
bank in Italy. This is classified as a negative bail-in event because it was a key evidence of the 
fact that the bail-in principle did not need to be imposed in any case of public support. 
Indication of commitment towards the bail-in mechanism: negative. 
Authorities involved: Italian and supranational.  
 
 
Bail-in of SNS Reaal, Netherlands: positive bail-in event 
69 
 
The Dutch institution SNS Reaal, with less than 85 billion euros in assets, during 2012, was bearing 
very heavy losses and also the percentage of non-performing loans was unceasingly expanding.  
On February 1, 2013, the Dutch government has nationalized the domestic institution SNS Reaal 
and, simultaneously, its shareholders and junior creditors lost their whole capital. This event is 
typically considered as reflecting the commitment of European authorities, given that the Dutch 
Finance Minister Dijsselbloem was also the president of the Eurogroup (which has a very 
prominent institutional role in the resolutions of EU banks) and was recognized as a strong 
advocate for the bail-in policy.30 
Indication of commitment towards the bail-in mechanism: positive. 
Authorities involved: Dutch and supranational.  
 
Bail-in of Bank of Cyprus and Laiki: positive bail-in event 
On March 18, 2013, after very intense discussions with the European Finance Ministers, the 
government of Cyprus declared that a likely condition for the government support was to include 
bail-in provisions in the form of losses for all unsecured debt and even deposits. 
On April 2, 2013, Cyprus and EU officials concluded the negotiations and, therefore, a large part 
of the uncertainty linked to the program was solved. The involvement of a very large set of 
unsecured instruments was confirmed and even depositors with more than 100.000 euros had to 
bear haircuts. 
Indication of commitment towards the bail-in mechanism: positive. 
Authorities involved: Cyprian and supranational.  
 
 
European Approval of BRRD: positive bail-in events 
On August 28, 2013, EU Finance Ministers agreed on the proposal of BRRD to be presented in 
the European Parliament. 
On April 14, 2014, the European Parliament votes the final approval of the BRRD proposal. 
                                                            
30 For instance, the New York Times writes: “What makes this (bail-in) much more than a Dutch novelty 
is the new clout of Dutch Finance Minister Dijsselbloem”. 
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Indication of commitment towards the bail-in mechanism: positive. 
Authorities involved: European. 
 
Bail-in of Banco Espirito Santo, Portugal: positive bail-in event 
On August 4, 2014, Reuters announces that Banco Espirito Santo (also referred to as BES), has 
been transformed into a “bad bank” after intense negotiations between the Portuguese government 
and the European Union. The agreement imposes the junior creditors to become the creditors of 
a “bad bank”, while a new “good bank” has to contain only the profitable part of the assets. 
Indication of commitment towards the bail-in mechanism: positive. 
Authorities involved: Portuguese and European. 
 
 
Austrian Parliament’s approval of Hypo Alpe’s bail-in and BRRD: positive bail-in events 
On July 8, 2014, after explicit requests from the Austrian government to let the national 
Parliament decide about the bail-in of Austrian financial institution Hypo Alpe, the national 
assembly approves the reorganization of the banks, which was the first step towards the bail-in of 
its creditors. 
On September 22, 2014, the Austrian Parliament approves the law which transpose the EU 
directive BRRD. 
Indication of commitment towards the bail-in mechanism: positive. 
Authorities involved: Austrian.  
 
Uncostitutionality of the bail-in of Hypo Alpe: negative bail-in events 
On July 28, 2015, the Austrian Constitutional Court declares unconstitutional the bail-in of the 
financial institution Hypo Alpe because Carinthian regional government had previously provided 
explicit guarantees for a large portion of the debt. However, the interpretation of this statement 
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is ambiguous because the Federal Finance Minister continues to reiterate that the bail-in has to 
be entirely realized.31 This is classified as a negative bail-in event. 
On August 5, 2015, after the federal government’s clarification that it recognizes as legitimate the 
guarantees of the Carinthian regional government in favor Hypo Alpe’s creditors, Moody’s certifies 
that the verdict of unconstitutionality has the legal basis to block the bail-in of the Austrian bank 
and, as a consequence, the rating agency even cuts the rating of the regional State of Carinthia.  
Indication of commitment towards the bail-in mechanism: negative. 
Authorities involved: Austrian.  
 
Law regarding the bail-in of Greek banks: positive bail-in event 
On August 12, 2015, as a precondition for the approval of the financial support from the European 
Commission, IMF and ECB, the Greek government prepares the banking law allowing the bail-in 
of its distressed banks. It is a positive bail-in event. 
Indication of commitment towards the bail-in mechanism: positive. 
Authorities involved: Greek and European.  
 
France’s transposition of BRRD: positive bail-in event 
On September 11, 2015, the French Government approves of the Décret 2015-1160, which realizes 
the national transposition of the BRRD. 
Indication of commitment towards the bail-in mechanism: positive. 
Authorities involved: French.  
 
Italy’s transposition of BRRD and media coverage of bail-in: positive bail-in event 
On July 2, 2015, the national Parliament votes the last approval for the Italian transposition of 
the BRRD. I analyze the first trading day after Italian Camera’s transposition of the BRRD. 
                                                            
31 Bloomberg writes: “Following the Constitutional Court’s ruling, the Ministry of Finance indicated that it 
would have no impact on the creation of Heta (i.e., the bad bank) or the moratorium on debt repayments”. 
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After the resolution of four small Italian banks, several demonstrations take place and, on 
December 9, 2015, a case of suicide among the unsophisticated investors occurs. This news 
generated a very intense and broad wave of information about the bail-in and the related risks for 
unsecured bondholders. The vast media coverage resulting from this event had reached the very 
large clientele of retail investors that, in Italy, hold 46% of the subordinated securities and 40% of 
unsecured senior debt issued by Italian banks. Given that the clientele of retail investors had 
profound difficulties in understanding all the novelties introduced by the bail-in (as claimed by 
national media and a Parliamentary Commission) this event might have changed the expectations 
about the legal treatment of unsecured bonds for the large class of unsophisticated unsecured 
bondholders. 
Indication of commitment towards the bail-in mechanism: positive. 
Authorities involved: Italian. 
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Appendix III 
Table A3. Spanish banks’ bail-in.  
The D-D coefficient is the estimate of ߚଵ relative to the model 𝑦𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛼𝑗 + 𝛽1 ൈ 𝑏𝑙𝑛𝑖𝑗 ൈ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿1 ൈ 𝑏𝑙𝑛𝑖𝑗 + 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑡 + 𝛿2 ൈ 𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡  ; N is the number 
of observations in the (-7; +2) window; the Adj.R2 is the adjusted R-squared. The variable Commitment describes whether the event indicates 
a positive or a negative commitment towards the bail-in principle. The variable Authority describes whether the negotiations regarding the 
event have involved only national authorities or supranational authorities, too. Appendix II provides information about these bail-in events. 
Standard errors are adjusted for both heteroscedasticity and within correlation clustered at the bank level. ***, **, and * indicate significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% two-tailed levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2)
Date Event Commitment Authority D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2
--------- ------------------ --------- --------- ------- ---- ------ ------- ---- ------ ------- ---- ------ ------- ---- ------ ------- ---- ------ ------- ---- ------
10.07.12 Spanish bail-in plan Positive Supranational 0.101 200 0.8 0.14*** 130 0.85 0.038* 256 0.99 0.014 590 0.97 0.027 170 0.91 -0.232 462 0.95
19.07.12 Germany votes Spain’ rescue Positive Supranational 0.149*** 200 0.86 0.202* 130 0.87 0.079*** 258 0.99 -0.055 590 0.97 0.127 170 0.91 3.617 468 0.8
23.08.12 Spanish Gov. proposes bail-in Positive Supranational 0.101** 200 0.93 0.039 130 0.88 0.046*** 256 0.99 0.007 600 0.97 0.028 170 0.83 0.011 474 0.98
29.10.12 Bail-in conversion details Positive Supranational 0.091* 200 0.98 0.081 130 0.85 0.07** 270 0.99 -0.027 620 0.95 0.02 180 0.85 -0.494 487 0.98
Italy Spain France U.K. Austria Germany
Panel A Panel B Panel C Panel C Panel D Panel E
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Table A4. Italian government supports Monte dei Paschi di Siena without bail-in provisions. 
The D-D coefficient is the estimate of ߚଵ relative to the model 𝑦𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛼𝑗 + 𝛽1 ൈ 𝑏𝑙𝑛𝑖𝑗 ൈ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿1 ൈ 𝑏𝑙𝑛𝑖𝑗 + 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑡 + 𝛿2 ൈ 𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 ; N is the 
number of observations in the (-7; +2) window; the Adj.R2 is the adjusted R-squared. The variable Commitment describes whether the event 
indicates a positive or a negative commitment towards the bail-in principle. The variable Authority describes whether the negotiations regarding 
the event have involved only national authorities or supranational authorities, too. Appendix II provides information about these bail-in events. 
Standard errors are adjusted for both heteroscedasticity and within correlation clustered at the bank level. ***, **, and * indicate significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% two-tailed levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
(1) (2)
Date Event Commitment Authority D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2
--------- ------------------ --------- --------- ------- ---- ------ ------- ---- ------ ------- ---- ------ ------- ---- ------ ------- ---- ------ ------- ---- ------
18.12.12 EU: no bail-in for MPS Negative Supranational -0.171*** 200 0.98 -0.095 130 0.89 -0.055 293 0.99 -0.083** 640 0.96 -0.083** 180 0.86 -0.269 499 0.98
Italy Spain France U.K. Austria Germany
Panel A Panel B Panel C Panel C Panel D Panel E
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Table A5. Bail-in of the Dutch bank SNS Reaal. 
The D-D coefficient is the estimate of ߚଵ relative to the model 𝑦𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛼𝑗 + 𝛽1 ൈ 𝑏𝑙𝑛𝑖𝑗 ൈ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿1 ൈ 𝑏𝑙𝑛𝑖𝑗 + 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑡 + 𝛿2 ൈ 𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 ; N is the 
number of observations in the (-7; +2) window; the Adj.R2 is the adjusted R-squared. The variable Commitment describes whether the event 
indicates a positive or a negative commitment towards the bail-in principle. The variable Authority describes whether the negotiations regarding 
the event have involved only national authorities or supranational authorities, too. Appendix II provides information about these bail-in events. 
Standard errors are adjusted for both heteroscedasticity and within correlation clustered at the bank level. ***, **, and * indicate significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% two-tailed levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
(1) (2)
Date Event Commitment Authority D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2
--------- ------------------ --------- --------- ------- ---- ------ ------- ---- ------ ------- ---- ------ ------- ---- ------ ------- ---- ------ ------- ---- ------
01.02.13 Bail-in SNS Reaal Positive Supranational 0.11*** 210 0.99 0.013 140 0.89 0.026 294 0.99 0.046*** 640 0.96 -0.014 180 0.86 -0.196 506 0.98
Italy Spain France U.K. Austria Germany
Panel A Panel B Panel C Panel C Panel D Panel E
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Table A6. Bail-in of Cyprian banks. 
The D-D coefficient is the estimate of ߚଵ relative to the model 𝑦𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛼𝑗 + 𝛽1 ൈ 𝑏𝑙𝑛𝑖𝑗 ൈ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿1 ൈ 𝑏𝑙𝑛𝑖𝑗 + 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑡 + 𝛿2 ൈ 𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 ; N is the 
number of observations in the (-7; +2) window; the Adj.R2 is the adjusted R-squared. The variable Commitment describes whether the event 
indicates a positive or a negative commitment towards the bail-in principle. The variable Authority describes whether the negotiations regarding 
the event have involved only national authorities or supranational authorities, too. Appendix II provides information about these bail-in events. 
Standard errors are adjusted for both heteroscedasticity and within correlation clustered at the bank level. ***, **, and * indicate significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% two-tailed levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
(1) (2)
Date Event Commitment Authority D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2
--------- ------------------ --------- --------- ------- ---- ------ ------- ---- ------ ------- ---- ------ ------- ---- ------ ------- ---- ------ ------- ---- ------
18.03.13 Cyprus rescue plan Positive Supranational 0.098*** 210 0.99 0.097** 140 0.89 0.017 298 0.99 0.054 650 0.94 0.053** 180 0.87 0.194 522 0.97
02.04.13 Cyprus accord signed Positive Supranational 0.11*** 168 0.99 0.042* 112 0.9 0.042*** 274 0.99 0.01 669 0.96 0.076*** 144 0.89 0.189 465 0.97
Italy Spain France U.K. Austria Germany
Panel A Panel B Panel C Panel C Panel D Panel E
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Table A7. Approvals of BRRD at European level. 
The D-D coefficient is the estimate of ߚଵ relative to the model 𝑦𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛼𝑗 + 𝛽1 ൈ 𝑏𝑙𝑛𝑖𝑗 ൈ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿1 ൈ 𝑏𝑙𝑛𝑖𝑗 + 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑡 + 𝛿2 ൈ 𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 ; N is the 
number of observations in the (-7; +2) window; the Adj.R2 is the adjusted R-squared. The variable Commitment describes whether the event 
indicates a positive or a negative commitment towards the bail-in principle. The variable Authority describes whether the negotiations regarding 
the event have involved only national authorities or supranational authorities, too. Appendix II provides information about these bail-in events. 
Standard errors are adjusted for both heteroscedasticity and within correlation clustered at the bank level. ***, **, and * indicate significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% two-tailed levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
(1) (2)
Date Event Commitment Authority D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2
--------- ------------------ --------- --------- ------- ---- ------ ------- ---- ------ ------- ---- ------ ------- ---- ------ ------- ---- ------ ------- ---- ------
28.06.13 Finance Ministers approve BRRD Positive Supranational -0.014 210 0.99 -0.033 140 0.9 0.004 295 0.99 -0.015 700 0.95 0.013 180 0.88 -1.601 555 0.96
15.04.14 EU Parliament approve BRRD Positive Supranational 0.089* 347 0.94 0.039** 150 0.86 0.012 385 0.99 0.046 904 0.98 -0.027 340 0.89 0.022 730 0.91
Italy Spain France U.K. Austria Germany
Panel A Panel B Panel C Panel C Panel D Panel E
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Table A8. BES Bail-in, Portugal. 
The D-D coefficient is the estimate of ߚଵ relative to the model 𝑦𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛼𝑗 + 𝛽1 ൈ 𝑏𝑙𝑛𝑖𝑗 ൈ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿1 ൈ 𝑏𝑙𝑛𝑖𝑗 + 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑡 + 𝛿2 ൈ 𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 ; N is the 
number of observations in the (-7; +2) window; the Adj.R2 is the adjusted R-squared. The variable Commitment describes whether the event 
indicates a positive or a negative commitment towards the bail-in principle. The variable Authority describes whether the negotiations regarding 
the event have involved only national authorities or supranational authorities, too. Appendix II provides information about these bail-in events. 
Standard errors are adjusted for both heteroscedasticity and within correlation clustered at the bank level. ***, **, and * indicate significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% two-tailed levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
(1) (2)
Date Event Commitment Authority D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2
--------- ------------------ --------- --------- ------- ---- ------ ------- ---- ------ ------- ---- ------ ------- ---- ------ ------- ---- ------ ------- ---- ------
05.08.14 BES bail-in Positive Supranational 0.107*** 377 0.96 0.036** 150 0.84 0.036** 392 0.99 0.068* 950 0.98 0.078 350 0.88 0.177** 734 0.85
Italy Spain France U.K. Austria Germany
Panel A Panel B Panel C Panel C Panel D Panel E
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Table A9. Austrian Parliament approvals for Hypo Alpe’s bail-in and for the national transposition of the BRRD. 
The D-D coefficient is the estimate of ߚଵ relative to the model 𝑦𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛼𝑗 + 𝛽1 ൈ 𝑏𝑙𝑛𝑖𝑗 ൈ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿1 ൈ 𝑏𝑙𝑛𝑖𝑗 + 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑡 + 𝛿2 ൈ 𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 ; N is the 
number of observations in the (-7; +2) window; the Adj.R2 is the adjusted R-squared. The variable Commitment describes whether the event 
indicates a positive or a negative commitment towards the bail-in principle. The variable Authority describes whether the negotiations regarding 
the event have involved only national authorities or supranational authorities, too. Appendix II provides information about these bail-in events. 
Standard errors are adjusted for both heteroscedasticity and within correlation clustered at the bank level. ***, **, and * indicate significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% two-tailed levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
(1) (2)
Date Event Commitment Authority D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2
--------- ------------------ --------- --------- ------- ---- ------ ------- ---- ------ ------- ---- ------ ------- ---- ------ ------- ---- ------ ------- ---- ------
08.07.14 Law for Hypo Alpe’s bail-in Positive National 0.007 370 0.97 0.034* 150 0.84 0.04*** 395 0.99 0.027* 929 0.99 0.053* 350 0.9 -0.004 735 0.91
22.09.14 Austrian BRRD transposition Positive National 0.007 380 0.97 -0.002 150 0.84 0.007 398 0.99 -0.003 970 0.99 0.183*** 350 0.87 -0.061 745 0.84
Italy Spain France U.K. Austria Germany
Panel A Panel B Panel C Panel C Panel D Panel E
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Table A10. Uncostitutionality verdict for the bail-in of Austrian bank Hypo Alpe. 
The D-D coefficient is the estimate of ߚଵ relative to the model 𝑦𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛼𝑗 + 𝛽1 ൈ 𝑏𝑙𝑛𝑖𝑗 ൈ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿1 ൈ 𝑏𝑙𝑛𝑖𝑗 + 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑡 + 𝛿2 ൈ 𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 ; N is the 
number of observations in the (-7; +2) window; the Adj.R2 is the adjusted R-squared. The variable Commitment describes whether the event 
indicates a positive or a negative commitment towards the bail-in principle. The variable Authority describes whether the negotiations regarding 
the event have involved only national authorities or supranational authorities, too. Appendix II provides information about these bail-in events. 
Standard errors are adjusted for both heteroscedasticity and within correlation clustered at the bank level. ***, **, and * indicate significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% two-tailed levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2)
Date Event Commitment Authority D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2
--------- ------------------ --------- --------- ------- ---- ------ ------- ---- ------ ------- ---- ------ ------- ---- ------ ------- ---- ------ ------- ---- ------
28.07.15 Uncostitutionality of bail-in Negative National 0.095 380 0.97 -0.004 170 0.83 -0.019 483 0.99 0.018 1050 0.96 -0.037 370 0.82 0.116 797 0.64
05.08.15 Moody’s downgrading Negative National 0.004 380 0.99 -0.008 170 0.83 -0.005 486 0.99 -0.006 1050 0.96 -0.053** 370 0.82 -0.018 794 0.64
Italy Spain France U.K. Austria Germany
Panel A Panel B Panel C Panel C Panel D Panel E
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Table A11. Greek government agrees to prepare a law for the bail-in of Greek banks. 
The D-D coefficient is the estimate of ߚଵ relative to the model 𝑦𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛼𝑗 + 𝛽1 ൈ 𝑏𝑙𝑛𝑖𝑗 ൈ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿1 ൈ 𝑏𝑙𝑛𝑖𝑗 + 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑡 + 𝛿2 ൈ 𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 ; N is the 
number of observations in the (-7; +2) window; the Adj.R2 is the adjusted R-squared. The variable Commitment describes whether the event 
indicates a positive or a negative commitment towards the bail-in principle. The variable Authority describes whether the negotiations regarding 
the event have involved only national authorities or supranational authorities, too. Appendix II provides information about these bail-in events. 
Standard errors are adjusted for both heteroscedasticity and within correlation clustered at the bank level. ***, **, and * indicate significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% two-tailed levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
(1) (2)
Date Event Commitment Authority D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2
--------- ------------------ --------- --------- ------- ---- ------ ------- ---- ------ ------- ---- ------ ------- ---- ------ ------- ---- ------ ------- ---- ------
12.08.15 Greek banks’ bail-in Positive Supranational 0.026* 380 0.99 0.025** 170 0.83 0.019** 487 0.99 0.001 1050 0.96 0.022 370 0.81 0.01 793 0.64
Italy Spain France U.K. Austria Germany
Panel A Panel B Panel C Panel C Panel D Panel E
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Table A12. France’s transposition of the BRRD.  
The D-D coefficient is the estimate of ߚଵ relative to the model 𝑦𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛼𝑗 + 𝛽1 ൈ 𝑏𝑙𝑛𝑖𝑗 ൈ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿1 ൈ 𝑏𝑙𝑛𝑖𝑗 + 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑡 + 𝛿2 ൈ 𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 ; N is the 
number of observations in the (-7; +2) window; the Adj.R2 is the adjusted R-squared. The variable Commitment describes whether the event 
indicates a positive or a negative commitment towards the bail-in principle. The variable Authority describes whether the negotiations regarding 
the event have involved only national authorities or supranational authorities, too. Appendix II provides information about these bail-in events. 
Standard errors are adjusted for both heteroscedasticity and within correlation clustered at the bank level. ***, **, and * indicate significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% two-tailed levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
(1) (2)
Date Event Commitment Authority D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2
--------- ------------------ --------- --------- ------- ---- ------ ------- ---- ------ ------- ---- ------ ------- ---- ------ ------- ---- ------ ------- ---- ------
14.09.15 French BRRD transposition Positive National 0.052* 380 0.99 0.009 170 0.83 0.028* 486 0.99 0.002 1050 0.95 -0.091 370 0.82 0.078 794 0.65
Italy Spain France U.K. Austria Germany
Panel A Panel B Panel C Panel C Panel D Panel E
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Table A13. Italy’s bail-in events. 
The D-D coefficient is the estimate of ߚଵ relative to the model 𝑦𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛼𝑗 + 𝛽1 ൈ 𝑏𝑙𝑛𝑖𝑗 ൈ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿1 ൈ 𝑏𝑙𝑛𝑖𝑗 + 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑡 + 𝛿2 ൈ 𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 ; N is the 
number of observations in the (-7; +2) window; the Adj.R2 is the adjusted R-squared. The variable Commitment describes whether the event 
indicates a positive or a negative commitment towards the bail-in principle. The variable Authority describes whether the negotiations regarding 
the event have involved only national authorities or supranational authorities, too. Appendix II provides information about these bail-in events. 
Standard errors are adjusted for both heteroscedasticity and within correlation clustered at the bank level. ***, **, and * indicate significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% two-tailed levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
(1) (2)
Date Event Commitment Authority D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2
--------- ------------------ --------- --------- ------- ---- ------ ------- ---- ------ ------- ---- ------ ------- ---- ------ ------- ---- ------ ------- ---- ------
03.07.15 Italian BRRD transposition Positive National 0.082*** 380 0.98 0.022 170 0.84 0.063** 476 0.99 0.056* 1044 0.96 0.038 370 0.85 0.065 794 0.68
09.12.15 Bail-in media coverage Positive National 0.067*** 380 0.98 -0.187 170 0.77 -0.001 486 0.99 0.07** 1080 0.97 0.068 370 0.79 0.306 824 0.65
Italy Spain France U.K. Austria Germany
Panel A Panel B Panel C Panel C Panel D Panel E
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Table A14. Triple-differencing with extended time window.  
The D-D-D coefficient is the estimate of ߚହ relative to the model ݕ݈݀௜	௝	௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߙ௜ ൅ ߚହ ൈ ݎݏ ௝݇	௧ ൈ ܾ݈݊௜ ൈ
݌݋ݏݐ௧ ൅ ߛଵ ൈ ݎݏ ௝݇	௧ ൈ ܾ݈݊௜ ൅ ߛଶ ൈ ݎݏ ௝݇	௧ ൈ ݌݋ݏݐ௧ ൅ ߛଷ ൈ ܾ݈݊௜ ൈ ݌݋ݏݐ௧ ൅ ߜହ ൈ ݎݏ ௝݇	௧ ൅ ߜ଺ ൈ ܾ݈݊௜ ൅ ݀ܽݕ௧ ൅ ߜ଻ ൈ ݐݐ݉௜	௧ ൅ ݑ௜	௝	௧; 
N is the number of observations in the (-7; +2) window; the Adj.R2 is the adjusted R-squared. 
Appendix II provides information about these bail-in events. The group of countries with relatively 
high debt contains Italy, Spain and France. The group of countries with relatively high debt 
contains U.K., Austria and Germany. Standard errors are adjusted for both heteroscedasticity and 
within correlation clustered at the bank level. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% two-tailed levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
(1) (2)
Date Event Commitment Authority D-D-D N Adj.R2 D-D-D N Adj.R2
---- ------------------ ----------- ----------- ----------- ---- ---- ----------- ---- ----
7.12 Spanish bail-in plan Positive Supranational 0,049* 586 0,92 0,014* 1222 0,95
7.12 Germany votes Spain’ rescue Positive Supranational 0,026 588 0,92 -0,105 1228 0,81
8.12 Spain initiates bail-in law Positive Supranational -0,006 586 0,93 0,009 1244 0,98
10.12 Bail-in conversion details Positive Supranational 0,044 600 0,94 -0,003 1287 0,98
12.12 EU: no bail-in for MPS Negative Supranational -0,004 623 0,96 -0,001 1319 0,98
2.13 Bail-in SNS Reaal Positive Supranational 0,001 644 0,96 0,004 1326 0,98
3.13 Cyprus rescue plan Positive Supranational -0,002 648 0,95 0,007 1352 0,97
4.13 Cyprus accord signed Positive Supranational 0,006 554 0,95 -0,001 1278 0,97
8.13 Finance Ministers approve BRRD Positive Supranational 0,000 645 0,97 0,029 1435 0,96
4.14 EU Parliament approve BRRD Positive Supranational 0,048*** 882 0,96 -0,01 1974 0,91
7.14 Law for Hypo Alpe’s bail-in Positive National 0,017 915 0,97 0,006 2014 0,91
8.14 BES bail-in Positive Supranational -0,002 919 0,97 0,017 2034 0,85
9.14 Austrian BRRD transposition Positive National -0,005 928 0,97 0,01 2065 0,85
7.15 Italian BRRD transposition Positive National -0,01 1026 0,98 0,008 2208 0,69
7.15 Uncostitutionality of bail-in Negative National 0,002 1033 0,98 0,001 2217 0,65
8.15 Moody’s downgrading Negative National 0,039 1036 0,98 0,011 2214 0,65
8.15 Greek banks’ bail-in Positive Supranational 0,009* 1037 0,98 0,003 2213 0,65
9.15 French BRRD transposition Positive National -0,011 1036 0,98 -0,041 2214 0,66
12.15 Bail-in media coverage Positive National 0,047* 1036 0,98 0,042 2274 0,66
Panel A Panel B
High-debt countries Low-debt countries
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Appendix IV 
Interpretation of the triple-differencing estimate 𝛽4 
The triple differencing empirical model is:  
𝑦𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽4 ൈ 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑗 ൈ 𝑏𝑙𝑛𝑖 ൈ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛾1 ൈ 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑗 ൈ 𝑏𝑙𝑛𝑖 + 𝛾2 ൈ 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑗 ൈ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡                  
+ 𝛾3 ൈ 𝑏𝑙𝑛𝑖 ൈ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿5 ൈ 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑗 + 𝛿6 ൈ 𝑏𝑙𝑛𝑖 + 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑡 + 𝛿7 ൈ 𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑖𝑗𝑡
+ 𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑡                                                                                           (4) 
We can assume that bank risk can take only two values (𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 = 𝑠 = 𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 or 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 = 𝑙 = 𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒), that 
𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 can take two values (𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 = 𝑝𝑟𝑒 = before bail-in  event or 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 = 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 = after bail-in  event), that 
𝑏𝑙𝑛 can take two values (𝑏𝑙𝑛 = 𝑏 = bailinable or 𝑏𝑙𝑛 = 𝑛 = non-bailinable) and that     
𝐸(𝑢|𝑏𝑙𝑛, 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡, 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒,𝑋) = 0 (where 𝑋 is the set of control variables in the DDD regression model). It 
can be shown (by calculating the expectations relative to the triple differencing empirical model) 
that the 𝛽4 is the difference between two time-series changes in sensitivities: 
𝛽4 = [(𝑦𝑙𝑑|𝑙 𝑏 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝑦𝑙𝑑|𝑙 𝑏 𝑝𝑟𝑒 ) − (𝑦𝑙𝑑|𝑙 𝑛 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝑦𝑙𝑑|𝑙 𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑒 )] − [(𝑦𝑙𝑑|𝑠 𝑏 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝑦𝑙𝑑|𝑠 𝑏 𝑝𝑟𝑒)
− (𝑦𝑙𝑑|𝑠 𝑛 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝑦𝑙𝑑|𝑠 𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑒) 
Where: 
(𝑦𝑙𝑑|𝑙 𝑏 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝑦𝑙𝑑|𝑙 𝑏 𝑝𝑟𝑒 ) is a difference in expected values describing the time series reaction (to 
the occurrence of a bail-in event) of the yield of a bailinable bond in a large bank. 
(𝑦𝑙𝑑|𝑙 𝑛 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝑦𝑙𝑑|𝑙 𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑒 ) is a difference in expected values describing the time series reaction (to 
the occurrence of a bail-in event) of the yield of a non-bailinable bond in a large bank. 
(𝑦𝑙𝑑|𝑠 𝑏 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝑦𝑙𝑑|𝑠 𝑏 𝑝𝑟𝑒) is a difference in expected values describing the time series reaction (to 
the occurrence of a bail-in event) of the yield of a bailinable bond in a small bank. 
(𝑦𝑙𝑑|𝑠 𝑛 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝑦𝑙𝑑|𝑠 𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑒) is a difference in expected values describing the time series reaction (to 
the occurrence of a bail-in event) of the yield of a non-bailinable bond in a small bank. 
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Appendix V 
Interpretation of the triple-differencing estimate 𝛽5 
The triple differencing empirical model is:  
𝑦𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽5 ൈ 𝑟𝑠𝑘𝑗𝑡 ൈ 𝑏𝑙𝑛𝑖 ൈ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛾1 ൈ 𝑟𝑠𝑘𝑗𝑡 ൈ 𝑏𝑙𝑛𝑖 + 𝛾2 ൈ 𝑟𝑠𝑘𝑗𝑡 ൈ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡                  
+ 𝛾3 ൈ 𝑏𝑙𝑛𝑖 ൈ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿5 ൈ 𝑟𝑠𝑘𝑗𝑡 + 𝛿6 ൈ 𝑏𝑙𝑛𝑖 + 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑡 + 𝛿7 ൈ 𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑖𝑗𝑡
+ 𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑡                                                                                           (5) 
We can assume that bank risk can take only two values (𝑟𝑠𝑘 = 𝑠 = 𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒 or 𝑟𝑠𝑘 = 𝑟 = 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑦), that 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 
can take two values (𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 = 𝑝𝑟𝑒 = before bail-in  event or 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 = 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 = after bail-in  event), that 𝑏𝑙𝑛 
can take two values (𝑏𝑙𝑛 = 𝑏 = bailinable or 𝑏𝑙𝑛 = 𝑛 = non-bailinable) and that     
𝐸(𝑢|𝑏𝑙𝑛, 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡, 𝑟𝑠𝑘,𝑋) = 0 (where 𝑋 is the set of control variables in the DDD regression model). It 
can be shown (by calculating the expectations relative to the triple differencing empirical model) 
that the 𝛽5 is the difference between two time-series changes in sensitivities: 
𝛽5 = [(𝑦𝑙𝑑|𝑟 𝑏 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝑦𝑙𝑑|𝑠 𝑏 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡) − (𝑦𝑙𝑑|𝑟 𝑏 𝑝𝑟𝑒 − 𝑦𝑙𝑑|𝑠 𝑏 𝑝𝑟𝑒)] − [(𝑦𝑙𝑑|𝑟 𝑛 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝑦𝑙𝑑|𝑠 𝑛 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡)
− (𝑦𝑙𝑑|𝑟 𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑒 − 𝑦𝑙𝑑|𝑠 𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑒)] 
Where: 
(𝑦𝑙𝑑|𝑟 𝑏 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝑦𝑙𝑑|𝑠 𝑏 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡) is a difference in expected values describing the sensitivity of the yield of 
a bailinable bond to an increase in risk from ݏ to ݎ, after the bail-in event. 
(𝑦𝑙𝑑|𝑟 𝑏 𝑝𝑟𝑒 − 𝑦𝑙𝑑|𝑠 𝑏 𝑝𝑟𝑒) is a difference in expected values describing the sensitivity of the yield of 
a bailinable bond to an increase in risk from ݏ to ݎ, before the bail-in event. 
(𝑦𝑙𝑑|𝑟 𝑛 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝑦𝑙𝑑|𝑠 𝑛 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡) is a difference in expected values describing the sensitivity of the yield 
of a non-bailinable bond to an increase in risk from ݏ to ݎ, after the bail-in event. 
(𝑦𝑙𝑑|𝑟 𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑒 − 𝑦𝑙𝑑|𝑠 𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑒) is a difference in expected values describing the sensitivity of the yield of 
a non-bailinable bond to an increase in risk from ݏ to ݎ, before the bail-in event. 
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It is also interesting to notice an alternative interpretation of 𝛽5 : 
𝛽5 = [(𝑦𝑙𝑑|𝑟 𝑏 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝑦𝑙𝑑|𝑟 𝑏 𝑝𝑟𝑒 ) − (𝑦𝑙𝑑|𝑟 𝑛 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝑦𝑙𝑑|𝑟 𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑒 )] − [(𝑦𝑙𝑑|𝑠 𝑏 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝑦𝑙𝑑|𝑠 𝑏 𝑝𝑟𝑒)
− (𝑦𝑙𝑑|𝑠 𝑛 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝑦𝑙𝑑|𝑠 𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑒)] 
Where: 
(𝑦𝑙𝑑|𝑟 𝑏 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝑦𝑙𝑑|𝑟 𝑏 𝑝𝑟𝑒 ) is a difference in expected values describing the time series reaction (to 
the occurrence of a bail-in event) of the yield of a bailinable bond in a risky bank. 
(𝑦𝑙𝑑|𝑟 𝑛 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝑦𝑙𝑑|𝑟 𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑒 ) is a difference in expected values describing the time series reaction (to 
the occurrence of a bail-in event) of the yield of a non-bailinable bond in a risky bank. 
(𝑦𝑙𝑑|𝑠 𝑏 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝑦𝑙𝑑|𝑠 𝑏 𝑝𝑟𝑒) is a difference in expected values describing the time series reaction (to 
the occurrence of a bail-in event) of the yield of a bailinable bond in a safe bank. 
(𝑦𝑙𝑑|𝑠 𝑛 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝑦𝑙𝑑|𝑠 𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑒) is a difference in expected values describing the time series reaction (to 
the occurrence of a bail-in event) of the yield of a non-bailinable bond in a safe bank. 
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Appendix VI 
Table A15. Parameters regarding economic significance of State-level difference-in-differences. 
𝐷𝐷/(𝑎𝑣𝑔(𝐷)) is the ratio between the difference-in-differences estimate and the average difference 
in yields between bailinable and non-bailinable bonds in the seven days before the event; 
𝐷𝐷/(𝑠𝑑(𝐷)) is the ratio of the difference-in-differences estimate and the standard deviation of the 
difference in means between bailinable and non-bailinable bonds in the seven days before the event. 
 
 
 
Date
------- ------- ------ ------- ------ ------- ------ ------- ------ ------- ------ ------- ------
10.07.12 0,05 1,74 0,05 1,33 0,01 2,06 0,01 0,23 0,03 1,19 -0,07 -2,67
19.07.12 0,05 1,73 0,08 2,11 0,02 4,41 -0,02 -0,98 0,12 1,24 0,51 2,77
23.08.12 0,03 1,49 0,02 1,46 0,01 1,10 0,00 -0,22 0,00 0,02 0,00 0,09
29.10.12 0,05 1,62 0,06 2,40 0,02 2,42 -0,02 -1,04 0,02 1,17 -0,04 -1,54
18.12.12 -0,06 -1,68 -0,04 -1,26 -0,01 -1,03 -0,03 -2,72 -0,06 -2,07 -0,03 -1,11
01.02.13 0,03 1,33 -0,01 -0,25 0,01 1,28 0,01 0,96 -0,04 -0,70 -0,04 -2,73
18.03.13 0,05 2,56 0,05 1,48 0,01 0,52 0,02 1,27 0,05 1,03 0,03 1,20
02.04.13 0,05 1,66 0,03 0,73 0,02 1,46 0,01 0,09 -0,01 -0,26 0,01 0,05
28.06.13 0,00 -0,21 -0,01 -0,80 -0,01 -0,99 -0,01 -1,62 0,01 0,20 -0,05 -0,67
15.04.14 0,07 4,82 0,02 1,83 0,04 1,02 0,01 1,04 -0,04 -0,99 -0,01 -0,41
08.07.14 -0,01 -0,69 0,01 1,87 0,05 1,54 0,02 1,68 0,03 1,09 0,01 1,10
05.08.14 0,05 3,03 0,01 1,43 0,02 0,61 0,02 0,24 0,00 -0,04 0,03 2,18
22.09.14 -0,01 -0,79 0,00 0,25 0,00 0,10 -0,01 -0,99 0,12 2,03 -0,01 -1,63
03.07.15 0,01 0,88 0,00 -0,23 0,05 1,81 0,01 0,67 0,00 0,27 0,00 0,11
28.07.15 0,05 5,10 0,00 -0,16 -0,02 -0,81 0,02 0,99 -0,02 -1,58 0,02 1,59
05.08.15 0,00 -1,15 -0,01 -1,10 -0,01 -0,69 -0,01 -0,58 -0,03 -2,21 -0,01 -0,70
12.08.15 0,01 1,62 0,01 1,28 0,01 0,41 -0,01 -0,85 0,00 -0,14 0,00 0,71
14.09.15 0,00 -0,51 0,00 1,26 0,02 0,97 0,00 0,28 -0,01 -1,04 0,00 -0,10
09.12.15 0,03 1,85 -0,12 -3,78 -0,02 -1,21 0,01 0,97 0,05 1,40 0,04 1,30
Panel A Panel A Panel A Panel A
Italy Spain France U.K. Austria Germany
Panel A Panel A
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Appendix VII  
Table A16. Region-level difference-in-differences without bank fixed effect.  
The D-D coefficient is the estimate of ߚଵ relative to the model ݕ݈݀௜	௝	௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚଵ ൈ ܾ݈݊௜ ൈ ݌݋ݏݐ௧ ൅ ߜ଺ ൈ ܾ݈݊௜ ൅
݀ܽݕ௧ ൅ ߜ଻ ൈ ݐݐ݉௜	௧ ൅ ݑ௜	௝	௧; N is the number of observations in the (-7; 0) window; the Adj.R2 is the 
adjusted R-squared. Appendix II provides information about these bail-in events. The group of 
countries with relatively high debt contains Italy, Spain and France. The group of countries with 
relatively high debt contains U.K., Austria and Germany. Standard errors are adjusted for both 
heteroscedasticity and within correlation clustered at the bank level. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% two-tailed levels, respectively. 
 
(1) (2)
Date Event Commitment Authority D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2
---- ------------------ ----------- ----------- ----------- ---- ---- ----------- ---- ----
7.12 Spanish bail-in plan Positive Supranational 0,037* 468 0,1 -0,057 978 0,05
7.12 Germany votes Spain’ rescue Positive Supranational 0,034 471 0,1 1,124 981 0,03
8.12 Spain initiates bail-in law Positive Supranational 0,042* 469 0,08 0,035 995 0,01
10.12 Bail-in conversion details Positive Supranational 0,119*** 482 0,07 -0,144 1030 0,01
12.12 EU: no bail-in for MPS Negative Supranational -0,029 498 0,09 -0,178* 1054 0,01
2.13 Bail-in SNS Reaal Positive Supranational -0,001 516 0,09 -0,042 1060 0,01
3.13 Cyprus rescue plan Positive Supranational 0,101** 518 0,1 0,045 1082 0,01
4.13 Cyprus accord signed Positive Supranational 0,064* 426 0,14 0,426 1002 0,01
8.13 Finance Ministers approve BRRD Positive Supranational 0,007 517 0,11 -0,199 1147 0,01
4.14 EU Parliament approve BRRD Positive Supranational 0,045** 705 0,11 0,007 1577 0,02
7.14 Law for Hypo Alpe’s bail-in Positive National 0,005 733 0,12 0,037 1610 0,02
8.14 BES bail-in Positive Supranational 0,068** 734 0,13 0,047* 1627 0,04
9.14 Austrian BRRD transposition Positive National -0,016 741 0,15 0,006 1652 0,04
7.15 Italian BRRD transposition Positive National 0,03* 822 0,09 0,000 1764 0,01
7.15 Uncostitutionality of bail-in Negative National 0,000 827 0,1 0,063 1773 0,01
8.15 Moody’s downgrading Negative National -0,016 828 0,1 -0,041 1772 0,01
8.15 Greek banks’ bail-in Positive Supranational 0,026*** 830 0,09 0,043*** 1770 0,01
9.15 French BRRD transposition Positive National 0,026** 829 0,1 0,021 1771 0,01
12.15 Bail-in media coverage Positive National -0,069 829 0,07 0,113 1819 0,01
High-debt countries Low-debt countries
Panel A Panel B
90 
 
Table A17. Region-level placebo tests without bank fixed effect. 
The D-D coefficient is the estimate of ߚଶ relative to the placebo diff-in-diff model 𝑦𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽2 ൈ
𝑏𝑙𝑛𝑝𝑙𝑐𝑏𝑖𝑗 ൈ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿1 ൈ 𝑏𝑙𝑛𝑝𝑙𝑐𝑏𝑖𝑗 + 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑡 + 𝛿2 ൈ 𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 ; N is the number of observations in the (-7; 0) 
window; the Adj.R2 is the adjusted R-squared. Appendix II provides information about these bail-
in events. The group of countries with relatively high debt contains Italy, Spain and France. The 
group of countries with relatively high debt contains U.K., Austria and Germany. Standard errors 
are adjusted for both heteroscedasticity and within correlation clustered at the bank level. ***, 
**, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% two-tailed levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
  
(1) (2)
Date Event Commitment Authority D-D N Adj.R2 D-D N Adj.R2
---- ------------------ ----------- ----------- ----------- ---- ---- ----------- ---- ----
7.12 Spanish bail-in plan Positive Supranational 0,248 286 0,14 -0,095 688 0,08
7.12 Germany votes Spain’ rescue Positive Supranational -0,133 296 0,15 1,48 692 0,05
8.12 Spain initiates bail-in law Positive Supranational 0,052 296 0,15 -0,025 696 0,02
10.12 Bail-in conversion details Positive Supranational 0,053 296 0,25 -0,109 696 0,02
12.12 EU: no bail-in for MPS Negative Supranational -0,038 286 0,29 -0,039 697 0,02
2.13 Bail-in SNS Reaal Positive Supranational -0,004 307 0,22 -0,119 712 0,03
3.13 Cyprus rescue plan Positive Supranational -0,025 312 0,29 0,094 720 0,04
4.13 Cyprus accord signed Positive Supranational -0,016 234 0,24 -0,003 551 0,04
8.13 Finance Ministers approve BRRD Positive Supranational 0,039 312 0,23 -0,148 752 0,02
4.14 EU Parliament approve BRRD Positive Supranational -0,003 437 0,17 0,006 968 0,04
7.14 Law for Hypo Alpe’s bail-in Positive National 0,006 472 0,2 -0,01 984 0,03
8.14 BES bail-in Positive Supranational -0,018 475 0,19 0,003 1000 0,04
9.14 Austrian BRRD transposition Positive National 0,006 489 0,19 0,016 1008 0,04
7.15 Italian BRRD transposition Positive National 0,007 504 0,15 0,072 1080 0,02
7.15 Uncostitutionality of bail-in Negative National 0,025 504 0,18 -0,021 1088 0,01
8.15 Moody’s downgrading Negative National -0,01 504 0,19 0,067 1092 0,01
8.15 Greek banks’ bail-in Positive Supranational 0,036** 504 0,19 -0,01 1096 0,01
9.15 French BRRD transposition Positive National -0,012 504 0,2 0,015 1096 0,01
12.15 Bail-in media coverage Positive National 0,027 504 0,19 0,137 1128 0,01
Panel A Panel B
High-debt countries Low-debt countries
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Table A18. Region-level triple-differencing without bank fixed effect. 
The D-D-D coefficient is the estimate of ߚହ relative to the model ݕ݈݀௜௝௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚହ ൈ ݎݏ ௝݇	௧ ൈ ܾ݈݊௜ ൈ ݌݋ݏݐ௧ ൅
ߛଵ ൈ ݎݏ ௝݇	௧ ൈ ܾ݈݊௜ ൅ ߛଶ ൈ ݎݏ ௝݇	௧ ൈ ݌݋ݏݐ௧ ൅ ߛଷ ൈ ܾ݈݊௜ ൈ ݌݋ݏݐ௧ ൅ ߜହ ൈ ݎݏ ௝݇	௧ ൅ ߜ଺ ൈ ܾ݈݊௜ ൅ ݀ܽݕ௧ ൅ ߜ଻ ൈ ݐݐ݉௜	௧ ൅ ݑ௜	௝	௧; N is 
the number of observations in the (-7; 0) window; the Adj.R2 is the adjusted R-squared. Appendix 
II provides information about these bail-in events. The group of countries with relatively high debt 
contains Italy, Spain and France. The group of countries with relatively high debt contains U.K., 
Austria and Germany. Standard errors are adjusted for both heteroscedasticity and within 
correlation clustered at the bank level. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
two-tailed levels, respectively. 
 
 
  
(1) (2)
Date Event Commitment Authority D-D-D N Adj.R2 D-D-D N Adj.R2
---- ------------------ ----------- ----------- ----------- ---- ---- ----------- ---- ----
7.12 Spanish bail-in plan Positive Supranational 0,041 468 0,14 0,011 978 0,05
7.12 Germany votes Spain’ rescue Positive Supranational -0,033 471 0,14 -0,108 981 0,03
8.12 Spain initiates bail-in law Positive Supranational 0,014 469 0,10 0,025 995 0,01
10.12 Bail-in conversion details Positive Supranational 0,02 482 0,20 -0,012 1030 0,01
12.12 EU: no bail-in for MPS Negative Supranational -0,026 498 0,29 -0,01 1054 0,01
2.13 Bail-in SNS Reaal Positive Supranational -0,021 516 0,39 0,007 1060 0,01
3.13 Cyprus rescue plan Positive Supranational -0,004 518 0,39 -0,02 1082 0,01
4.13 Cyprus accord signed Positive Supranational 0,025* 426 0,39 -0,016 1002 0,01
8.13 Finance Ministers approve BRRD Positive Supranational -0,026 517 0,48 0,01 1147 0,01
4.14 EU Parliament approve BRRD Positive Supranational 0,213* 705 0,15 -0,013 1577 0,02
7.14 Law for Hypo Alpe’s bail-in Positive National -0,211 733 0,15 0,018 1610 0,02
8.14 BES bail-in Positive Supranational 0,107* 734 0,14 0,01 1627 0,03
9.14 Austrian BRRD transposition Positive National 0,311 741 0,18 0,06*** 1652 0,04
7.15 Italian BRRD transposition Positive National -0,33 822 0,15 0,021 1764 0,01
7.15 Uncostitutionality of bail-in Negative National 0,168 827 0,15 0,02 1773 0,01
8.15 Moody’s downgrading Negative National -0,429 828 0,15 0,013 1772 0,01
8.15 Greek banks’ bail-in Positive Supranational 0,794 830 0,13 -0,003 1770 0,01
9.15 French BRRD transposition Positive National 0,185 829 0,16 -0,059 1771 0,01
12.15 Bail-in media coverage Positive National 0,323 829 0,10 0,074 1819 0,05
Panel A Panel B
High-debt countries Low-debt countries
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Table A19. Region-level triple-differencing with lagged risk. 
The D-D-D coefficient is the estimate of ߚହ relative to the model ݕ݈݀௜௝௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߙ௝ ൅ ߚହ ൈ ݎݏ ௝݇௧ିଵ ൈ ܾ݈݊௜ ൈ
݌݋ݏݐ௧ ൅ ߛଵ ൈ ݎݏ ௝݇௧ିଵ ൈ ܾ݈݊௜ ൅ ߛଶ ൈ ݎݏ ௝݇௧ିଵ ൈ ݌݋ݏݐ௧ ൅ ߛଷ ൈ ܾ݈݊௜ ൈ ݌݋ݏݐ௧ ൅ ߜହ ൈ ݎݏ ௝݇௧ିଵ ൅ ߜ଺ ൈ ܾ݈݊௜ ൅ ݀ܽݕ௧ ൅ ߜ଻ ൈ ݐݐ݉௜	௧ ൅
ݑ௜	௝	௧; N is the number of observations in the (-7; 0) window; the Adj.R2 is the adjusted R-squared. 
Appendix II provides information about these bail-in events. The group of countries with relatively 
high debt contains Italy, Spain and France. The group of countries with relatively high debt 
contains U.K., Austria and Germany. Standard errors are adjusted for both heteroscedasticity and 
within correlation clustered at the bank level. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% two-tailed levels, respectively. 
 
 
  
(1) (2)
Date Event Commitment Authority D-D-D N Adj.R2 D-D-D N Adj.R2
---- ------------------ ----------- ----------- ----------- ---- ---- ----------- ---- ----
7.12 Spanish bail-in plan Positive Supranational 0,032* 407 0,91 0,017 856 0,96
7.12 Germany votes Spain’ rescue Positive Supranational 0,034 412 0,92 -0,101 858 0,8
8.12 Spain initiates bail-in law Positive Supranational 0,025 410 0,93 0,007 871 0,98
10.12 Bail-in conversion details Positive Supranational -0,115 422 0,94 -0,002 901 0,98
12.12 EU: no bail-in for MPS Negative Supranational -0,003 435 0,95 0,004 921 0,98
2.13 Bail-in SNS Reaal Positive Supranational 0,006 452 0,95 0,003 927 0,98
3.13 Cyprus rescue plan Positive Supranational -0,002 453 0,95 0,003 947 0,97
4.13 Cyprus accord signed Positive Supranational 3,703* 314 0,94 -0,083 815 0,97
8.13 Finance Ministers approve BRRD Positive Supranational 0,013** 452 0,97 0,03 1004 0,96
4.14 EU Parliament approve BRRD Positive Supranational 0,003 616 0,96 -0,011 1379 0,91
7.14 Law for Hypo Alpe’s bail-in Positive National -0,007*** 641 0,97 0,006 1409 0,91
8.14 BES bail-in Positive Supranational 0,009** 637 0,96 0,002 1424 0,85
9.14 Austrian BRRD transposition Positive National -0,003 648 0,97 0,04 1445 0,84
7.15 Italian BRRD transposition Positive National -0,004 719 0,98 0,005 1543 0,68
7.15 Uncostitutionality of bail-in Negative National -0,003 724 0,98 0,003 1551 0,63
8.15 Moody’s downgrading Negative National 0,002 724 0,98 0,006 1551 0,63
8.15 Greek banks’ bail-in Positive Supranational -0,02 727 0,98 -0,004 1548 0,64
9.15 French BRRD transposition Positive National -0,013 725 0,98 -0,029 1550 0,65
12.15 Bail-in media coverage Positive National 0,03 726 0,98 -0,002 1591 0,65
High-debt countries Low-debt countries
Panel A Panel B
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Table A20. Region-level triple-differencing with size; banks over/below 95 percentile. 
The D-D-D coefficient is the estimate of ߚ଺ relative to the model ݕ݈݀௜௝௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߙ௝ ൅ ߚ଺ ൈ 95𝑝𝑒𝑟௝ ൈ ܾ݈݊௜ ൈ
݌݋ݏݐ௧ ൅ ߛଵ ൈ 95𝑝𝑒𝑟௝ ൈ ܾ݈݊௜ ൅ ߛଶ ൈ 95𝑝𝑒𝑟௝ ൈ ݌݋ݏݐ௧ ൅ ߛଷ ൈ ܾ݈݊௜ ൈ ݌݋ݏݐ௧ ൅ ߜହ ൈ 95𝑝𝑒𝑟௝ ൅ ߜ଺ ൈ ܾ݈݊௜ ൅ ݀ܽݕ௧ ൅ ߜ଻ ൈ ݐݐ݉௜	௧ ൅
ݑ௜	௝	௧; N is the number of observations in the (-7; 0) window; the Adj.R2 is the adjusted R-squared. 
Appendix II provides information about these bail-in events. The dummy variable 95𝑝𝑒𝑟 takes the 
value of 1 when the bank is larger than the 95 percentile in a region, in a given event window. 
The group of countries with relatively high debt contains Italy, Spain and France. The group of 
countries with relatively high debt contains U.K., Austria and Germany. Standard errors are 
adjusted for both heteroscedasticity and within correlation clustered at the bank level. ***, **, 
and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% two-tailed levels, respectively. 
 
(1) (2)
Date Event Commitment Authority D-D-D N Adj.R2 D-D-D N Adj.R2
---- ------------------ ----------- ----------- ----------- ---- ---- ----------- ---- ----
7.12 Spanish bail-in plan Positive Supranational D-D-D N Adj.R2 D-D-D N Adj.R2
7.12 Germany votes Spain’ rescue Positive Supranational 0.112 301 0.9 0.018 442 0.97
8.12 Spain initiates bail-in law Positive Supranational 0.004 303 0.91 0.115* 441 0.99
10.12 Bail-in conversion details Positive Supranational 0.027 301 0.92 -0.088 451 0.98
12.12 EU: no bail-in for MPS Negative Supranational -0.056 306 0.92 -0.056 470 0.98
2.13 Bail-in SNS Reaal Positive Supranational 0.011 307 0.94 -0.014 502 0.99
3.13 Cyprus rescue plan Positive Supranational -0.196** 308 0.93 -0.078** 484 0.99
4.13 Cyprus accord signed Positive Supranational -0.055 334 0.94 -0.038 482 0.99
8.13 Finance Ministers approve BRRD Positive Supranational 0.033 279 0.95 -0.147*** 447 0.99
4.14 EU Parliament approve BRRD Positive Supranational 0.004 357 0.96 2.165 491 0.92
7.14 Law for Hypo Alpe’s bail-in Positive National -0.005 473 0.89 -0.067 700 0.9
8.14 BES bail-in Positive Supranational 0.025 478 0.91 0.007 722 0.9
9.14 Austrian BRRD transposition Positive National -0.033 489 0.91 0.006 721 0.81
7.15 Italian BRRD transposition Positive National -0.026 492 0.9 -0.029 733 0.8
7.15 Uncostitutionality of bail-in Negative National 0.033 521 0.94 0.324 786 0.66
8.15 Moody’s downgrading Negative National -0.067 523 0.93 0.002 797 0.61
8.15 Greek banks’ bail-in Positive Supranational -0.055 524 0.94 0.002 796 0.61
9.15 French BRRD transposition Positive National -0.003 526 0.94 0.177 794 0.61
12.15 Bail-in media coverage Positive National 0.058 525 0.94 -0.233 795 0.62
Panel A Panel B
Large banks in high-debt states Large banks in low-debt states
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Abstract 
For Fama and French (2002), the established evidence of negative profitability-leverage relation 
contradicts Trade-Off Theory (TOT). I test TOT under its static and dynamic versions using 
exogenous expected profitability. Using the “double instrumental variable” approach, the first 
stage predicts the exogenous competition from China where the instrument is the Chinese 
exports towards rich countries; the second stage predicts the decrease of Norwegian firms’ 
profitability that is explained by the increases of exogenous competition from China; the third 
stage investigates how leverage reacts to the predicted profitability. Concerning the tests of the 
static TOT, I find that profitability reduces leverage because assets decrease, while debt 
remains stable. Moreover, tests of the dynamic TOT illustrate a negative profitability-leverage 
relation at non-refinancing points, which corroborates the dynamic TOT. I also find, at 
refinancing points, insignificant profitability-leverage relation, which does not corroborate the 
dynamic TOT. 
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1. Introduction 
In numerous corporate capital structure models, the relation between leverage and 
profitability represents a pivotal prediction. For instance, in Fama and French (2002) this relation 
has a central role for the empirical assessment of the merits of pecking order and trade-off theories 
(TOT). As explained by Graham and Leary (2011), the tests of trade-off models have focused on 
the static trade-off theory’s prediction that “more profitable firms should more highly value the 
tax-shield benefits of debt”. The current paper tests the hypotheses about the profitability-leverage 
relation by building on the trade-off theory’s predictions. In doing so, it addresses the empirical 
concerns of the previous literature and encompasses predictions not only from the static but also 
from the more recent dynamic versions of the trade-off theory. I find that the leverage of Norwegian 
firms react negatively to expected profitability’s shocks that are exogenous with respect to the 
leverage decisions; my results reject the static TOT and find mixed evidence for the dynamic TOT. 
An established empirical literature tests the static TOT and finds a negative relation between 
realized profitability and leverage.32 Fama and French (2002) find that book leverage is higher in 
less profitable firms and conclude that this evidence contradicts the trade-off theory. This 
discrepancy between the static trade-off theory and empirical evidence has been addressed both 
through a theoretical revision of the static models and through an empirical revision of its tests. 
The trade-off dynamic inaction models have revised and extended the static models, for instance, 
by acknowledging and modeling the presence of adjustment costs towards the equilibrium 
leverage.33 With this framework, the dynamic trade-off theory explains how the evidence of a 
negative profitability-leverage relation does not contradict the trade-off theory. In addition, the 
recent contribution of Danis et al. (2014) empirically corroborates the dynamic inaction theory by 
finding that profitability is positively correlated with leverage when firms are at refinancing points. 
On the other hand, concerning the empirical revision of the static TOT’s test, another recent 
research emphasizes that a better identification strategy can be sufficient to solve the discrepancy 
                                                            
32 For instance, Rajan and Zingales (1995), Baker and Wurgler (2002), Titman and Wessels (1988) and 
Myers (2003). 
33 According to the definition of Danis, Rettl and Whited (2014), it is the class of models that includes, for 
instance, Fisher et al. (1989), Strebulaev (2007) and Hennessy and Whited (2005). The trade-off dynamic 
inaction theories will also be referred to as dynamic trade-off theories or dynamic TOT. 
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between predictions and empirics. Xu (2012)’s intuition is that, since the crucial predictions of 
TOT involve the expected profitability (rather than the lagged realized profitability typically used 
in the tests of TOT), better proxies of expected profitability can improve the empirical assessment 
of TOT. As new proxy for the expected profitability of domestic U.S. firms, Xu (2012) adopts the 
import competition, namely the product market competition exerted by foreign producers against 
domestic U.S. firms. The use of this proxy builds on the evidence that import competition 
deteriorates profitability.34 By finding a positive relation between leverage and expected 
profitability, which corroborates the static TOT, Xu (2012) contrasts the conclusions of Fama and 
French (2002).35 
My paper contributes to the investigations about the profitability-leverage relation by nesting 
and extending these two revisions. It tests the static and dynamic trade-off theories by employing 
a measure of profitability that emphasizes the expectations of profitability, and it also tackles the 
endogeneity concerns of the previous empirical analyses. 
Regarding the endogeneity, an analysis of the impact of import competition on capital 
structure must require that capital structure does not drive the import competition. Xu’s 
contribution recognizes that a simple measure of import competition is endogenous with leverage 
and, thus, it uses the U.S. tariff policy as an exogenous shock.36  
However, U.S. tariffs reveal a documented endogeneity problem. Indeed, previous 
contributions point out not only that the governments of large rich countries - such as the U.S. - 
have vast powers to impose which industries must be liberalized, but also that the government’s 
tariffs policy is subject to a pervasive and costly lobbying activity.37 Since firm’s aversion to 
competition and firm’s ability to lobby are crucially driven by specific profitability and capital 
structure patterns, it is difficult to argue that the treatment “liberalization in the U.S.” is assigned 
to firms independently from their capital structures. There is anecdotal evidence that among 
                                                            
34 Katics and Pedersen (1994), DeRosa and Goldstein (1981), Pagoulatos and Sorensen (1976). 
35 Xu (2012) is the only paper investigating the trade-off theory under the competition-profitability-leverage 
relations, to the best of my knowledge. 
36 For instance, the high leverage of an industry increases its vulnerability with respect to the aggressive 
competition and predatory pricing exerted by foreign firms, in line with Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) and 
Campello (2006). 
37 Krugman, Obsfeld, and Melitz (2012), Grossman and Helpman (1992) and Krishna, Mitra (2005). 
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finance authors this endogeneity is considered as a primary concern in the studies of the effects of 
import competition on corporate financing. The reason is that firms have different incentives for 
lobbying against liberalizations and these differences crucially depend on profitability, default 
probability, leverage, diversification and governance.38 The circumstances regarding the “steel 
safeguards” - a U.S. protectionist measure in favor of steel producers - offer a prominent example 
of the relation between firm characteristics, lobbying incentives and government response. Liebman 
and Tomlin (2006) explain that, after China’s entry in the U.S. steel market, American producers 
were facing a severe increase in leverage and a strong wave of defaults. After an expensive lobbying 
activity, the Bush administration decided to start and bargain with the trade partners. The 
negotiations allowed the rapid adoption of the “steel safeguards”, which were later repealed, once 
the default risk has diminished. 
This endogeneity concern interferes with our understanding of the impact of import 
competition on financing decisions. Hence, in order to predict an exogenous import competition, I 
use the imports shocks regarding Norway. This setting has the advantage of being based on a 
small open economy (Norwegian GDP is less than 1/34 of the U.S. GDP), where the lobbying 
activity of firms can scarcely influence the timing and extent of multilateral import tariffs and 
non-tariff barriers to trade (NTBs). 
In addition, differently from previous literature, in this paper the source of shocks to imports 
does not consist only in the tariff changes, which represent only a portion of the barriers to trade. 
Indeed, as illustrated by Antras (2014), and Mansfield and Busch (1995), the non-tariff barriers 
to trade (NTBs) represent a crucial determinant of foreign competition. Implementing for the first 
time in the corporate finance literature the approach of Autor et al. (2013), the current analyses 
are not limited to the study of shocks resulting from tariffs decisions. In fact, my measure of 
exogenous competition uses all types of shocks to the Chinese productivity that made Chinese 
products more successful among rich countries’ consumers. More precisely, the exogenous 
competition affecting Norwegian firms is predicted by the shocks to the supply of Chinese goods 
                                                            
38 For instance, Lenway, Mork and Yeung (1996) explain that, in the steel industry, lobbyer firms follow 
very different paths compared to non-lobbyer firms. Lobbyers are less profitable, bigger, older, less 
diversified, less innovative, pay workers and CEO’s more, have greater tenures for CEO’s. 
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towards nine rich countries. Hence, these shocks allow to exclude the Chinese competition against 
Norwegian firms that is driven by Norwegian policies or other domestic idiosyncratic shocks (which 
can be driven by firms’ preferences). In addition, to ensure a significant shock on the instrument, 
I use the years around China’s access to the World Trade Organization (WTO) (December 2001) 
because it represented an exceptional shock for Chinese exports and because Norwegian firms had 
a scarce decision power about it. This very large shock ensures the fact that this instrument 
satisfies the “relevance condition” of the instrumental variable approach. 
My analyses start with a series of tests of the static trade-off theory. In these tests, I address 
the aforementioned endogeneity issues by implementing the “double instrumental variable” model 
(or “three stages least squares”) of Becker and Woessmann (2009), which extends the traditional 
two-stages instrumental variable framework by adding a further stage. Specifically, the first stage 
predicts the exogenous competition from China using as instrument the Chinese exports towards 
other rich countries (following Autor et al. (2013)). The second stage predicts the variation of 
Norwegian firms’ profitability that is explained by the increases of exogenous competition from 
China calculated in the first stage. The third stage, investigating how leverage reacts to the 
predicted profitability, is the test of the static TOT. In line with the interpretation of Becker and 
Woessmann (2009), the “double instrumental variable” intends to ensure that the impact of 
competition on leverage passes through a precise channel - profitability - rather than through other 
channels like the technological innovation, which can be caused by the competition and that affects 
capital structure decisions.39 
My results document a negative reaction of leverage to the predicted profitability. I also 
investigate the mechanism behind this negative response and show that a lower (higher) predicted 
profitability produces a decrease (increase) in the value of assets. For robustness, I show that the 
results do not change dramatically when I implement a two-stage instrumental variable framework 
that considers the (increments of) imports as the proxy for (decreases of) expected profitability. 
                                                            
39 For instance, Bloom et al. (2016) show that the entrance of China has increased the investment in R&D 
for the European firms. Since the R&D intensity decreases the equilibrium leverage, a negative competition-
leverage relation might be driven by the fact that the increase in competition entails an increase of R&D 
investments. 
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Furthermore, this paper extends the analyses of the previous empirical research by testing 
the dynamic inaction models. They recognize that the sign of profitability-leverage relation 
crucially depends on whether or not the firm is actively adjusting its capital structure. Specifically, 
these models provide two main predictions (Danis et al. (2014)). First, if the firm is not at 
adjustment points, we expect a negative profitability-leverage relation. Second, if the firm is at 
adjustment points, the profitability-leverage relation is positive. Results show a negative 
profitability-leverage relation at non-adjustment points, coherently with Fisher et al. (1989) and 
Hennessy and Whited (2005). On the other hand, at adjustment points, I find an insignificant 
reaction of leverage to exogenous expected profitability, which does not corroborate the second 
prediction of Danis et al. (2014). 
The variability of adjustment costs is an additional element that contribute to describe the 
fact that the profitability-leverage relation depends on the occurrence of active adjustments. As 
argued by Brav (2009), firms with higher adjustment costs - i.e., private firms in his setting - 
undertake the active corrections of leverage less frequently; thus, the time series of these firms are 
expected to contain fewer observations in which the profitability-leverage relationship is positive. 
Since my sample contains both private and public firms, I test the prediction that public firms - 
i.e., firms with relatively low adjustment costs and more adjustment points - decrease leverage less 
than private firms in response to higher exogenous profitability. I find that public firms have an 
insignificant profitability-leverage relation, which is more positive than the negative reaction of 
private firms. In addition, it is important to notice that the main part of this paper analyzes 
private firms and the analysis of this sample allows to provide an investigation of the relation 
between exogenous profitability and leverage for private firms, which constitute the vast majority 
of the firms in the developed economy.40 
This paper is not only particularly related to the tests of the TOT or to the empirical 
assessment of China’s entrance into the WTO. It also contributes to a recent literature composed 
of key empirical studies, whose scrutiny illustrates that product market competition is a central 
driver of firms’ funding costs and financing decisions (Hoberg and Phillips (2010), Hoberg and 
                                                            
40 For instance, Michealy and Roberts (2012) and Brav (2009) show that, in the case of U.K., private firms 
account for 97% of the U.K.’s firms. 
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Phillips (2010), Hoberg and Phillips and Prabhala (2014), Peress (2010), Gaspar and Massa (2006), 
Hou and Robinson (2006), Irvine and Pontiff (2009)). Nonetheless, as pointed out by other recent 
works studying firms’ investment choices (Valta (2012) and Fresard (2010)), the empirical scrutiny 
of these studies fail to address the concern of the endogenous impact of cash holdings and leverage 
on the product market choices of a firm and its competitors. However, similarly to Xu (2012)’s 
case, these recent papers use the U.S.A. import tariff policy, which is affected by lobbying concerns. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the sample and present the 
benchmark test of the TOT with lagged realized profitability; Section 3 tests the static trade-off 
theory with the instrumented profitability; Section 4 tests the dynamic trade-off theory with the 
instrumented profitability; Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Sample description 
The final sample consists of 14,005 manufacturing Norwegian private and public firms. They 
are part of an unbalanced panel dataset of 72,118 firm-year observations from 1998 to 2006. The 
Norwegian Corporate Accounts constitute the source for the annual information about financial 
statements and firms’ ownership characteristics.41 Berner et al. (2012) describe this dataset and its 
quality, which is warranted by the fact that an external auditor is typically required to verify the 
reports and by the fact that the data is collected for tax purposes - which ensures the presence of 
virtually all Norwegian firms -. 
A second dataset is based on the Comtrade’s sample. It contains the imports from China and 
from the rest of the world (for Norway and nine Other Rich Countries, also referred to as the 
ORC).42 
By merging these two sources of data, I generate an “intermediate sample” of 145,689 
observations (which considers only manufacturing firms and excludes utilities and financial firms). 
From this sample I eliminate observations with missing data concerning the total invested capital, 
                                                            
41   All the data in NOK are converted into Dollars by means of the exchange rate provided by the Norwegian 
Central Bank. All the variables are winsorized at 1% level. 
42 See Appendix 1 for further details regarding all the steps for the creation of the dataset regarding the 
imports from China. 
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the number of employees or the indicator for being listed or non-listed (sample decreases to 119,960 
obs.). I exclude observations with missing data concerning depreciation and sales (sample decreases 
to 105,659 obs.) and the observations without information on net property plant and equipment 
(sample decreases to 91,303 obs.). I include only firms with at least two years of contiguous balance 
sheet data (sample decreases to 72,118 obs.). 
Table 1 and Table 2 contain the descriptive statistics of the relevant variables for Norwegian 
firms from 1998 to 2006. In particular, Panel A in Table 1 and Table 2 focuses on the private 
entities while Panels B illustrates the statistics relative to public corporations.  
While the number of public firms appears low (more than 30 per year), this number is 
comparable with the one relative to important previous contributions regarding the effect of 
competition on corporate decisions. For instance, Khanna and Tice (2000), who study the impact 
of product market competition on capital expenditures (using data about the entrance of WalMart 
in specific market niches), consider 20 private firms and 38 public companies. 
From Table 1, we notice that among Norwegian firms the leverage is higher for private firms 
(0.44 on average) than for public institutions (0.32 on average). Following Brav (2009), this 
evidence can be interpreted with the fact that equity is more expensive for private firms than for 
public firms. Hence, the relative cost of equity to debt is higher for private than for public firms. 
This condition implies that private firms rely more on debt financing relative to public firms. An 
additional characteristic is the fact that Norwegian public firms maintain a leverage ratio that is 
similar to American public firms, as illustrated by Xu (2012). 
For public firms, the ratio of depreciation to assets (0.021 on average) is not different from 
the ratio in the previous literature. It is interesting to notice that the CapEx to assets ratio (0.066 
on average), the size (10,840 on average) and the profitability appear lower among private firms 
relatively to public firms. This fact is coherent with the established evidence that, compared to 
similar firms, the firms going public are the ones that, on average, have a higher profitability, 
higher growth opportunities and larger size (Pagano and Panetta (1998)). 
 
2.1 Effect of non-exogenous profitability on leverage 
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The main hypotheses are centered on investigating how profitability affects book leverage. As 
a benchmark case, it is worth to describe the relation between book leverage and profitability by 
investigating the following regression model, as it constitute a typical test of the static TOT: 
 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑗𝑖𝑡 = ߙ1 + 𝛽1 × 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑗𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝛾1 × 𝑋𝑗𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝑢𝑗𝑖𝑡                                        (1) 
 
Leverage is the total book leverage gauged by the ratio of interest bearing debt divided by 
total assets. Profitability is measured by means of ROA (net income over total assets) and by 
means of profit margins (sum of pre-tax income, interest expense and depreciation, divided by 
sales). The specifications in Table 3 control for the same set of covariates used in the standard 
leverage regressions of the previous literature (Baker and Wurgler (2002) and Leary and Roberts 
(2005)): asset tangibility, firms’ size and growth opportunities (proxied by capital expenditures to 
total assets (Brav (2009)). Year fixed effects control for the time trends in book leverage that are 
common across all firms. The inclusion of firm fixed effects controls for firm specific and time 
invariant components in book leverage (Lemmon, Roberts and Zender (2008)). Moreover, firm 
fixed effects decrease the concerns of time series correlations in book leverage due to firm or 
industry factors (Pedersen (2009)). Since this empirical model tests the leverage-profitability 
relation unconditionally with respect to the occurrence of refinancing, we consider specifications 
with firm fixed effects (not just with industry fixed effects) because they are more in line with the 
theory of Danis et al. (2014). Similarly to Xu (2012), we have to account for the fact that firms 
can vary the productive efficiency of their assets; thus, I control for depreciation to assets 
(Gildersleeve (1999)).43 
The columns in Table 3 illustrate the outcomes relative to model (1), in the period from 1998 
to 2006. We observe that the measures of profitability used in the previous literature are negatively 
correlated with leverage; thus, the coefficients of these benchmark models are consistent with 
established traditional tests of the static TOT (Fama and French (2002), Baker and Wurgler 
(2002)). 
                                                            
43 In addition, these specifications account for capital-labor intensity to have a set of control variables that 
is consistent with the main regressions of this paper, which will involve the capital-labor intensity. 
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As discussed in the introduction, this paper enhances the empirical strategy of the traditional 
static TOT’s tests. First, this paper recognizes that the trade-off theories focus on expected 
profitability, not on realized profitability. Thus, in line with Xu (2012), this paper enhances the 
traditional tests of the TOT by measuring profitability by means of a shock on future prospects 
that derives from import competition, which is a measure that gives strong emphasis on future 
prospects. Indeed, evidence suggests that import competition diminishes profitability in the long-
run.44  
Second, by using a measure of profitability that is by construction exogenous with respect to 
leverage, this study benefits from the use of a contemporaneous rather than lagged measure of 
profitability. Indeed, to address the endogeneity concerns,45 traditional empirical tests of the TOT 
had to proxy contemporaneous profitability with lagged profitability. 
In particular, this paper addresses endogeneity concerns, by instrumenting the profitability 
with the exogenous import competition using both a traditional instrumental variable approach 
and a “double instrumental variable” design, which consists of three stages: the first stage 
regression predicts the exogenous import competition from China where Chinese exports towards 
other rich countries is the instrument (following Autor et al. (2013)); the second stage predicts the 
decrease of Norwegian firms’ profitability that is explained by the increases of exogenous import 
competition from China; the third stage investigates how leverage reacts to the predicted 
profitability. 
 
3. Tests of Static Trade-Off Theory with exogenous 
imports 
                                                            
44 For instance, competition can force firms to long and costly restructuring processes or it can increase the 
probability of default. See for instance Coucke and Sleuwaegen (2008), Bloom et al. (2012), Katics, Pedersen 
(1994), DeRosa, Goldstein (1981), Pagoulatos, Sorensen (1976). 
45 Hortascu et al. (2010) illustrate that consumers prefer to buy the goods that are produced by firms with 
lower risk of distress, which depends on leverage. Hopler and Titman (1994) show that higher leverage 
decreases profitability and sales, especially regarding specialized products. Hence, firms with a leverage that 
is high enough to increase the distress probability might deteriorate their current profits. 
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3.1 Import competition and import penetration 
The import competition is the competitive threat that is generated by the expansion of foreign 
competitors’ sales into the domestic markets. In particular, import competition increases for 
Norwegian industry i if it is experiencing an increment of the competition due to the increase of 
imports into Norway of the goods that are produced by foreign competitors and that constitute 
the output of Norwegian industry i . The intensity of the import competition from China is 
measured by the import penetration from China, ܥ݄݅݊݁ݏ݁ܥ݋݉݌݁ݐ. ݅݊ܰ݋ݎݓܽݕ. It is defined (similarly 
to Xu (2012) and Bertrand (2004)) as: 
 
𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑒𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡. 𝑖𝑛𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑤𝑎𝑦𝑖𝑡 =
𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑤. 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝐹𝑟𝑜𝑚𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑖𝑡
𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑤. 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝐹𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑤. 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡
                         (2) 
 
The Norwegian imports from China are the Dollar value of goods imported from China into 
Norway that represent the outputs of an industry i defined by the NACE system at the 4-digits 
level. The source of this data is the Comtrade database which provides the dollar value of imports 
for each product code identified at the 6-digits HS code. See Appendix II for further details on the 
construction of import penetration. 
As argued in previous research, we need to predict a measure of import competition that has 
to be exogenous with respect to capital structure decisions. Indeed, the simple import penetration 
could produce inconsistent coefficients if it is used as explanatory variable for the capital structure 
decisions.46 Moreover, there may be a problem of third confounding factor. An expansive monetary 
policy, by depreciating the domestic currency, may decrease external finance premium and, hence, 
                                                            
46 As argued by Xu (2012), the main reason behind this inconsistency is that capital structure variables 
endogenously affect import competition by affecting firm’s competition strategies (as described in Brader 
and Lewis (1986), Maksimovic (1988)) or firm’s resilience to predatory pricing strategies (Bolton and 
Sharfstein (1990), Campello (2006)). 
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corporate leverage becomes cheaper (Bernanke and Gertler (1995)). This depreciation of the 
domestic currency also negatively affects the imports into Norway.47 
To solve this endogeneity problem, Xu (2012) uses U.S.A.’s import tariff cuts and the dollar 
exchange rates as the two instruments for import penetration. Both of these instruments might be 
endogeous in Xu’s setting because of companies’ lobbying activity, which can drive both the import 
policy and the monetary policy. Furthermore, the dollar exchange rate depends on the monetary 
policy, which, in turn, affect corporates leverage.  
Instead, this paper addresses this problem by applying in a small country the design inspired 
by Acemoglu et al. (2015), Balsvik et al. (2014) and Autor et al. (2013). This design consists in 
predicting the exogenous Norwegian imports from China by means of exogenous shock to the 
supply of Chinese goods towards rich countries.  
 
 
3.2 Effect of Rich Countries’ imports on Norwegian imports: 
first stage 
The first stage predicts the exogenous Chinese import penetration into Norway by regressing 
industry-level Chinese import penetration into Norway on the Chinese import penetration into 
nine Other Rich Countries (this set is also referred to as the ORC and it includes: U.S.A., U.K., 
Germany, France, Italy, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Sweden). This regression predicts 
exogenous imports from China that are explained only by the exports that Chinese competitors 
have been able to realize towards nine rich countries (other than Norway). This instrumental 
variable methodology addresses the endogeneity concerns under the assumption that the shocks 
that are endogenous with Norwegian firms’ capital structure variable are not correlated across the 
nine rich countries, an assumption made in earlier studies (Autor et al., 2013). The regression 
model is: 
 
                                                            
47 A large literature finds that the appreciation of domestic currencies creates an advantage for the foreign 
products (Berman, Martin, and Meyer (2009), Campa (2004), Bernard and Jensen (2004b), Forbes (2002), 
and Greenaway, Kneller, and Zhang (2007)). 
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𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑒𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡. 𝑖𝑛𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑤𝑎𝑦𝑖𝑡 = ߙ3 + 𝛽3 ൈ 𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑒𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡. 𝑖𝑛𝑂𝑅𝐶𝑖𝑡 + ߜ3 × 𝑋𝑗𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝑢𝑗𝑖𝑡       (3) 
 
This regression model controls for the same set of variables used in model (1) and its results 
are shown in the column “First Stage” of all subsequent tables. In particular, the column “First 
Stage” of Table 4 illustrates that the coefficient ChineseCompet.inORC - that is the estimate of 
𝛽3 relative to rich countries’ imports from China - positively (and significantly) affect the exports 
towards Norway (as in Acemoglu et al. (2015), Balsvik et al. (2014) and Autor et al. (2013)). This 
means that the first stage predicts the imports from China (also referred to as Import Penetration 
Index, or IPI) that are explained by the “success” the Chinese products experienced in the markets 
of the nine rich countries. 
 
3.3 Effect of exogenous import penetration on profitability: 
second stage 
In this empirical analysis, it is important to investigate whether import competition 
significantly affects profitability. Previous studies have shown that the increase of foreign supply 
cuts the price-cost margins, market shares and profit margins48. Hence, also in the current sample 
we can expect to assess that import competition is negatively related to profitability. This 
hypothesis is tested by the following model for the period from 1998 to 2006: 
 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑗𝑖𝑡 = ߙ4 + 𝛽4 ൈ 𝐶ℎ𝚤𝑛𝑎𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡. 𝚤𝑛𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑤𝑎𝑦̂ 𝑗𝑖𝑡 + ߜ4 × 𝑋𝑗𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝑢𝑗𝑖𝑡                       (4) 
 
The dependent variable, i.e., the profitability of each bank-year pair, is the return on assets. 
The model controls for capital-labor intensity in order to characterize firms’ production technology 
(Xu (2012)) and the same set of covariates used in the standard leverage regressions of previous 
                                                            
48 Xu (2012), Katics, Pedersen (1994), DeRosa, Goldstein (1981), Pagoulatos, Sorensen (1976). 
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literature (Baker and Wurgler (2002) and Leary and Roberts (2005)).49 Hence, we account for: 
asset tangibility, firms’ size and growth opportunities (proxied by capital expenditures to total 
assets (Brav (2009)). Furthermore, I control for depreciation to assets and I also include year and 
firm fixed effects.50 The column “Second stage” in all subsequent tables present the estimates of 
𝛽4 and, in particular, in Table 4 we verify that the exogenous increase of imports from China 
deteriorates Norwegian firms’ profitability. 
 
 
3.4 Tests of the Static Trade-Off Theory: Third Stage 
In this section, we test the predictions of the static trade-off theory by using (as main 
regressor) the expected the profitability that has been predicted by exogenous import penetration. 
The following model is studied for the private firms in the years from 1998 to 2006.51 
 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑗𝑖𝑡 = ߙ5 + 𝛽5 ൈ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝚤𝑡𝑎𝑏̂ 𝑗𝑖(𝑡−1) + ߜ5 × 𝑋𝑗𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝑢𝑗𝑖𝑡                                        (5) 
 
The set of controls contains growth opportunities, size and asset tangibility. Also year and 
firm fixed effects are included. The results in the Column (1) of Table 4 show that predicted 
profitability has a negative impact on leverage. Since the specification in Column (1) does not 
control also for firms’ productive efficiency and for the weight of labor in their production 
technology, which are of fundamental importance in a study concerning the impact of competition 
from a country with relatively low wages like China. Thus, the specification in Column (2) controls 
                                                            
49 We have to use the standard covariates of leverage regressions even though the dependent variable is 
profit margins, not leverage. These controls are necessary in order to solve simultaneous systems (Koopmans 
and Hood (1953)). 
50 According to Gildersleeve (1999), depreciation to assets allows to indicate whether the firm has a sufficient 
replacement of existing assets or whether it is in a cost-reducing phase. 
51 This paper regresses the models (5) and (4) using the Stata command ivreg in order to permit the statistical 
software to correct the standard errors (Roberts and Whited (2012)). OLS is used for the first stage model; 
although I recognize that the usage of OLS for the first stage might generate incorrect standard errors, Stata 
does not provide - to the best of my knowledge - a single command performing the double-instrumental 
variable approach of Becker and Woessman (2009). 
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also for depreciation to sales and capital-labor intensity. We observe in Column (2) that the 
coefficient of predicted profitability becomes insignificant. It is important to notice that, in line 
with the evidence Fama and French (2002) and Rajan and Zingales (1995), these coefficients 
regarding Norwegian private firms do not to corroborate the static trade-off theory’s prediction 
that more profitable firms are supposed to have a higher leverage, as they can benefit more from 
the larger tax-shield offered by the additional leverage (Graham and Leary (2011)). 
With the previous model, we have studied the response of leverage to lagged predicted 
profitability. However, my instrumental variable framework allows to gauge also the reaction of 
leverage to contemporaneous profitability because the literature has traditionally lagged 
profitability in order to address the endogeneity of the relation between leverage and 
contemporaneous profitability. Table 5 shows the results of the regression of leverage on 
contemporaneous predicted profitability. The model is: 
 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑗𝑖𝑡 = ߙ6 + 𝛽6 ൈ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝚤𝑡𝑎𝑏̂ 𝑗𝑖𝑡 + ߜ6 × 𝑋𝑗𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝑢𝑗𝑖𝑡                                        (6) 
 
The results of the first and the second stages are presented in the relative columns of Table 
5 and illustrate, again, that import penetration (of Chinese products) regarding nine rich countries 
has a positive and significant impact on the Norwegian import penetration and that exogenous 
Norwegian import penetration deteriorates profitability. Importantly, the significantly negative 
coefficients of the third stage, in Columns (1) and (2), suggest that the leverage of Norwegian 
private firms increases (decreases) in correspondence with exogenous profitability’s reduction 
(growth). Thus, also this evidence suggests that the static trade-off theory is not confirmed in my 
sample. However, as anticipated in the introduction, the previous empirical investigations are not 
a conclusive test of the trade-off theory since, contrarily with respect to the dynamic trade-off 
theory, they do not account for the occurrence of capital structure’s adjustments. The details will 
be discussed and analyzed in the next section. Instead, the next two sub-sections investigate, first, 
the mechanics of the negative coefficient and, second, the discrepancy between these results and 
the previous literature. 
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3.5 Debt issuances and asset growth 
To have a better understanding of which mechanism drives the negative profitability-leverage 
relation, we should investigate the dynamics of specific variables that describe firms’ behaviors 
regarding asset growth, net equity issuance and net debt issuance,. Therefore, the set of regression 
models is:  
 
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑗𝑖𝑡 = ߙ7 + 𝛽7 ൈ∆𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝚤𝑡𝑎𝑏̂ 𝑗𝑖𝑡 + ߜ7 × ∆𝑋𝑗𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝑢𝑗𝑖𝑡                                      (7) 
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑗𝑖𝑡 = ߙ8 + 𝛽8 ൈ∆𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝚤𝑡𝑎𝑏̂ 𝑗𝑖𝑡 + ߜ8 × ∆𝑋𝑗𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝑢𝑗𝑖𝑡                                       (8) 
𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑗𝑖𝑡 = ߙ9 + 𝛽9 ൈ∆𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝚤𝑡𝑎𝑏̂ 𝑗𝑖𝑡 + ߜ9 × ∆𝑋𝑗𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝑢𝑗𝑖𝑡                                          (9) 
 
In order to examine these choices, I specify a change regression model where the dependent 
variables are defined following Xu (2012)’s definitions: asset growth (annual change in logarithm 
of assets), net debt issues (annual changes in debt minus cash divided by lagged assets), net equity 
issues (annual change in total equity minus retained earnings over lagged assets). The key regressor 
is the change of profitability that is predicted by the following second-stage regression: 
 
∆𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑗𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽10 ൈ∆𝐶ℎ𝚤𝑛𝑎𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡. 𝚤𝑛𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑤𝑎𝑦̂ 𝑗𝑖𝑡 + ߜ10 ൈ∆𝑋𝑗𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝑢𝑗𝑖𝑡                      (10) 
 
The results of the first and second stages are presented in the relative columns of Table 6. 
The control variables are the lagged annual changes of the covariates’ set characterizing previous 
regressions. I control for the lagged equity over lagged total assets since it is necessary to account 
for the cumulative impact of past capital structure decisions. The results of the third stages are 
illustrated in columns (1), (2) and (3) of Table 6. In order to provide a description of the effect of 
exogenous imports on profitability growth, Figure 1 plots the distribution of firm-year pairs across 
different levels of predicted profitability changes. It is interesting to notice that, in this sample 
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consisting of Norwegian private manufacturing firms, the exogenous shocks to imports have almost 
always (in 99.17% of the cases) generated a positive change in the predicted profitability.52  
Column (1) illustrates that the relation of exogenous profitability shocks and net debt issuance 
is insignificant, which suggests that private firms do not correct their debt when expected 
profitability changes, although these changes might have modified the target leverage. The reaction 
of asset growth is positive, which means that firms decrease their assets when profitability 
decreases for reasons linked to the increase of competition. This result is reminiscent of the evidence 
in Fresard and Valta (2015); they show that firms react to increased product market threat by 
decreasing their assets (more precisely they decrease capital expenditure). The reaction of equity 
is positive, which suggests that the increase of the assets side of balance sheet is reflected into an 
increase of equity, in the liability side. 
 
3.6 Effect of import penetration on leverage 
Results relative to models (5) and (6) have shown that Norwegian private firms exhibit a 
negative or insignificant relation between exogenous profitability and leverage. On the other hand, 
Xu (2012) - the only other paper testing the static trade-off theory with exogenous shocks on 
import competition - finds a positive profitability-leverage relation in a sample of American listed 
companies. This section is intended to discuss the discrepancy between the current paper and Xu 
(2012)’s contribution not only by presenting the possible determinants of the discrepancy but also 
by performing tests that aim at gradually removing part of such determinants and observe whether 
this removal reduces the differences in results.  
One can identify three general determinants for this discrepancy. The first is the difference in 
the countries analyzed in the two papers. For instance, the fact that Norway has only marginal 
powers, compared to the U.S.A., in shaping the details of China’s entrance into the WTO (which 
enhances the exogeneity of the profitability shocks) creates a fundamental difference between the 
                                                            
52 This result does not imply that the entrance of China into the WTO has been a negative news for the 
almost entirety of the Norwegian private manufacturing firms. This result shows that the portion of imports 
growth from China that has been motivated by an increase of the value of Chinese products into rich 
countries’ markets has generated a negative impact on Norwegian firms’ profitability.   
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two analyses. A second determinant might be the fact that, differently from previous research, the 
results in previous subsections are relative to private firms only, which typically have different 
patterns in capital structure choices compared to public entities (Brav (2009)). A third possible 
determinant is the fact that the current paper is based on a double instrumental variable approach 
in order to ensure that the effect of competition on leverage has a specific channel, i.e., profitability, 
through which it determines capital structure decisions, thereby excluding dimensions that have a 
decisive impact on leverage, such as the technological progress. 
This subsection removes the second and third determinants by implementing an empirical 
analysis that more tightly follows Xu (2012)’s analysis, which - differently from the current paper 
- studies public firms only and regresses leverage directly on predicted imports, thereby assuming 
that import penetration is itself the proxy of expected profitability. 
More precisely, the empirical model in Xu (2012) is a two-stages least-squares approach that, 
in the second stage, regresses leverage on the imports that are predicted by a first stage. In the 
current paper, the regression model for the first stage is the specification (3) while the regression 
model for the second stage is the following one: 
 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑗𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽11 ൈ 𝐶ℎ𝚤𝑛𝑎𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡. 𝚤𝑛𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑤𝑎𝑦̂ 𝑗𝑖𝑡−1 + ߜ11 ൈ𝑋𝑗𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝑢𝑗𝑖𝑡                            (11) 
 
Since this model is testing the leverage-profitability relation unconditionally with respect to 
the occurrence of refinancing, we consider specifications with firm fixed effects (not just with 
industry fixed effects) because they are more in line with the theory of Danis et al. (2014). Columns 
of Table 7 illustrate the outcomes under multiple specifications depending on an increasing set of 
covariates. The specification in Column (1) contains asset tangibility, growth opportunities and 
expected profitability as regressors. The results show that leverage has an insignificantly positive 
reaction to import competition.  
The specification in Column (2) controls also for the depreciation to assets, capital-labor 
intensity and we observe that the sign of the coefficient for import competition becomes 
significantly positive. According to Xu (2012), we can interpret this finding as a negative reaction 
of leverage to expected profitability, which is coherent with the previous results of the double-IV 
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model relative to the Table 6. In order to add a specification that is more comparable to Xu (2012), 
in Column 3, I run a specification in which the industry fixed effects substitute the firm fixed 
effects. The results show an insignificant leverage-competition relation. 
To increase the comparability with the previous research, which analyzes public firms only, 
Table 8 provides results for the subsample of Norwegian listed entities. We observe that 
competition’s coefficients are insignificantly negative both with firm fixed effect and with industry 
fixed effects. These results suggest that even if we use a two-stages least-square approach, we focus 
on public firm only and we use the industry fixed effect, my analyses do not to corroborate the 
negative competition-leverage relation evidenced by Xu (2012) and interpreted as a positive 
profitability-leverage relationship. The Tables 8 and 9 suggest that the residual discrepancy 
between the results of the current paper and the ones in the previous literature can be explained 
essentially by factors that are related to the differences between Norway and the U.S.A..  
A first factor may be related to the Norwegian import policy. Indeed, given that Norway is a 
small economy, compared to the U.S.A., the Norwegian firms’ preferences about import policy are 
supposed to have a weaker influence over the decisions about the industries to be liberalized 
(Grossman and Helpman (1992)). Some types of businesses are prepared than others to increase 
investments in the most innovative and complex areas of production. Bloom et al. (2012) suggest 
that businesses with an ability to increase innovation are more likely to survive after an initial 
shock of competition and, therefore, have a lower aversion for import tariff cuts. This lower 
aversion can be translated into the fact that the set of liberalized industries used by studies about 
the U.S.A. might not be random. For instance, firms with a strong ability to expand the most 
innovative areas of production can have a lower aversion to the liberalization and, at the same 
time, have a lower target leverage ratio, given that they have lower tangibility and higher R&D, 
compared to firms that, instead, have stronger aversion to liberalization. 
Another factor explaining the positive profitability-leverage reaction of American firms may 
be a faster reaction of American firms, compared to Norwegian counterparts, in adjusting their 
debt to reach a new target leverage. This faster reaction may be attributed to the fact that U.S.A.’s 
capital markets are able to offer a higher adjustment speed, which would be in line with the 
evidence that U.S.A.’s equity market has lower trading costs than the Norwegian one (Domowitz 
and Madhavan (2001)).  
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4. Tests of Dynamic Trade-Off Models 
Hitherto, the leverage regression using contemporaneous profitability shocks has illustrated 
that leverage increases in response to profitability cuts. The mechanics of this movement show 
that Norwegian firms do not retire debt while assets decrease, which is reflected into a decline of 
retained earnings. These steps represented a method to test the hypotheses that firms follow the 
static trade-off theory. 
In this section, instead, we test the predictions elaborated by the dynamic inaction models. 
These models give strong emphasis on the fact that the relation has to be positive conditionally 
on the fact that the firm is actively implementing costly adjustments of capital structure. Indeed, 
the time series of each firm is constituted by periods of in which leverage fluctuates in-between 
the thresholds of the inactivity region and by periods of adjusting activity, where firms undertake 
costly corrections of capital structure.53 
To propose a preliminary description of how the leverage-profitability relationship depends 
on adjustments, we can check whether firms with different adjustment costs have different a 
relationship. The intuition is the following: as argued by Brav (2009), firms with higher adjustment 
costs - i.e., private firms in his setting - undertake the active corrections of leverage less frequently; 
thus, we can expect that the time series of these firms contain fewer observations in which the 
profitability-leverage relationship is positive. Symmetrically, firms with lower adjustment costs - 
i.e., public firms - should have more adjustment activity and, thus, more observations in which 
the profitability-leverage relationship is positive. Since my sample contains both private and public 
firms, I test the prediction that public firms - i.e., firms with relatively low adjustment costs and 
more adjustment points - exhibit a more positive profitability-leverage relation compared to 
private firms. The following model is studied for the public firms in the years from 1998 to 2006: 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑗𝑖𝑡 = ߙ12 + 𝛽12 ൈ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝚤𝑡𝑎𝑏𝚤𝑙𝚤𝑡𝑦̂ 𝑗𝑖𝑡 + ߜ12 ൈ𝑋𝑗𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝑢𝑗𝑖𝑡                                  (12) 
 
                                                            
53 See Strabulaev and Whited (2012) 
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The outcomes in Table 9 show that public entities have an insignificant profitability-leverage 
relation, while private firms have a significantly negative profitability-leverage relation, in line 
with Table 5. The positive and significant t-statistic relative to the difference between the estimate 
of public and private firms corroborate the prediction that public entities, which have more 
adjustment activity than private ones, have a leverage that correlates less negatively with 
profitability. The second stage’s outcomes in Table 9 verify that exogenous imports from China 
have a negative impact on profit margins for public and private firms.54 
For a more appropriate empirical test of the dynamic trade-off theory, I examine two specific 
predictions discussed by Danis et al. (2014) that characterize the profitability-leverage relation 
depending on whether the firm is in adjustment or, alternatively, non-adjustment points. The 
adjustment points are defined as the firm-year observations in which there is a sufficient 
refinancing activity, that is the concurrence of a net debt issuance and a net equity retirement.  
It is important to motivate why the debt reductions are not eligible as adjustment points. 
Danis et al. (2014) argues that dynamic trade off models are difficult to be examined using their 
predictions about debt reductions. Indeed, these models normally do not consider debt reductions 
as an optimizing behavior, apart from the moments close to default or to strategic renegotiations, 
although evidence suggest that half of the leverage decreasing recapitalizations are implemented 
by firms that are not in distress (Kisser and Rapushi (2017)).  
The specification relative to this approach is the following: 
 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑗𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽 × 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝚤𝑡𝑎𝑏̂ 𝑗𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾 × 𝑅𝑒𝑓𝚥𝚤𝑡 × 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝚤𝑡𝑎𝑏𝚥𝚤𝑡̂ + 𝛿 × 𝑋𝑗𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝑢𝑗𝑖𝑡           (13) 
 
The dummy variable ܴ ݂݁ identifies the refinancing points. They are the firm-year observations 
exceeding the thresholds of 5% for the debt issues (defined as the annual changes in long term 
debt minus cash changes, divided by assets) and the level of 5% for the net equity retirements 
                                                            
54 There is a limitation in the analysis of this heterogeneity: the low number of observations does not allow 
the matching of private firms with firms that are similar but public. However, this paper controls for size, 
growth opportunities, depreciation to assets, capital labor intensity and tangibility. 
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(defined as the dividends net of new equity issues, divided by assets).55 Importantly, the inclusion 
of an interaction between profitability and refinancing allows us to separate the profitability-
leverage correlation at refinancings from the one at non-refinancings. This separation is crucial for 
tightly testing the dynamic trade off theory of Danis et al. (2014), which makes different 
predictions depending on whether refinancing is occurring or not. First, they predict a significantly 
negative profitability-leverage relation in the non-refinancing periods. This means that they predict 
a negative sign for (ߚ), which is the coefficient of profitability at non-refinancing points. Second, 
concerning cross-sectional models, they predict a positive relation at refinancing points. Thus, we 
expect a positive sign for (ߚ ൅ ߛ) that is the sum of the coefficient of profitability at refinancings 
and the coefficient of the interaction variable between profitability and the occurrence of 
refinancing (this interaction describes the differencial impact of profitability between refinancing 
point and non-refinancing points).  
The specifications in Table 10 test these predictions. The results show that the exogenous 
profitability has a negative impact on leverage at the non-refinancing points. This evidence 
corroborate the dynamic trade-off theory. In addition, concerning the second hypothesis, in Table 
10 the crucial examination is relative to the Wald test, which aims to assess whether the null that 
the sum of the coefficients (ߚ ൅ ߛ) is equal to zero. Column (1) shows the outcomes of the 
specification with only the most basic controls of the leverage regression, that is size, growth 
opportunities and tangibility. The p-value relative to the Wald-test is very large and, hence, we 
cannot reject the null hypothesis that profitability has no impact on leverage.  
The results in Column (1) might potentially be biased because they do not control for 
depreciation to assets and capital-labor intensity. However, even when we control for these two 
covariates, Column (2) confirms that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the impact of 
profitability at refinancing points is insignificant. Hence, differently from the evidence of Danis et 
al. (2014) regarding U.S.A.’s public firms, my analyses only corroborate the first prediction of the 
dynamic TOT, while they find no support for the second prediction for which the cross-sectional 
profitability-leverage relation is positive at refinancing points. 
 
                                                            
55 We cannot include the stock repurchases because the dataset does not provide information about them. 
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5. Conclusions 
Static Trade-Off Theory (TOT) of capital structure predicts that profitability increases the 
advantage of debt by increasing its tax-shield benefit. For Fama and French (2002), the established 
evidence of negative profitability-leverage relation contradicts TOT. In this paper, I test TOT 
under its static and dynamic versions by using an exogenous expected profitability. By means of 
a double IV approach, the first stage predicts the exogenous competition from China where Chinese 
exports towards other rich countries is the instrument (following Autor et al. (2013)); the second 
stage predicts the Norwegian firms’ profitability by means of the increases of exogenous 
competition from China; the third stage analyzes the response of leverage to the predicted 
profitability. When I focus on the tests of the static TOT, I find that leverage increases when 
predicted profitability drops. This response is driven by the assets’ decrease and the retained 
earnings’ decrease. On the other hand, debt is not adapted to the lowered level of profitability. 
Moreover, I introduce tests of the dynamic TOT in the literature concerning competition-
profitability-leverage. With the “double instrumental variable” approach, I find a negative 
profitability-leverage relation at non-refinancing points, which corroborates the dynamic TOT. 
However, I also find, at refinancing points, insignificant profitability-leverage relation, which does 
not corroborate the dynamic TOT. 
 
  
117 
 
References 
 
Acemoglu, D Autor, D Dorn, G Hanson, B Price - 2015. Import Competition and the Great U.S. 
Employment Sag of the 2000s. 
 
Autor, D Dorn, GH Hanson (2013). The China syndrome: Local labor market effects of import 
competition in the United States. AER 
 
Baker, J Wurgler, 2002 . Market timing and capital structure. The journal of finance, 2002 
 
Balsvik, S Jensen, KG Salvanes (2014). Made in China, sold in Norway: Local labor market effects 
of an import shock. Journal of Public Economics, 2014 
 
Berner, Mjøs, Olving (2014). Norwegian Corporate Accounts 
 
Becker and Woessmann (2009) Was Weber Wrong? A Human Capital Theory of Protestant 
Economic History The Quarterly Journal of Economics 
 
Bernanke, Mark Gertler (1995) Inside the Black Box: The Credit Channel of Monetary Policy 
Transmission Journal of Economic Perspectives 
 
Bloom, Draca And Van Reenen (2012) Trade Induced Technical Change? The Impact Of Chinese 
Imports On Innovation, It And Productivity 
 
Bradley, Jarrel and Kim (1984). On the existence of an optimal capital structure: Theory and 
evidence. The journal of Finance, 1984 
 
Danis, Rettl, Whited (2014). Refinancing, Profitability, and Capital Structure. Journal of 
Financial Economics 
118 
 
 
DeRosa and Goldstein(1981). Import Discipline in the U.S. Manufacturing Sector . 
 
Fama and French (2002). Testing trade-off and pecking order predictions about dividends and 
debt. Review of financial studies 
 
Fisher, Heinkel and Zechner (1989) Dynamic Capital Structure Choice: Theory and Tests Journal 
of Finance 
 
Frank and Goyal (2007). Trade-off and pecking order theories of debt. 
 
Fresard (2010) Financial Strength and Product Market Behavior: The Real Effects of Corporate 
Cash Holdings Journal of Finance 
 
Fresard and Valta (2015). How Does Corporate Investment Respond to Increased Entry Threat?. 
Review of Corporate Finance Studies 
 
Gildersleeve (1999). Winning Business: How to Use Financial Analysis and Benchmarks 
 
Graham and Leary (2011) A Review of Empirical Capital Structure Research and Directions for 
the Future Annual Review of Financial Economics 
 
Hennessy and Whited (2005). Debt dynamics. The Journal of Finance 
 
Hoberg and Phillips (2010), Product Market Synergies and Competition in Mergers and 
Acquisitions: A Text-Based Analysis. Review of Financial Studies 
 
Hortaçsu, Matvos, Syverson (2013) Indirect Costs of Financial Distress in Durable Goods 
Industries: The Case of Auto Manufacturers Review of Financial Studies 
119 
 
 
Katics and Pedersen (1994). The effect of rising import competition on market power: a panel data 
study of U.S. manufacturing. The Journal of Industrial Economics, 1994 
 
Kisser and Rapushi (2017). Leverage Decreasing Recapitalizations and Stockholder’s Value, 
Working Paper 
 
Leary and Roberts (2005). Do firms rebalance their capital structures?. The journal of finance, 
2005 
 
Lenway, Mork and Yeung (1996) “Rent Seeking, Protectionism and Innovation in the American 
Steel Industry,” Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, 
 
Liebman and Tomlin (2006) Steel Safeguards and the Welfare of U.S. Steel Firms and Downstream 
Consumers of Steel: A Shareholder Wealth Perspective IIS Discussion paper 
 
Maksimovic (1988) Capital structure in repeated oligopolies RAND Journal of Economics 
 
Myers (2003). Financing of corporations. 
 
Pagoulatos and Sorensen(1976). Foreign trade, concentration and profitability in open economies. 
European Economic Review, 1976 
 
Rajan and Zingales (1995). What do we know about capital structure? Some evidence from 
international data. The journal of Finance, 1995 
 
Strabulaev (2007). Do tests of capital structure theory mean what they say?. The Journal of 
Finance, 2007 
 
120 
 
Titman and Wessels (1988). The determinants of capital structure choice. The Journal of finance, 
1988 
 
Valta (2012) “Competition and the cost of debt,” Journal of Financial Economics 
 
Xu (2012) . Profitability and capital structure: Evidence from import penetration. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 2012 
 
 
 
  
121 
 
Appendix I 
 
Imports are listed at the 6-digits Harmonized System (HS) product code, which are provided 
by Comtrade. I associate the 6-digits HS codes to the relative NACE (revision 1.1) industry codes 
by means of the conversion tables of RAMON’s database. The NACE industries that have data 
on imports span from 0100 to 3800, which concerns the primary and the manufacturing industries. 
By merging these two datasets, I eliminate 2,044,571 firm-year observation because the initial 
Norwegian Corporate Accounts contains the universe of Norwegian industries, including the NACE 
codes from 3810 to 9999 whose outputs are not the tangible products described by Comtrade. The 
other two reasons for this decrease of observations are: first, my initial Norwegian Corporate 
Accounts dataset (which spans from 1995 to 2007) contained more years than my imports dataset 
(which spans from 1996 to 2006); second, some firms have missing data for which concerns the 
NACE code. 
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Appendix II 
 
The Norwegian imports are the Dollar value of goods imported from the whole world in Norway 
that are the outputs of an industry i defined by the NACE system at the 4-digit level. The source 
of this data is the Comtrade database. 
Total sales are the Dollar value of products that have been sold by Norwegian industry i defined 
by the NACE system at the 4-digit level. The source of this information is the Norwegian 
Corporate Accounts’ database, which is discussed by Berner, Mjos and Olving (2012). 
The NACE (revision 1.1) codes that are involved are from 0100 to 3800, which concerns the 
primary and the manufacturing industries. The conversion tables from HS6 to NACE are provided 
by the RAMON’s database. 
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Figures 
 
Figure 1. Distribution of the change in ROA predicted by the exogenous change in the Chinese competition 
towards Norwegian private firms. The sample period is from 1998 to 2006.  
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Tables 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics. The sample period is from 1998 to 2006.  
Total leverage is defined as total interest bearing debt over total assets; short-term leverage is defined as 
short-term interest bearing debt over total assets; long-term leverage is defined as long-term interest bearing 
debt over total assets; depretiation to assets is a measure of operating efficiency and it is defined as 
depretiation divided by sales; profit margin is the sum of pre-tax income, interest expense and depreciation, 
divided by sales; Capex to assets is the measure of growth opportunities; log sales is the measure of firm 
size. 
 
Panel A. Private firms 
 
 
 
Panel B. Public firms 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics.  
The sample period is from 1998 to 2006. Capital-labor intensity is defined as total invested capital over 
number of employees; IPI is the import penetration and it is defined as total imports from China over the 
sum of total imports from the world and total Norwegian sales (see the text for further details), asset 
tangibility is defined as fixed assets over assets. 
 
 
Panel A. Private firms 
 
 
 
 
Panel B. Public firms 
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Table 3. Impact of non-exogenous profitability on leverage.  
Private firms from the dataset on Norwegian Corporate Accounts. The sample period is from 1998 to 2006. 
The model is 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑗𝑖𝑡 = ߙ1 + 𝛽1 × 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑗𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝛾1 × 𝑋𝑗𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝑢𝑗𝑖𝑡 . The dependent variable is leverage 
(total interest bearing debt divided by assets). The variables are: profit margins (sum of pre-tax income, 
interest expense and depreciation, divided by sales), ROA (EBITDA over assets), asset tangibility (fixed 
assets over assets), depreciation to assets (depreciation over assets), firm size (logarithm of sales), capex to 
assets (capital expenditures over assets), capital-labor intensity (total invested capital over number of 
employees). The standard errors are clustered at firm level. The symbols *, **, *** refer to estimates 
significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5% and 1% confidence levels. 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Leverage Leverage Leverage Leverage
------------- ------------- ------------- -------------
ROA -0.141***  -0.142*** 
(0.00)  (0.00) 
Profit Margin -0.017** -0.017**
 (0.02)  (0.02)
Tangibility 0.144*** 0.135*** 0.188*** 0.183***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00)
Size -0.011** -0.006 -0.023*** -0.019***
 (0.04) (0.37) (0.00) (0.00)
CapEx.To.Assets -0.047** -0.042** -0.089*** -0.086***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00)
Depr.To.Assets 0.076* 0.047
(0.08) (0.28)
Cap.Lab.Int. 0.000 0.000
(0.50) (0.96)
Firm FE YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES
R2 0.10 0.11 0.08 0.08
N 72118 72118 72118 72118
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Table 4. Impact of lagged exogenous profitability on leverage. 
The regression involves private firms from the dataset on Norwegian Corporate Accounts. The sample period 
is from 1998 to 2006. The first stage model is 𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑒𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡. 𝑖𝑛𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑤𝑎𝑦𝑖𝑡 = ߙ3 + 𝛽3 ൈ 𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑒𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡. 𝑖𝑛𝑂𝑅𝐶𝑖𝑡 +
ߜ3 × 𝑋𝑗𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝑢𝑗𝑖𝑡 . The second stage model is 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑗𝑖𝑡 = ߙ4 + 𝛽4 ൈ 𝐶ℎ𝚤𝑛𝑎𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡. 𝚤𝑛𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑤𝑎𝑦̂ 𝑗𝑖𝑡 + ߜ4 × 𝑋𝑗𝑖(𝑡−1) +
𝑢𝑗𝑖𝑡. The third stage model is 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑗𝑖𝑡 = ߙ5 + 𝛽5 ൈ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝚤𝑡𝑎𝑏̂ 𝑗𝑖(𝑡−1) + ߜ5 × 𝑋𝑗𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝑢𝑗𝑖𝑡 . The variables are: ROA 
(earning before interest and taxes, divided by assets), asset tangibility (fixed assets over assets), depreciation 
to assets (depreciation over assets), firm size (logarithm of sales), capex to assets (capital expenditures over 
assets), capital-labor intensity (total invested capital over number of employees). ChineseCompet.Norway 
is the measure of  the import penetration of Chinese products into Norway, ChineseCompet.inORC is the 
measure of import penetration of Chinese products into nine rich countries. The standard errors are clustered 
at firm level. The symbols *, **, *** refer to estimates significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5% and 
1% confidence levels. 
 
 
 
First Stage Second Stage (1) (2)
ChineseCompet.Norway ROA Leverage Leverage
------------- ------------- ------------- -------------
Lagged Pred. ROA -0.013* -0.015
Pred. ChineseCompet.Norway -0.003**
ChineseCompet.inORC 0.091***
Tangibility 0.000 0.056 0.173*** 0.172***
Size 1.665 -0.045 -0.023*** -0.034**
CapEx.To.Assets 0.823 -0.045** -0.116** -0.092**
Depr.To.Assets 0.345 0.023 0.073**
Cap.Lab.Int. 0.087 0.043** 0.019
Firm FE YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES
R2 0.01 0.01 0.10 0.11
N 72118 72118 72118 72118
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Table 5. Impact of predicted expected profitability on leverage. 
Private firms from the dataset on Norwegian Corporate Accounts. The sample period is from 1998 to 2006. 
The dependent variable is leverage (total interest bearing debt divided by assets). The first stage is 
𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑒𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡. 𝑖𝑛𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑤𝑎𝑦𝑖𝑡 = ߙ3 + 𝛽3 ൈ 𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑒𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡. 𝑖𝑛𝑂𝑅𝐶𝑖𝑡 + ߜ3 × 𝑋𝑗𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝑢𝑗𝑖𝑡 . The second stage model is 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑗𝑖𝑡 = ߙ4 + 𝛽4 ൈ 𝐶ℎ𝚤𝑛𝑎𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡. 𝚤𝑛𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑤𝑎𝑦̂ 𝑗𝑖𝑡 + ߜ4 × 𝑋𝑗𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝑢𝑗𝑖𝑡. The third stage model is 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑗𝑖𝑡 =
ߙ5 + 𝛽5 ൈ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝚤𝑡𝑎𝑏̂ 𝑗𝑖𝑡 + ߜ5 × 𝑋𝑗𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝑢𝑗𝑖𝑡 . The variables are: ROA (earning before interest and taxes, divided 
by assets), asset tangibility (fixed assets over assets), depreciation to assets (depreciation over assets), firm 
size (logarithm of sales), capex to assets (capital expenditures over assets), capital-labor intensity (total 
invested capital over number of employees). ChineseCompet.Norway is the measure of  the import 
penetration of Chinese products into Norway, ChineseCompet.inORC is the measure of  the import 
penetration of Chinese products into nine rich countries. The standard errors are clustered at firm level. 
The symbols *, **, *** refer to estimates significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5% and 1% confidence 
levels. 
 
 
 
  
First Stage Second Stage (1) (2)
ChineseCompet.Norway ROA Leverage Leverage
------------- ------------- ------------- -------------
Pred. ROA -0.081* -0.044*
Pred. ChineseCompet.Norway -0.003**
ChineseCompet.inORC 0.086***
Controls YES YES NO YES
Firm FE YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES
R2 0.01 0.01 0.11 0.12
N 72118 72118 72118 72118
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Table 6. Impact of changes of expected profitability on flow variables.  
The regression involves private firms from the dataset on Norwegian Corporate Accounts. The sample period 
is from 1998 to 2006. The first stage is ∆𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑒𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡. 𝑖𝑛𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑤𝑎𝑦𝑖𝑡 = ߙ3 + 𝛽3 ൈ ∆𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑒𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡. 𝑖𝑛𝑂𝑅𝐶𝑖𝑡 +
ߜ3 × ∆𝑋𝑗𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝑢𝑗𝑖𝑡 . The second stage model is ∆𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑗𝑖𝑡 = ߙ10 + 𝛽10 ൈ ∆𝐶ℎ𝚤𝑛𝑎𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡. 𝚤𝑛𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑤𝑎𝑦̂ 𝑗𝑖𝑡 + ߜ10 ×
∆𝑋𝑗𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝑢𝑗𝑖𝑡. The third stage model is 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑗𝑖𝑡 = ߙ+ 𝛽 ൈ ∆𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝚤𝑡𝑎𝑏̂ 𝑗𝑖𝑡 + ߜ× ∆𝑋𝑗𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝑢𝑗𝑖𝑡 . The dependent 
variables in the third stages are: asset growth (annual change in logarithm of assets), net debt issues (annual 
changes in debt minus cash divided by lagged assets), net equity issues (annual change in total equity minus 
retained earnings over lagged assets). The variables are: annual change of ROA, annual changes of standard 
control variables and equity over assets. ChineseCompet.Norway Chg. is the measure of changes in import 
penetration of Chinese products into Norway, ChineseCompet.inORC is the measure of  the import 
penetration of Chinese products into nine rich countries. The standard errors are clustered at firm level. 
The symbols *, **, *** refer to estimates significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5% and 1% confidence 
levels. 
 
 
 
  
First Stage Second Stage (1) (2) (3)
ChineseCompet.Norway Chg. ROA Chg Debt issue Asset growth Equity growth
------------- ------------- ------------- ------------- -------------
Pred. ROA Chg -0.422 0.234** 0.549*
(0.78) (0.04) (0.07)
Pred.ChineseCompet.Norway Chg. -0.004*
(0.07)
ChineseCompet.inORC Chg. 0.102**
(0.04)
Controls YES YES YES YES YES
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES
R2 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.02
N 59060 59060 59060 59060 59060
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Table 7. Impact of lagged exogenous import penetration on leverage.  
The regression involves private firms from the dataset on Norwegian Corporate Accounts. The sample period 
is from 1998 to 2006. The first stage model is 𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑒𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡. 𝑖𝑛𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑤𝑎𝑦𝑖𝑡 = ߙ3 + 𝛽3 ൈ 𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑒𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡. 𝑖𝑛𝑂𝑅𝐶𝑖𝑡 +
ߜ3 × 𝑋𝑗𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝑢𝑗𝑖𝑡 . The second stage model is 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑗𝑖𝑡 = ߙ11 + 𝛽11 ൈ 𝐶ℎ𝚤𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑒𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡. 𝚤𝑛𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑤𝑎𝑦𝚤𝑡−1̂ + ߜ11 ×
𝑋𝑗𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝑢𝑗𝑖𝑡 . The variables are: asset tangibility (fixed assets over assets), depreciation to assets 
(depreciation over assets), firm size (logarithm of sales), capex to assets (capital expenditures over assets), 
capital-labor intensity (total invested capital over number of employees). ChineseCompet.Norway is the 
measure of  the import penetration of Chinese products into Norway, ChineseCompet.inORC is the measure 
of  the import penetration of Chinese products into nine rich countries. The standard errors are clustered 
at firm level. The symbols *, **, *** refer to estimates significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5% and 
1% confidence levels. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
First Stage (1) (2) (3)
ChineseCompet.Norway Leverage Leverage Leverage
------------- ------------- ------------- -------------
Lag.Pred.ChineseCompet.Norway 0.117 0.121* -0.065
ChineseCompet.inORC 0.086***
Tangibility 0.000 0.173** 0.175*** 0.194**
Size 0.346 -0.026*** -0.022*** -0.032***
CapEx.To.Assets 0.634 -0.089*** -0.086*** -0.334***
Depr.To.Assets 0.823 0.052 0.095***
Cap.Lab.Int. 0.103 -0.000 -0.000
Firm FE YES YES YES NO
Industry FE NO NO NO YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES
R2 0.01 0.11 0.12 0.14
N 72118 72118 72118 72118
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Table 8. Impact of lagged expected profitability on leverage.  
The regression involves public firms from the dataset on Norwegian Corporate Accounts. The sample period 
is from 1998 to 2006. The first stage model is 𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑒𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡. 𝑖𝑛𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑤𝑎𝑦𝑖𝑡 = ߙ3 + 𝛽3 ൈ 𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑒𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡. 𝑖𝑛𝑂𝑅𝐶𝑖𝑡 +
ߜ3 × 𝑋𝑗𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝑢𝑗𝑖𝑡 . The second stage model is 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑗𝑖𝑡 = ߙ11 + 𝛽11 ൈ 𝐶ℎ𝚤𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑒𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡. 𝚤𝑛𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑤𝑎𝑦𝚤𝑡−1̂ + ߜ11 ×
𝑋𝑗𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝑢𝑗𝑖𝑡 . The variables are: asset tangibility (fixed assets over assets), depreciation to assets 
(depreciation over assets), firm size (logarithm of sales), capex to assets (capital expenditures over assets), 
capital-labor intensity (total invested capital over number of employees). ChineseCompet.Norway is the 
measure of  the import penetration of Chinese products into Norway, ChineseCompet.inORC is the measure 
of  the import penetration of Chinese products into nine rich countries. The standard errors are clustered 
at firm level. The symbols *, **, *** refer to estimates significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5% and 
1% confidence levels. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
First Stage (1) (2) (3)
ChineseCompet.Norway Leverage Leverage Leverage
------------- ------------- ------------- -------------
Lag.Pred.ChineseCompet.Norway -0.119 -0.056 -0.242
ChineseCompet.inORC 0.089*
Tangibility 0.000 -0.007 -0.063 -0.143
Size 0.432 0.021* 0.045*** 0.041***
CapEx.To.Assets 0.765 0.044 -0.003 -0.040
Depr.To.Assets 0.786 0.118*** 0.130**
Cap.Lab.Int. 0.102 0.000 0.000***
Firm FE YES YES YES NO
Industry FE NO NO NO YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES
R2 0.01 0.5 0.7 0.7
N 282 282 282 282
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Table 9. Impact of profitability on leverage.  
The regression involves public firms from the dataset on Norwegian Corporate Accounts. The sample period 
is from 1998 to 2006. The variables are: ROA (earning before interest and taxes, divided by assets), asset 
tangibility (fixed assets over assets), depreciation to assets (depreciation over assets), firm size (logarithm 
of sales), capex to assets (capital expenditures over assets), capital-labor intensity (total invested capital 
over number of employees). ChineseCompet.Norway is the measure of  the import penetration of Chinese 
products into Norway, ChineseCompet.inORC is the measure of  the import penetration of Chinese products 
into nine rich countries. The standard errors are clustered at firm level. The symbols *, **, *** refer to 
estimates significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5% and 1% confidence levels. 
 
 
 
  
Second Stage Third stage Second Stage Third stage T-test
ROA Leverage ROA Leverage Public - Private
------------- ------------- ------------- ------------- -------------
Pred. ROA -0.020 -0.044*  2.104**
Pred. ChineseCompet.Norway -0.002* -0.003**
Controls YES YES YES YES
Firm FE YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES
R2 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.12
N 282 282 72118 72118
--------------------------------------- ---------------------------------------
Public firms Private firms
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Table 10. Impact of predicted expected profitability on leverage at refinancing points.  
The variables are: ROA (earning before interest and taxes, divided by assets), Refinancing dummy (it equal 
one if the firm-year observation exceeds 5% of long term debt issues and 5% of net equity retirement to 
shareholders, see the text for further details), asset tangibility (fixed assets over assets), depreciation to 
assets (depreciation over assets), firm size (logarithm of sales), capex to assets (capital expenditures over 
assets), capital-labor intensity (total invested capital over number of employees). The first stage is 
𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑒𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡. 𝑖𝑛𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑤𝑎𝑦𝑖𝑡 = ߙ3 + 𝛽3 ൈ 𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑒𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡. 𝑖𝑛𝑂𝑅𝐶𝑖𝑡 + ߜ3 × 𝑋𝑗𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝑢𝑗𝑖𝑡 . The second stage model is 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑗𝑖𝑡 = ߙ4 + 𝛽4 ൈ 𝐶ℎ𝚤𝑛𝑎𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡. 𝚤𝑛𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑤𝑎𝑦̂ 𝑗𝑖𝑡 + ߜ4 × 𝑋𝑗𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝑢𝑗𝑖𝑡. The third stage model is 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑗𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 +
𝛽 × 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝚤𝑡𝑎𝑏̂ 𝑗𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾 × 𝑅𝑒𝑓𝚥𝚤𝑡 × 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝚤𝑡𝑎𝑏𝚥𝚤𝑡̂ + 𝛿 × 𝑋𝑗𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝑢𝑗𝑖𝑡 The Wald test has the null hypothesis that the sum 
(ߚ ൅ ߛ) is zero. The standard errors are clustered at firm level. The symbols *, **, *** refer to estimates 
significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5% and 1% confidence levels. 
 
 
  
First Stage Second Stage (1) (2)
ChineseCompet.Norway ROA Leverage Leverage
------------- ------------- ------------- -------------
Pred. ROA -0.032** -0.037*
(0.04) (0.07)
Pred. ChineseCompet.Norway -0.007**
(0.04)
ChineseCompet.inORC 0.079**
(0.03)
Ref 0.047 -0.053** 0.072** 0.076***
(0.27) (0.04) (0.04) (0.00)
Pred. ROA x Ref 0.043* 0.032**
(0.08) (0.06)
HP sum = 0 0.14 0.19
Controls YES YES NO YES
Industry FE YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES
R2 0.01 0.01 0.12 0.12
N 72118 72118 72118 72118
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Impact of the Capital Purchase Program on the 
Capital Ratio of U.S. Banks 
 
Raffaele Giuliana 
 
July 7, 2017 
 
Abstract 
This paper illustrates that the U.S. Capital Purchase Program (October 2008) has effectively 
expanded banks’ capitalization by increasing their equity issuances. This impact is analyzed by 
means of a difference-in-differences framework, after illustrating that the parallel trend 
assumption is satisfied. In addition, the paper shows that the improvement of banks 
capitalization has not been attenuated nor reinforced by modifications of the payout or 
investment policies that may have been resulting from the Capital Purchase Program. These 
results are robust to the implementation of an instrumental variable approach. In addition, I 
show that not only the preferred equity, but also the common equity has increased in response 
to the preferred equity infusions. 
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1. Introduction 
The stability of the banking system strongly hinges on the levels of capitalization the financial 
institutions are able to maintain, especially during the macroeconomic contractions (Jarrow (2013), 
Blum (2008)). To ensure a sufficient bank capitalization, policymakers have both prescribed capital 
requirements (Basel I, II, III) and, particularly during the financial crises of the last decade, they 
have created unprecedentedly expensive schemes that explicitly sustain financial institutions using 
several different mechanisms.  
The most prominent example is the U.S. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA), 
which generated the Capital Purchase Program (CPP). Introduced in October 2008, the Capital 
Purchase Program allowed the Treasury to acquire at a subsidized price preferred equity issued 
by banks, with an expenditure ceiling of $250 billion (more than 1,7% of GDP). In order to 
participate and remain into the program, banks had to receive the Treasury’s authorization, which 
was significantly politically motivated (Duchin and Sosyura (2014)), in addition to the obligation 
to pay the buyer with dividends that were lower but close to market valuation. A third condition 
was the limitation of the managerial compensations and of the payouts to common equity, even 
though the latter restriction could have been removed through approvals provided by the Treasury 
(Pratt and Grabowski (2009), Treasury Department (2009)). Since the original fundamental 
objective of the plan was officially to increase banks’ capitalization in order to restore the 
confidence in the network of financial institutions (Massad (2013)), the natural question posed by 
authors like Hosh and Kashyap (2010) was: “will the U.S. bank recapitalization succeed?”  
This enquiry constitutes an open empirical question. In particular, although the original 
objective was the recapitalization and stabilization of the banks, the positive shocks on capital 
represented by the infusion of new equity might have been substantially counterbalanced by 
excessive expansions of the investments and of the payout policy. 
Concerning the investments, it is worth noticing that a very broad group of major lawmakers 
and their electorate even considered the expansion of investments as the necessary goal for a public 
program like the CPP (Warren et al. (2009)). In fact, at the peak of the financial crisis, the 
economy in the U.S.A. was experiencing the largest decline in GDP since the World War, the 
unemployment rate was at its highest record in almost three decades and firms were experiencing 
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a generalized credit crunch. In this context, the priority for voters and politicians was to exert 
strong pressure on the Treasury and on banking regulators in order to ensure that taxpayers’ 
money was not retained inside the banks but, rather, transmitted to the “real economy” for funding 
new projects. 
According to Acharya and Yorulmazer (2007), public rescue programs like the CPP can 
excessively expand banks’ assets and risk-taking under the assumption that the acceptance into 
such programs, being often related to political decisions, might signal an increased probability of 
bail-out for a specific bank also in future distress cases. This signal deteriorates investors’ 
monitoring of protected banks, exacerbates moral hazard and, hence, reinforces banks’ incentives 
to relax the net present value (NPV) requirements for funding new loans. 
Another possible mechanism behind the expansion of investment might be linked to the debt 
over-hang problem discussed by Myers (1977). The infusion of capital might have increased the 
equity ratio and, hence, decreased the proportion of debtholders claims. If this decrease were large 
enough, it could have allowed the equity-holders to have enough expected revenue to accept a 
portion of the productive projects abandoned during the crisis’ debt over-hang. 
Also the payout policy represented an important element of uncertainty that could have 
facilitated or hindered the objective of increasing banks’ capital ratio. It is possible to conjecture 
that the limits on the payout policy have decreased the dividends payments or stock repurchases 
for the banks that were authorized to receive CPP funds. However, the concern of a dividends 
policy limiting capitalization might be reinforced by findings such as the one of Acharya et al. 
(2011), which illustrates that large banks, even in a highly distressed condition, have strongly 
increased dividends during the 2008 financial crisis and that these expansions have deteriorate 
their capitalization. For instance, they show that even Lehman Brothers considerably expanded 
its dividends from $95 million in 2008Q2 to $118 million in 2008Q3 right before its bankruptcy. 
In line with Lehman Brothers’s behavior, Merrill Lynch approximately doubled its dividends in 
2008Q4 compared to the previous year and Bear Stearns enlarged dividends from $36 million in 
2007Q4 to $47 million in 2008Q1. Acharya et al. (2011) argues that the implicit too-big-to-fail 
guarantee can be the main driver of this high - an in several cases increased - payout ratio in 
periods of profound crisis. If we combine the evidence of Acharya et al. (2011) with the findings 
of Bayazitova and Shivdasani (2012) that large institutions have considerably larger probability 
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of being accepted into the CPP, it is possible to empirically observe that the payout ratio of CPP 
institutions react more positively (or less negatively) to the crisis compared to institutions that 
did not access the CPP.  
This paper investigates whether a stimulus plan like the CPP has been effective in increasing 
banks’ equity ratio by contributing to the exploration of this question with a natural experiment 
framework (difference-in-differences) and with analyses concerning three drivers of equity ratio 
(equity issuances, payout policy and illiquid investments) and two important subcomponents of 
equity (i.e., common and preferred stock).56 The examination of these drivers is particularly 
important also to understand whether the objective of recapitalizing banks through equity 
issuances has been reinforced or attenuated by illiquid investments or dividends payouts.  
This study compares the reaction to CPP’s introduction of banks accepted into the program 
(also referred to as the CPP banks, which constitute the treated group) with the reaction of 
institutions that did not have access to the program (also referred to as the non-CPP banks, which 
constitute the control group). In addition, this study implements a difference-in-differences 
estimation in which the treatment dummy is the prediction of a first-stage using an Instrumental 
Variable approach. This procedure addresses the endogeneity concerns related to the fact that the 
authorization into the CPP might be determined by variables like the bank’s distress, which might 
affect the dependent variables and create a confounding effect. 
I show that the CPP banks significantly increased the equity to assets ratio (Tier 1 total 
capital ratio) compared to institutions that did not have access to the CPP while, importantly, 
their ratios displayed a clear parallel trend before 2008Q4, that is before CPP’s introduction. 
Further evidence corroborates the hypothesis that this expansion is crucially driven by the equity 
issuances and that the CPP did not significantly affect the banks’ behavior in terms of dividends 
payouts. Moreover, analyses illustrate that, in reaction to the CPP, banks did not increase their 
illiquid investments. 
In addition, this paper attempts to discern whether banks’ equity issuances are exclusively 
driven by the preferred stocks bought by the Treasury or, alternatively, whether CPP has triggered 
a beneficial effect by prompting also an increase of the common equity. My findings illustrate that 
                                                            
56 Investments, payout policy and equity issuances are the three fundamental drivers of the equity ratio in 
the studies about how banks adjust their capitalization (e.g., MAG (2010), Gerali and Angelini (2013)). 
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not only the preferred equity ratio but also the common equity ratio increased in reaction to the 
CPP. This expansion of the common equity ratio might be reflecting an endogenous response: since 
the CPP funds decrease the stock volatility (Huerta et al. (2011)), and since firms with lower 
equity volatility have lower seasoned common equity offering (SEO) underpricing (Drucker and 
Puri (1999), Altinkilic and Hansen (2000) and Corwin (2003)), we can expect that CPP funds 
increase the SEO. On the other hand, the increase of the common equity ratio might be compatible 
with a “regulatory requirement” effect: even though the regulation does not explicitly impose higher 
requirements to the CPP banks, for redeeming the CPP capital, from June 2009, the Federal 
Reserve Guidance on TARP Repayments imposed the CPP banks to “demonstrate” the ability to 
access to common equity markets.  Supporting the hypothesis that banks expanded their common 
equity ratio in order to fulfil the necessary requirement for redeeming the preferred stocks, I find 
that the reaction of equity ratio is positive only starting from June 2009. 
This paper is organized as follows: section 2 provides the institutional background regarding 
the CPP; section 3 discusses the related literature; section 4 presents the data; section 4 describes 
the summary statistics with a particular focus on the parallel trends of capital ratio and its 
determinants; section 6 perform the difference-in-differences analyses and the additional 
instrumental variable approach; section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Capital Purchase Program (CPP) 
In October 2008, regulators created the Capital Purchase Program (CPP). It allowed to use 
up to $250 billion for buying banks’ preferred stocks. The Capital Purchase Program was limited 
to “healthy banks” and this definition was the outcome of an evaluation partially based on the 
Camels ratings, which is a supervisory rating system accounting for six bank features: Capital 
adequacy, Asset quality, Management, Earnings, Liquidity and Sensitivity to market risk. This 
system provides five rating classes and the probability of CPP authorization, officially, should 
have been increasing in the safety of the bank. 
However, Pana and Wilson (2013) argue that the vast discretion and confidentiality 
concerning the authorization’s decision is the driver of this large political interference. Analyzing 
the likelihood of a bank receiving CPP capitals, Bayazitova and Shivdasani (2012) underline that 
139 
 
the size is the most important factor for the authorization, while the capital ratio is not a 
significant explanatory variable. This evidence is in line with the finding of higher leniency for 
large institutions, which is supported, among others, by the works of Ioannidou (2005) and 
Lambert (2016). Duchin and Sosyura (2014), Duchin and Sosyura (2012)) demonstrate that the 
decision of authorizing a bank is largely motivated by its political connections. 
For CPP banks, the direct costs related to the preferred stock are in the form of dividends of 
five percent for the first five years and nine percent thereafter. In addition, the CPP funds entailed 
high indirect costs due to the government restrictions on dividends, stock repurchases and 
managerial compensations (Pratt and Grabowski (2010), Treasury Department (2009)). In 
particular, if the dividends of the preferred stock were not paid, the dividends and the repurchases 
in favor of the equity holders were prohibited. In addition, for three years starting from the issuance 
of the preferred stock, the increase of common dividends per share was subject to the consent of 
the Treasury. The equity stock repurchases needed a Treasury’s consent, unless they were “in 
connection with any benefit plan consistent with best practice”, which is a specification that 
contributed to increase the discretion of the regulators (Pratt and Grabowski (2010)). 
 
3. Related literature 
This paper is related to the large literature regarding the impact of equity on banks’ lending. 
Using panel-regression methodologies Hancock and Wilcox (1993, 1994) show that positive shocks 
on banks’ capital induced banks with capital shortfalls to expand their lending, even though the 
effect is modest. In addition, they show that this relation is not constant over decades: for instance, 
it has been stronger in the 1990s than in the 1980s. Similar results are corroborated also by the 
contribution of Lown and Morgan (2006) who use a VAR model and find a small impact of bank 
capital ratio shocks on lending. Also Berrospide and Edge (2010)’s evidence confirms these small 
effects on lending. These results are in contrast with the ones offered by the scatterplot of Adrian 
and Shin (2007) showing a very large effect of capital ratio. The latter results are very important 
from a policy perspective as they are the main motivation behind the additional increase of the 
capital ratio requirements imposed by the Basel accord. Brei et al. (2013) use a large dataset 
composed of 14 important advanced countries for the period from 1995 to 2010 and they study 
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the impact of capitalization on lending. They show that, while capital shocks expand lending in 
normal times, during a crisis institutions increase lending in response to capital shock only if their 
capital ratio exceeds a critical level. Boyson et al. (2014) shows that during the U.S. financial crisis 
and before the capital injections, banks fund themselves with newly issued equity rather than 
assets’ fire sales. 
Bernanke and Lown (1991) demonstrate that the lack of equity is a significant determinant 
of a credit crunch and they disentangle its effect from the effects caused by demand factors, such 
as a weakened state of borrowers’ balance sheets. In addition, they study the effects of a credit 
crunch on firms’ investments finding a significant, although weak, impact. 
Berger and Roman (2014) study the effect of the CPP on borrower firms’ behaviors and show 
that it increased the job creation while reducing business and personal bankruptcies. A vast 
banking literature has examined the banks’ reaction in response to the CPP in terms of lending 
and risk-taking. Puddu and Walchli (2013), focusing on loans to small business, illustrate that 
CPP banks provide a large additional amount of lending compared to non-TARP banks. Black 
and Hazelwood (2013) focus on the risk-taking of a sample of 81 institutions and illustrate that 
commercial and industrial loans have expanded for small CPP banks, but they declined for large 
CPP banks, compared to banks non-participating to the program. Employing a large sample of 
listed institutions, Duchin and Sosyura (2014) show that CPP banks initiated riskier loans. The 
latter study seems the closest contribution, in that they also use a difference-in-differences 
approach to study banks’ total lending. The current paper contributes to this debate by describing 
whether the effect of preferred stock on equity ratio has been reinforced or attenuated by 
investments, dividends payouts or common equity and by describing the impact of CPP on banks’ 
total lending.57 
An important group of contributions regarding the CPP has employed event study 
methodologies. Veronesi and Zingales (2010) illustrate that that CPP equity had the consequence 
of shifting wealth to the creditors of the CPP recipients creating a cost for taxpayers roughly 
between $20 billion and $40 billion. Acharya et al. (2016) underline that the access to the CPP 
                                                            
57 This paper studies the impact on total lending for average values of loan-to-income; Duchin and Sosyura 
(2014), the only paper studying the effect on total lending, find estimates that are conditional on a value of 
loan-to-income equal to zero, while the average value in their dataset is 2,000.  
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has deteriorated the market discipline of financial firms compared to non-financial firms. 
Comparing the reaction of the preferred stock of taxpayers’ and the trust preferred stockholders, 
Kim and Stock (2010) find that the latter had a disproportionate advantage from CPP because 
they are senior to the former. 
In addition, several authors illustrate that banks’ size and political connections are crucial 
drivers of the probability of receiving the CPP’s approval (Bayazitova and Shivdasani (2012), 
Croci et al (2015) and Duchin and Sosyura (2014)). 
 
4. Data 
The quarterly information about banks’ balance sheet, income statement and cash-flow 
statement is based on the Compustat database for financial institutions, which comprehends the 
institutions that are traded on the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ. I initially consider the period 
between 2004Q1 and 2013Q4 as this ensures the necessary granularity regarding the cash-flow 
statements. Starting with a total of 23,120 observations over the period from 2004Q1 to 2013Q4, 
I then focus on banks that are headquartered in the U.S (this step reduces the sample to 21,303 
observations). The empirical analyses do not consider observations with negative total assets or 
stock sales, observations with missing values for total assets, payout ratio, stock sales or preferred 
equity. This exclusion reduce the sample to 18,154 bank-quarter observations. Since we focus on 
the period between 2007Q1 and 2010Q4, that is the four years around the quarter of CPP 
introduction - namely, 2008Q4 -, observations decline to a level of 7,534 (663 banks). Concerning 
the data about the Capital Purchase Program, using data provided by the U.S. Treasury 
Department, I have manually collected the information about which banks gained the 
authorization to receive Treasury funds in exchange for preferred stocks. 
The total capital ratio (also referred to as the total equity ratio) is defined as the ratio of the 
book value of total equity (i.e., total Tier 1 capital) over total assets. The changes in equity ratio 
are the respective quarterly changes. Concerning the equity ratio, this paper uses the non risk-
weighted assets, in line with the generality of the banking papers that do not specifically investigate 
the bank’s risk taking. Furthermore, the importance of non-risk weighted capital ratio is underlined 
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by the fact that Basel I, II, III impose key leverage requirements that are based on non-risk-
weighted assets. 
In order to gauge the equity issuances, Compustat offers a measure aggregating cash-flows 
from the issuances of preferred and common equity. Nonetheless, this paper provides also an 
analysis separating preferred from common equity by investigating the preferred and common 
equity ratios. The variable used to describe the increase of investment in illiquid assets is the sum 
of net expenses for loans, net investments, net expenses for capital expenditures and acquisitions, 
minus the net short-term investments. The component describing bank’s payout policy is 
constructed as dividends divided by income. 
 
5. Parallel Trends and Descriptive Statistics 
This section illustrates the quarterly averages of the main variables of interest in this paper 
(changes in equity ratio, total equity issuances, investment in illiquid assets and the payout ratio) 
by dividing banks based on their access to the CPP. The graphs of this section display clear 
parallel trends, which constitute a necessary condition for the causal interpretation of the 
difference-in-differences estimations - the main analyses in this paper - .  
Figure 1 shows that the total capital ratio of the CPP institutions has the same level and the 
same trend as the ratio relative to non-CPP institutions, before 2008Q4. A very strong shock has 
affected only the CPP banks exactly in the quarter 2008Q4, and it expanded their capital ratio 
also in the subsequent quarters.   
Figure 2 gives an intuition about whether the total equity issuances are the driver of the 
equity ratio’s shock. It compares the quarterly averages of the CPP banks’ total equity issuances 
with the corresponding cash-flow value regarding non-CPP banks. We can observe that the two 
trends and the two levels are very similar in the period before the introduction of the CPP. From 
2008Q4, institutions accepted into the CPP sharply amplified the weight of the new equity 
issuances as a funding source. 
Figure 3 allows us to investigate the reaction of the investment in illiquid assets and, like for 
the case of equity issues, we can observe a distinct parallel trend between the two quarterly 
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averages before the CPP. However, the introduction of the CPP seems not to generate a change 
in the difference between the two means.  
With Figure 4, we can graphically investigate also the trends of the payout ratio. They 
exhibits a parallel trend before 2008Q4 and, even though we can observe a decrease for the CPP 
banks that is not parallel with the corresponding data of non-CPP institutions, the introduction 
of CPP did not significantly affect the difference between the treated and control groups, as we 
will see in the results of the main difference-in-differences estimations. 
The finding that these variables had parallel trends before 2008Q4 attenuates the possible 
concerns that causes non-ascribable to the CPP may have been motivating the large differential 
shocks between treated and control groups that we see in the changes of equity ratio and in the 
equity issuances. We can notice, for instance, that there is an absence of differential reactions even 
in the crisis periods characterizing the three quarters before the introduction of the CPP (the 
period from 2008Q1). To provide a summary of the variables contained in the analyses of this 
paper, Table 1 shows the mean, median, standard deviation and number of observations relative 
to all the banks in my final sample (from 2007Q1 to 2010Q4). 
 
 
6. Main Hypotheses and Difference-in-differences Models 
This paper investigates two main questions. The first is whether the introduction of the CPP 
has increased the total capital ratio. The second investigates whether investments and payout 
ratio reinforced or attenuated the impact of equity issuances on change in equity ratio. Given that 
the authorization to access the CPP funds was largely driven by political considerations and given 
that these political considerations seemed having had an effect on the dependent variables only 
starting from the introduction of the CPP (this second condition is visible by means of the parallel 
trends of the graphs from Figure 1 to Figure 4), the difference-in-differences framework is the 
method chosen for testing the hypotheses. 
 
6.1 Impact on Equity Ratio 
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The first question is investigated by comparing the reaction of the CPP banks’ change in 
total capital ratio with the reaction of the non-CPP banks’  change in total capital ratio. The 
related difference-in-differences regression model is: 
𝑇𝑜𝑡.𝐸𝑞.𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡
= 𝛼 + 𝛽1 ൈ 𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑖 ൈ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡2008𝑄4𝑡 + 𝛿1 ൈ 𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑖 + 𝛾1 ൈ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡2008𝑄4𝑡 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑀𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡          (1) 
The dependent variable is the ratio of total equity to assets. The group dummy 𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑖 is the 
indicator taking the value of one if a bank has been authorized to receive the CPP funds. The 
time dummy 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡2008𝑄4𝑡 takes the value of one in the quarters ending after the introduction of 
the CPP. The control variables are indicated by 𝑋𝑖𝑡 and consider the lagged levels of profitability 
(ROA), the accounting measure of risk (percentage of non-performing loans (NPL) over assets, in 
line with Jimenez et al. (2013)), the level of intangible assets (intangibles over assets) and the 
accounting measure of growth opportunities (growth of interest income (Brav (2010)). 𝑀𝑡 is the 
vector of macroeconomic control variables and it comprehend the quarter fixed effects, the GDP 
growth and the CPI inflation index. The main coefficient of interest is 𝛽1 , the difference-in-
differences estimate. A positive coefficient is interpreted as an increase of the difference between 
the CPP banks’ change in total capital ratio and the non-CPP banks’ change in total capital ratio. 
Table 2 illustrates the outcomes of regressions without the macroeconomic and firm-specific control 
variables. Importantly, Column 1 shows that the impact of the CPP has been beneficial for the 
total equity ratio. This finding addresses the enquiry of Hosh and Kashyap (2010); “will the U.S. 
bank recapitalization succeed?”, which was particularly relevant given that the crucial objective of 
the plan was to increase banks’ capitalization in order to restore the confidence in the banking 
system. 
  
6.2 Impact on Determinants of Equity Ratio 
I investigate the second question - about CPP’s impact on equity issuances, investments and 
payout ratio - by substituting the dependent variable of the empirical model (1). The dependent 
variables are the investment in illiquid assets (scaled by total assets), the cash raised by the equity 
issuances (scaled by total assets) and the payout ratio (dividends divided by income). The 
difference-in-differences specifications are: 
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𝐸𝑞. 𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑎𝑛.𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡
= 𝛼 + 𝛽2 ൈ 𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑖 ൈ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡2008𝑄4𝑡 + 𝛿2 ൈ 𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑖 + 𝛿2 ൈ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡2008𝑄4𝑡 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑀𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡      (2) 
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡.𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡
= 𝛼 + 𝛽3 ൈ 𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑖 ൈ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡2008𝑄4𝑡 + 𝛿3 ൈ 𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑖 + 𝛿3 ൈ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡2008𝑄4𝑡 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑀𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡           (3) 
𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑.𝑖𝑡
𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡
= 𝛼 + 𝛽4 ൈ 𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑖 ൈ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡2008𝑄4𝑡 + 𝛿4 ൈ 𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑖 + 𝛿4 ൈ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡2008𝑄4𝑡 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑀𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡           (4) 
The coefficients of interest in these specifications are the 𝛽’s , the difference-in-differences 
estimates. Concerning the equity issuances, the hypothesis is that the CPP has allowed the CPP 
banks to increase the total equity issuances more than the non-CPP banks. Hence, we expect a 
positive 𝛽2.  
Concerning the investments, the null hypothesis is that 𝛽3 is zero, which means that the CPP 
did not have a significant differential impact on the net investment on illiquid assets. This result 
would be in line with the fact that the CPP’s primary objective was to recapitalize U.S. banks 
(Massad (2013)). In addition, this result would be consistent with Brei et al. (2013)’s finding that 
exogenous shocks to bank capital positively affects lending only if the capital ratio exceeds a given 
threshold. Concerning the payout ratio, the null hypothesis is that 𝛽4 is zero, meaning that the 
equity infusions of CPP did not increase or decrease the payout ratio. This estimate would be in 
line with the idea that the Treasury has successfully avoided the adverse scenario in which the 
banks accessing the CPP conveyed a significant portion of the funds to the amplification of the 
payout ratio rather than stimulating capitalization. 
In Table 2 , columns 2-4 illustrate that the cash from equity issuances has significantly 
increased for CPP banks, compared to the non-CPP ones and that the investment and payout 
policies of the authorized banks is not statistically different from the ones of non-CPP banks. 
Table 3 investigates the aforementioned hypotheses regarding equity ratio, equity issuances, 
investments and payout ratio by introducing the bank-specific and time-specific control variables; 
we can observe that results are robust to this change in specifications. 
 
6.3 Instrumental Variable Framework 
This subsection introduce an Instrumental Variable approach that is intended to address the 
endogeneity concerns linked to the fact that the CPP’s approval might be driven by variables like 
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the bank’s distress condition, which might influence the dependent variables and create a biased 
estimate. In the first stage of the IV approach, I predict the CPP authorization by means of the 
size of the bank in the quarter of CPP’s introduction (i.e., 2008Q4). The first stage regression has 
the following specification: 
𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽5(𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡) + 𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                             (5) 
This regression is performed only in the quarter 2008Q4 and it uses the bank size as 
instrumental variable given that this variable satisfies two essential conditions for an instrument. 
The first is that the instrument is relevant, meaning that it is a significant predictor of the 
authorization to use the CPP funds. The column 1 of Table 4 illustrates the results relative to the 
first stage model (5) and we observe that the positive and significant estimate relative to banks’ 
size in 2008Q4 corroborates this first fundamental condition for an instrumental variable approach. 
The intuition behind this result is that regulators and politicians have stronger motives for bailing 
out a large bank (both for the too-big-to-fail considerations and for the superior ability to lobby), 
compared to small institutions. This aspect is supported, among others, by the works of Bayazitova 
and Shivdasani (2011), Ioannidou (2005) and Lambert (2016).  
The second condition is that the size affects the dependent variable only through the channel 
of the CPP authorization (exclusion restriction condition). My evidence provides support about 
this condition in two ways. First, I provide a placebo difference-in-differences test using the size 
of 2008Q4 (and not the CPP authorization) and it shows that the treatment dummy delivers 
insignificant estimates. This test supports the idea that size per se does not have an impact on the 
main dependent variable (i.e., equity ratio) and, instead, we will see in the subsequent Table 5 
that only the part of size’s variability that is correlated with the CPP’s approval is able to affect 
the equity ratio. Second, in a falsification test, I illustrate that the size does not affect the 
accounting measure of banks’ distress (i.e., the portion of non-performing loans), which represented 
the main concern, since the CPP’s approval is officially based on banks’ CAMEL rating that could 
be correlated with the equity ratio. The results of the placebo difference-in-differences and of the 
falsification tests are presented in columns 2 and 3 of Table 4. The model specifications relative 
to the Instrumental Variable approach are the following ones: 
𝑇𝑜𝑡.𝐸𝑞.𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡
= 𝛼 + 𝛽6 ൈ 𝐶𝑃𝑃?̂? ൈ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡2008𝑄4𝑡 + 𝛿6 ൈ 𝐶𝑃𝑃?̂? + 𝛾6 ൈ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡2008𝑄4𝑡 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑀𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                (6) 
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𝐸𝑞. 𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑎𝑛.𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡
= 𝛼 + 𝛽7 ൈ 𝐶𝑃𝑃?̂? ൈ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡2008𝑄4𝑡 + 𝛿7 ൈ 𝐶𝑃𝑃?̂? + 𝛿7 ൈ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡2008𝑄4𝑡 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑀𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡           (7) 
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡.𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡
= 𝛼 + 𝛽8 ൈ 𝐶𝑃𝑃?̂? ൈ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡2008𝑄4𝑡 + 𝛿8 ൈ 𝐶𝑃𝑃?̂? + 𝛿8 ൈ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡2008𝑄4𝑡 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑀𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                 (8) 
𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑.𝑖𝑡
𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡
= 𝛼 + 𝛽9 ൈ 𝐶𝑃𝑃?̂? ൈ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡2008𝑄4𝑡 + 𝛿9 ൈ 𝐶𝑃𝑃?̂? + 𝛿9 ൈ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡2008𝑄4𝑡 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑀𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                (9) 
Columns 1-4 of Table 5 illustrate the results regarding the second stages and they confirm 
the results of the original difference-in-differences tests relative to the models from (1) to (4).  
 
 
6.4 Drivers of Equity Issuances 
This section addressed the question of whether banks’ equity issuances are entirely determined 
by the preferred stocks purchased by the government or, alternatively, whether the CPP has 
triggered an expansion of common equity.  
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓.𝐸𝑞.𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡
= 𝛼 + 𝛽10 ൈ 𝐶𝑃𝑃?̂? ൈ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡2008𝑄4𝑡 + 𝛿10 ൈ 𝐶𝑃𝑃?̂? + 𝛾10 ൈ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡2008𝑄4𝑡 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑀𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡         (10) 
𝐶𝑜𝑚. 𝐸𝑞.𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡
= 𝛼 + 𝛽11 ൈ 𝐶𝑃𝑃?̂? ൈ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡2008𝑄4𝑡 + 𝛿11 ൈ 𝐶𝑃𝑃?̂? + 𝛾11 ൈ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡2008𝑄4𝑡 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑀𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡         (11) 
Table 6 shows that both preferred equity ratio but common equity ratio significantly increased 
in reaction to the CPP. 
An eventual increase of common equity ratio would be in line with two hypotheses: the 
endogenous response hypothesis and the regulatory requirement hypothesis. The endogenous 
response hypothesis is based on the fact that CPP banks might have benefited from a reduced 
stock volatility which decrease the underpricing of their seasoned common equity offerings. On the 
other hand, the interest behind this result is that a possible increase of the common equity ratio 
is compatible also with the regulation’s requirements for redeeming the CPP capital (Federal 
Reserve Guidance on TARP Repayments (2009)). From June 2009, this regulation imposed the 
CPP banks to “demonstrate” access to common equity markets. Therefore, we can expect that if 
the increase of the common equity ratio characterizes the period after June 2009, then it is more 
likely that the banks were raising the equity ratio for reasons linked to the regulation, with respect 
to the alternative hypothesis of an endogenous response. The evidence in Table 7 shows that before 
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June 2009 the difference-in-differences estimate is insignificant, while it is significantly positive in 
the quarter 2009Q2. This result is more in line with the regulatory requirement hypothesis.  
 
 
Conclusions 
This paper illustrates, with a natural experiment framework, that the U.S. Capital Purchase 
Program has effectively increased the equity issuances and expanded U.S. banks’ equity ratio. This 
capitalization’s improvement has not been attenuated by a rise in the payout policy or by a growth 
of the investments in illiquid assets. I address the concerns of endogeneity by combining the 
difference-in-differences framework with the instrumental variable approach and the results are 
robust. In addition, I show that not only the preferred equity but also the common equity ratio 
has increased in response to the preferred equity infusions. 
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Figures  
Figure 1 . Mean of Changes in Eq./As. for CPP and non-CPP banks.  
This figure shows the changes in the total capital ratio (also referred to as the total equity ratio), defined 
as the ratio of the book value of total equity (i.e., total Tier 1 capital) over total assets. The sample period 
is from 2007Q1 to 2010Q4. 
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Figure 2 . Mean of total equity issuances (scaled by total assets) for CPP and non-CPP banks. 
This figure shows the total equity issuances, defined as the sum of common and preferred equity issuances. 
The sample period is from 2007Q1 to 2010Q4. 
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Figure 3 . Mean of investment in illiquid assets (scaled by total assets) for CPP and non-CPP banks. 
This figure shows the investment in illiquid assets, which is the additive inverse of the net cash-flow from 
investing activity. It is the sum of net expenses for loans, net investments, net expenses for capital 
expenditures and acquisitions, minus the net short-term investments. The sample period is from 2007Q1 to 
2010Q4. 
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Figure 4 . Mean of payout ratio (scaled by total assets) for CPP and non-CPP banks. 
This figure shows the payout ratio, which is dividends over income. The sample period is from 2007Q1 to 
2010Q4. 
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Tables  
 
Table 1 . Descriptive Statistics. 
This table illustrates the summary statistics for the entire sample (from 2007Q1 to 2010Q4) relative to total 
assets (in $million), changes in equity over assets, net investments in illiquid assets (over assets), dividends 
(over income), total equity issuances, ROA, non-performing loans (over assets), intangible assets (over 
assets), growth of interest income. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Statistic Tot. As. Eq./As. Change Invest. Divid./Income Eq. Iss. ROA NPL Intang./As. Growth Op.
------- ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- -------
Mean 7,354 0.000 0.021 0.838 0.003 0.000 0.020 0.014 0.012
Median 1,366 0.000 0.014 0.557 0.000 0.002 0.013 0.007 0.009
St.Dev. 18,436 0.008 0.051 1.003 0.007 0.007 0.019 0.017 0.053
N 7,534 7,534 7,534 7,534 7,534 7,534 7,534 7,534 7,534
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Table 2 . Difference-in-Differences estimations without controls. 
The columns of this table contain the output of the following regression model (from 2007Q1 to 2010Q4):  
ܦ݁݌݁݊݀݁݊ݐܸܽݎ.ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚ ൈ ܥܲ ௜ܲ ൈ ݌݋ݏݐ2008ܳ4௧ ൅ ߜ ൈ ܥܲ ௜ܲ ൅ ߛ ൈ ݌݋ݏݐ2008ܳ4௧ ൅ ߝ௜௧	 
The dependent variables are: changes in total equity ratio, total equity issuances (over assets), net 
investments in illiquid assets (over assets), dividends (over income). The independent variables include: the 
diff-in-diff interaction between the CPP bank status and the post-2008Q4 status. N is the number of 
observations. Standard errors are adjusted for both heteroscedasticity and within correlation clustered at 
the bank level. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% two-tailed levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Eq./As. Change Eq. Iss. Invest. Divid./Income
----------- ----------- ----------- -----------
CPP*post08Q4 0.001** 0.004*** 0.008 0.001
post08Q4 0.001*** 0.001*** -0.020*** -0.001***
CPP 0.000* 0.003 0.068 0.002
Adj.R2 0.01 0.11 0.06 0.01
N 7,534 7,534 7,534 7,534
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Table 3 . Difference-in-Differences estimations with controls. 
The columns of this table contain the output of the following regression model (from 2007Q1 to 2010Q4):  
ܦ݁݌݁݊݀݁݊ݐܸܽݎ.ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚ ൈ ܥܲ ௜ܲ ൈ ݌݋ݏݐ2008ܳ4௧ ൅ ߜ ൈ ܥܲ ௜ܲ ൅ ߛ ൈ ݌݋ݏݐ2008ܳ4௧ + 𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑀𝑡−1 ൅ ߝ௜௧	 
The dependent variables are: changes in total equity ratio, total equity issuances (over assets), net 
investments in illiquid assets (over assets), dividends (over income). The independent variables include: the 
diff-in-diff interaction between the CPP bank status and the post-2008Q4 status, ROA, non-performing 
loans (over assets), intangible assets (over assets), growth of interest income, quarter fixed effects, CPI and 
GDP. N is the number of observations. Standard errors are adjusted for both heteroscedasticity and within 
correlation clustered at the bank level. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% two-
tailed levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Eq./As. Change Eq. Iss. Invest. Divid./Income
----------- ----------- ----------- -----------
CPP*post08Q4 0.001*** 0.004*** 0.002 0.046
post08Q4 0.004*** -0.001** 0.029*** 0.002
CPP 0.002 0.002 -0.004 0.011
L.ROA 0.039* -0.034** 0.132 5.855***
L.(NPL/As.) -0.042*** 0.007 1.087*** -12.943***
L.(Intang./As.) -0.012** 0.032*** 0.212*** 2.931**
L.(Growth Op.) 0.006*** 0.004*** -0.068*** -0.476**
L.CPI -0.051*** 0.008* -0.327*** 1.974***
L.GDP 0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000
Adj.R2 0.02 0.17 0.24 0.14
N 7,534 7,534 7,534 7,534
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Table 4 . First Stage regression and placebo Difference-in-Differences estimations. 
Columns 1 and 2 of this table contain the output of the following regression model (only in 2008Q4): 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑉𝑎𝑟.= 𝛼 + 𝛽5(𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡) + 𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑀𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 The dependent variables are: the CPP bank status, non-
performing loans (over assets).  
Column 3 of this table contain the output of the following regression model (from 2007Q1 to 2010Q4): 
𝑇𝑜𝑡. 𝐸𝑞.𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡
ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚ ൈ ݏ݅ݖ݁08ݍ4݅ ൈ ݌݋ݏݐ2008ܳ4ݐ ൅ ߜ ൈ ݏ݅ݖ݁08ݍ4݅ ൅ ߛ ൈ ݌݋ݏݐ2008ܳ4ݐ + 𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑀𝑡 ൅ ߝ݅ݐ 
The independent variables include: bank’s size in 2008Q4, the diff-in-diff interaction between bank’s size in 
2008Q4 and the post-2008Q4 status, ROA, non-performing loans (over assets), intangible assets (over 
assets), growth of interest income, quarter fixed effects, CPI and GDP. N is the number of observations. 
Standard errors are adjusted for both heteroscedasticity and within correlation clustered at the bank level. 
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% two-tailed levels, respectively. 
 
 
  
(1) (2) (3)
First stage Placebo test Falsification test
----------- ----------- -----------
CPP NPL/As. Eq./As. Change
----------- ----------- -----------
Size2008Q4 0.033** 0.000 0.000***
Size2008Q4*post08Q4 0.000
post08Q4 0.003***
ROA -1.449 -0.598*** 0.038
(NPL/As.) -2.281 -0.039***
Intang./As. 5.592*** -0.120*** -0.032***
Growth Op. -0.334 -0.102*** 0.007***
CPI 0.000 0.000 -0.066***
GDP 0.000 0.000 0.000***
Adj.R2 0.06 0.40 0.17
N 523 523 7,534
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Table 5 . Second stage, Difference-in-Differences estimations with controls. 
The columns of this table contain the output of the following regression model (from 2007Q1 to 2010Q4):  
ܦ݁݌݁݊݀݁݊ݐܸܽݎ.ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚ ൈ ܥܲ෣ܲ௜ ൈ ݌݋ݏݐ2008ܳ4௧ ൅ ߜ ൈ ܥܲ෣ܲ௜ ൅ ߛ ൈ ݌݋ݏݐ2008ܳ4௧ + 𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑀𝑡−1 ൅ ߝ௜௧	 
The dependent variables are: changes in total equity ratio, total equity issuances (over assets), net 
investments in illiquid assets (over assets), dividends (over income). The independent variables include: the 
diff-in-diff interaction between the CPP bank status and the post-2008Q4 status, ROA, non-performing 
loans (over assets), intangible assets (over assets), growth of interest income, quarter fixed effects, CPI and 
GDP. N is the number of observations. Standard errors are adjusted for both heteroscedasticity and within 
correlation clustered at the bank level. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% two-
tailed levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Eq./As. Change Eq. Iss. Invest. Divid./Income
----------- ----------- ----------- -----------
CPP.pr.*post08Q4 0.006* 0.016*** 0.047 -1.2205
post08Q4 0.002 -0.006*** 0.011 0.622**
CPP.pr. 0.013*** 0.006** 0.080** -0.003***
L.ROA 0.038 -0.033** 0.126 4.051***
L.(NPL/As.) -0.042*** 0.012 1.068*** -13.751**
L.(Intang./As.) -0.027*** 0.028*** 0.161** 1.232
L.(Growth Op.) 0.007*** 0.005*** -0.066*** 0.546***
L.CPI -0.051*** 0.006 -0.323*** -2.249***
L.GDP 0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000
Adj.R2 0.02 0.14 0.25 0.14
N 7,534 7,534 7,534 7,534
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Table 6 . Second stage, Difference-in-Differences estimations with controls (from 2007Q1 to 2010Q4). 
The columns of this table contain the output of the following regression model (from 2007Q1 to 2010Q4):  
ܦ݁݌݁݊݀݁݊ݐܸܽݎ.ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚ ൈ ܥܲ෣ܲ௜ ൈ ݌݋ݏݐ2008ܳ4௧ ൅ ߜ ൈ ܥܲ෣ܲ௜ ൅ ߛ ൈ ݌݋ݏݐ2008ܳ4௧ + 𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑀𝑡−1 ൅ ߝ௜௧	 
The dependent variables are: changes in common equity ratio, changes in preferred equity ratio. The 
independent variables include: the diff-in-diff interaction between the CPP bank status and the post-2008Q4 
status, ROA, non-performing loans (over assets), intangible assets (over assets), growth of interest income, 
quarter fixed effects, CPI and GDP. N is the number of observations. Standard errors are adjusted for both 
heteroscedasticity and within correlation clustered at the bank level. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% two-tailed levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
  
(1) (2)
(Comm.Eq./As.) Change (Pref.Eq./As.) Change
----------- -----------
CPP.pr.*post08Q4 0.007* 0.003*
post08Q4 0.002 0.001**
CPP.pr. 0.013*** 0.001
L.ROA 0.057** 0.028***
L.(NPL/As.) -0.030*** 0.009***
L.(Intang./As.) -0.040*** -0.013***
L.(Growth Op.) 0.009*** 0.001
L.CPI -0.040*** 0.011***
L.GDP 0.000*** 0.000***
Adj.R2 0.11 0.09
N 7,534 7,534
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Table 7 . Second stage, Difference-in-Differences estimations with controls. 
The dependent variables is: changes in common equity ratio. The independent variables include: the diff-in-
diff interaction between the CPP bank status and the post-2009Q1 status, the diff-in-diff interaction between 
the CPP bank status and the post-2009Q2 status, ROA, non-performing loans (over assets), intangible assets 
(over assets), growth of interest income, quarter fixed effects, CPI and GDP. N is the number of 
observations. Standard errors are adjusted for both heteroscedasticity and within correlation clustered at 
the bank level. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% two-tailed levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2)
(Comm.Eq./As.) Change (Pref.Eq./As.) Change
----------- -----------
CPP.pr.*post09Q1 0.009
post09Q1 -0.001
CPP.pr.*post09Q2 0.039***
post09Q2 -0.014***
CPP.pr. 0.009*** 0.010***
L.ROA 0.021 0.026
L.(NPL/As.) -0.070*** -0.071***
L.(Intang./As.) -0.035*** -0.040***
L.(Growth Op.) 0.007*** 0.006***
L.CPI -0.046*** -0.040***
L.GDP 0.000*** 0.000
Adj.R2 0.16 0.14
N 4360 4842
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